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 ABSTRACT 
 
  
This thesis examines the 1999–2003 case of political conflict in Ambon, in 
Eastern Indonesia, in the context of political change in Indonesia from 1950-1998. It 
is argued that political transformation during this period was closely influenced by a 
much longer period of unprecedented social change preceding the politics of this 
period. It is suggested that the ideologisation of ethnic identities is likely to occur 
when structures of community are disrupted by changes in the contemporary world 
such as economic fluctuations or state policy interventions. One result is to disrupt 
traditional village communities so as to place individuals in stress situations making 
them susceptible to new nationalist ideologies. The other impact is to dislocate 
authority structures so that both incumbent and aspiring elites lose their power and 
authority and thus search for new ways in order to re-establish their moral and 
political legitimacy. 
 
It is argued that nationalism is able to offer a resolution to social disruption and thus 
to the community in search of social cohesion, while also functioning to rebuild elite 
authority. In ethnic nationalist ideology, insecurities and feelings of isolation are 
ameliorated by subsequent constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ where members of one 
distinct community are demarcated from other communities. It is suggested that 
myths of ancestry and homeland together with counterposed moral dichotomies 
appealed to the Ambonese who needed this form of ideological support. It is the 
insecurities and fear experienced by disrupted communities which promote this 
powerful ideological formula.   
 
It is asserted that conflict on the island has been characterised by this trend towards 
ideological absolutism where two conflicting ideological constructions have translated 
the conflict into a non-negotiable confrontation between opposing national rights. It is 
argued that these two ideological constructions have remained internalised on the 
island and embedded within the mindsets of both Ambonese Christians and Muslims, 
thereby rendering setbacks to conflict resolution.  
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      be free citizens, that is, free of the compulsory services for the 
      VOC and the obligations of the spice monopoly     
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FKAWJ   Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah 
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F-Penegak    Fraksi Pembela Negara Kesatuan 
   Parliamentary faction of the Defenders of a Unified State 
  x 
 FPI     Front Pembelaan Islam 
   Islam Defenders Front 
 
FPIM     Front Pembelaan Islam Maluku 
   Moluccan Chapter for the Islam Defenders Front 
 
GAM     Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
   Free Aceh Movement 
 
GDMS     Gerakan Demokrasi Maluku Selatan 
   Democratic Movement of the South Moluccas 
 
HMI-MPO   Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam – Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi 
   Splinter group of the Association of Islamic Students 
 
HRW    Human  Rights  Watch 
 
ICG    Indonesia  Crisis  Group 
 
ICMI     Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia 
   Indonesian  Association  of  Muslim  Intellectuals 
 
IMF    International  Monetary  Fund 
 
JI     Jemaah Islamiyah 
 
Kafir harbi    Infidel 
   
KAMMI   Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia 
   Indonesian Muslim Students Action Group 
 
Kampung   Village 
 
Kapitan   Military Commander 
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 Kepala Daerah  Regional Head 
 
Kepala Kewang  Head of Land Affairs 
 
Kepala Soa    Head of a collection of kin-groups 
 
Kiai      Title or reference for a teacher of Islam 
 
KISDI     Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam. 
   Indonesian  Committee  for  International Islamic Solidarity 
 
KNIL     Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Leger 
   Dutch East Indies Army 
 
KONTRAS   Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan 
   The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence 
 
KOSTRAD   Komando Strategi Reserve Command 
   Army Strategic Reserve Command 
 
Kota Ambon    Ambon City 
   
Krismon   Krisis  Moneter 
   Monetary Crisis 
 
Laskar Jihad    Java-based paramilitary group established in early 2000 who 
      intervened on behalf of local Muslims in the conflict in Maluku 
 
LIPI     Lemaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia 
   Indonesian Institute of Sciences 
 
LKMD     Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa 
   Village  Social  Activities  Group 
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 LMD     Lembaga Masyarakat Desa 
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Marinjo   The soa messenger and minor police officer 
 
Masjumi   Modernist  Muslim  Party 
 
Mata rumah    Household, patrilineage 
 
Negri     Village 
 
Negri Lama    Village of origin 
 
New Order    Soeharto, early in his tenure as President of Indonesia,  
      described his regime as the ‘New Order’ as opposed to the ‘Old 
   Order’  government  of  Indonesia’s earlier and first President 
   Soekarno. 
 
NIP     Insulinde / Nationaal-Indische Partij 
   Insulinde was founded in 1907 as an organisation to promote 
      the social and political aims of Europeans and Eurasians in the 
   Indies 
 
NIT     Negara Indonesia Timoer 
   State of East Indonesia. Part of a Dutch federal strategy for the 
   creation  of  the  State  of East Indonesia in 1946-1947 
 
NTT     Nusa Tenggara Timur 
   Easter  Lesser  Sundas 
 
NU     Nahdlatul Ulama 
   Association of Muslim scholars, a Muslim political party of the 
   1970s 
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 Nunusaku   A human rights organisation based in Ambon. Also the name of 
   the  legendary  mountain  in  West Seram and the source of the 
      Three Rivers, the Eti, the Tala, and the Sapalewa. It is  
      traditionally regarded as the beginning and the end that is, the 
      source and the destiny of life. 
 
Nusa     Island 
 
Old Order    A reference to the ‘Old Order’ government of Indonesia’s  
   earlier  and  first  President  Soekarno as opposed to Soeharto’s 
   subsequent  ‘New  Order’regime 
 
OPM     Organisasi Papua Merdeka 
   Free Papua Organisation, secessionist movement of West  
   P a p u a      
 
Pancasila   The five basic principles of the Republic of Indonesia: the  
      belief on one God Almighty, humanity that is just and civilised, 
      the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the wisdom of 
   representative  deliberation,  social justice for all Indonesians 
 
Parindra   Partai Indonesia Raya 
   Greater  Indonesia  Party    
 
Parkindo    Parti Kristen Indonesia 
   Indonesian  Protestant  Party 
 
Partai Katolik   Roman Catholic Party  
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   alliance.  It  is  conceived  of as an enduring and inviolable  
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   Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
 
PIM     Partai Indonesia Merdeka 
      A political party formed in August 1946, the major pro- 
      Indonesia party on Ambon at the time 
 
PNI     Partai Nasional Indonesia 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The development of an Ambonese nationalist movement in 2000 from a non-
territorial communal riot offers an important insight into understanding the changes in 
ethnic and national consciousness that had taken place among the Ambonese since the 
eruption of violence in January 1999. The 1999 conflict in Ambon, Eastern Indonesia, 
began as a communal riot in which members of one group suddenly instigated a 
violent attack on civilian members of another group. Indeed, the conflict was 
classified as synonymous with ‘religious’ or ‘ethnic’ disturbances because of its 
obvious religious and ethnic underpinnings. 
 
The fighting which ensued between Muslim and Christian villages and the desecration 
of places of worship were typical of the conflict which has traditionally been referred 
to by the Indonesian government as SARA (Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar Golongan), an 
acronym used to denote communal violence with ethnic, religious, and/or racial 
underpinnings.
1 When a fight broke out on Ambon between a Christian public 
transport driver and a Muslim youth on January 19, 1999, the events which followed 
                                                                 
1 These include anti-Chinese riots which have been a widespread reoccurring phenomenon in 
Indonesia. Violent anti-Chinese riots broke out in Jakarta on 13 and 14 May 1998 attracting extensive 
international attention. The Chinese community was specifically targeted with shops and houses owned 
by Chinese being burnt and the destruction reaching other parts of the capital and into the city of Solo 
in Central Java. The riots claimed the lives of hundreds of Chinese while scores of Chinese were 
abused in what seemed like a systematic series of rapes of women. Many outbreaks of violence, 
especially during the 1990’s, often had underlying themes containing obscure variables and almost 
always had overt expressions of anti-Chinese hostility. For examples of this see Kathleen Turner, The 
Rising Crescent Tide: Christian Churches and Javanese Islam in Conflict in New Order Indonesia, 
Honours Thesis, Faculty of Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 1997. Likewise, West 
Kalimantan has had a long history of ethnic violence during the New Order period of government from 
1965-1998 between the immigrants from the island of Madura off the coast of East Java and the 
indigenous Dayak people. The most violent outbreak of the late 1990s between the two ethnic groups 
occurred in December 1996 and flared up again in the beginning of March 1997. For further 
information, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) [online], West Kalimantan, 1997 Report. Accessed 16 
May 2000. 
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throughout Ambon and provincial Maluku (Moluccas) demonstrated the inflammable 
nature of ethnic and religious relationships throughout the Indonesian archipelago.  
 
Within the first 12–24 months of the conflict, Ambon was often classified by 
members of the Indonesian press as another site of SARA. This was based on two 
factors: first was the conflict’s extreme violence in which there was the deliberate 
targeting of either Christians or Muslims and, second was the widespread damage to 
property with extensive material damage to much of the central part of the city of 
Ambon (Kota Ambon), the capital of Maluku province, as well as to Ambon’s 
neighbouring islands of Seram and the Lease Islands. Continued widespread hostility 
in these areas during 1999 and 2000 also caused many casualties with reports of at 
least 4,000
2 deaths and at least 40,000 displaced persons.
3  
 
In the second year of the conflict, in 2000, the Moluccan Sovereignty Front (FKM) 
was established in Ambon aiming to achieve an independent Moluccan state. In that 
same year the Java-based Laskar Jihad was formed which sought to eradicate this 
separatist movement. The development of these two groups represented an important 
phase in conflict development as each nationalist construction played off the other. 
The transition from riot to nationalist movement in Ambon signified not only 
considerable change in individual and national identity but also the transformation of 
the conflict into one of nationalist confrontation. The differing nationalist identities 
and diagnoses of the conflict from the FKM and the Laskar Jihad movements 
provided two competing interpretative frameworks of the nation. The politics of 
nationalist contention in Ambon, therefore, became a politics of ideological 
confrontation with resultant mutual distrust and resistance to compromise.  
 
                                                                 
2 See George Junus Aditjondro, ‘Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: how the military exploited local 
ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges’, in Ingrid 
Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (eds) Violence in Indonesia, Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 2001, p.100. 
3 See Margaretha, ‘Ambon Manise, Ambon Manangise’, Hidup, 2 July 2000, p.22. 
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Some degree of interactive normality continued to exist in Ambon so that ties to an 
Ambonese community of Muslims and Christians, migrants and indigenous, were not 
completely broken. Neither the riots nor the subsequent ideological conflict were so 
extensive that it completely took over Ambon and its neighbouring islands. However, 
the development of these opposing nationalist visions in Ambon, suggest certain 
ideological changes within the various layers of the interactive community. The 
affiliation of members to these differing nationalist visions also means that there is 
then little chance of reconciliation between them. 
 
The ideological constructions of both the FKM and the Laskar Jihad managed to 
mobilise significant support within Ambon and succeeded in maintaining strong 
support thereafter on the island. The degree of popular support achieved by elites in 
the face of widespread economic hardship and political turbulence is evidenced by the 
number of Ambonese identifying themselves in exclusivist terms and their political 
goal in self-determination/nationalism terms both ethnocultural  and ethnonationalist.  
While the conflict abated somewhat, remnants of these constructions have remained 
embedded in Ambon suggesting that this ‘sedimentation’ has been a way in which 
individuals deal with the insecurities caused by disruption. Much of this is due to the 
successful manipulation of myths and symbols which have enhanced the legitimacy of 
FKM and Laskar Jihad elites and their political regimes. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explain the clash between two competing nationalisms in 
order to explain the dynamics of the conflict in Ambon in 2000-2004 and why it has 
thus become so entrenched. It is argued that the tensions of nationalist politics in 
Ambon have been clashes between two ideologies which were counterposed and 
developed in response to each other. More specifically, these tensions emerged 
because of the collision between two competing kinship and homeland visions, each 
marginalising or demonising the other. This phenomena is examined through an 
analysis of the nature and impact of various levels of disruption, both long-term 
  3    
disruptions and disruptions involving the conflict itself, in order to show how 
traditional notions of identity underwent a process of reconstruction in order to 
account for changes within people’s immediate social and economic environment.  
 
It is further argued in this thesis that while the development of nationalism occurred 
within a wide range of disruptive contexts, it is the specific nature of these disruptions 
which have been crucial to this shift. As will be shown, it is in the context of 
disruptive circumstances in which incumbent elites fear an erosion of their authority 
and choose nationalism as a way in which to re-establish their authority by creating 
new leadership roles for themselves. These dislocated elites are instrumental in the 
resuscitation of myths of territorial homeland, and their visions of identity of the 
community through the employment of a demonized “Other” which counterposes the 
vision of harmonious and virtuous “Us” in order to mobilize mass-based support. 
Hence, this thesis chooses to specifically analyse the disruption of authority structures 
and the disruption of communal cohesion as forming a crucial set of pre-conditions 
conducive to engendering nationalism as a likely response.   
 
To achieve this purpose, there will be three distinct foci. The first is the formation of 
nationalist ideologies in Ambon which is explored in an examination of the 1950 and 
2000 nationalist movements within a context of disruptive social, economic and 
political processes. The 1950 movement is examined in the context of disruptions 
engendered by Portuguese and Dutch colonialism between the eighteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. There is a subsequent examination of the 2000 Ambonese 
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ethnocultural nationalist movement and Islamic-based ethnoreligious
4 nationalism in 
the context of unprecedented social change in Indonesia from 1950-1998. Political 
transformation during this period was closely influenced by a much longer period of 
unprecedented social change preceding the politics of this period.  
 
It will be shown how, firstly, disruptive processes led aspiring elites to unite around a 
minority ethnocultural nationalism in 2000 which harked back nostalgically to the 
Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS) movement of 1950 through the employment 
of pre-existing ideas of identity and history, and secondly how this subsequently led 
many Ambonese to polarise their community along religious lines and mobilise 
against a perceived Christian separatist threat. The second focal concern of the thesis 
is the content of contemporary nationalist ideologies in Ambon. This requires an 
examination of those processes which have led both the Ambonese ethnocultural and 
the Islamic-based nationalist movements to develop counterposing ideologies of 
identity. Through fieldwork interviews, an invaluable opportunity was provided to the 
author in an attempt to demystify these sorts of issues and gain an insight into them. 
Those interviews were conducted with Ambonese refugees and members of the 
paramilitary group, the Laskar Jihad,  in East Java, Southeast Sulawesi and West 
Timor during July-August 2001. That analysis proved particularly helpful in 
understanding local perceptions of identity and notions of political understanding.  
 
                                                                 
4 I use the term ‘ethnoreligious’ simply as a categorisation that would not be dissimilar to other sub-
categories of ethnic conflict and nationalism such as ‘ethnolinguistic’ and ‘ethnoracial’. The term 
‘ethnoreligious’ has also been used to describe the ethnic conflict in the Balkans, the dissent between 
Puerto Ricans and American Jews, the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, 
and ethnic conflict throughout Southeast Asia.  Clearly, by using such categories I run the risk of 
giving the impression that each term is describing a separate phenomenon in that the conflict or 
nationalist movement could not survive without these observable characteristics. Using variables such 
as these however is quite common if only to point out that a specific characteristic of a group or nation 
can become a particular rallying point in a communal or national struggle. For examples of usages of 
these terms, see Janice Broun, ‘Yugoslavian Inferno: Ethnoreligious Warfare in the Balkans’, Religion, 
State & Society, vol.27, no.1, March 1999, pp.140-3; Ana Maria Diaz-Stevens, ‘Ethnoreligious identity 
as locus for dialogue between Puerto Rican Catholics and American Jews’, Religious Education, 
vol.91, no. 4, Fall 1996, p.473-9; Michael A. Poole, ‘One day at a time’, Peace Review, vol.13, no. 1, 
March 2001, p.5-12; Peter Searle ‘Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Rise or decline? Recent developments in 
Southeast Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.24, no.1, April 2002, pp.1-11.  
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After using the interview material in producing an analysis of the content of these 
ideologies, the third focal concern of this thesis is a study of the implications of the 
clash between two nationalist ideologies. For this analysis, this thesis will use the 
explanation of Constructivism as one of the core conceptualisations of nationalism. 
This theoretical approach fundamentally depicts the nation as an ideological 
construction invented and employed by political elites. It suggests that affiliation with 
the ‘national community’ is based on ideological frameworks which offer a sense of 
identity and security for insecure individuals. In Chapter 2 constructivism will be 
explored as a useful analytical approach in order to develop a coherent understanding 
of the contemporary dispute of Ambonese secessionism in Indonesia.  
 
It is acknowledged that it was not possible to specify contextual influences from the 
media, political dynamics, and/or local rumours which may have had an impact on 
individual perceptions in Ambon, and on the varying ways informants espoused the 
ideological notions of the FKM and Laskar Jihad. However, information gleaned 
from the interviews did, to a significant degree, espouse either support for an 
autonomous Ambon, or the depiction of the FKM as an evil anti-Islamic and anti-
Indonesian separatist movement. Informants often referred proudly to symbols of 
Moluccan identity referring nostalgically to the RMS and the fight for the Moluccan 
homeland. Others focused on hero-worshipping Ja’far Umar Thalib and referred to 
historical events in East Timor and in the Moluccas as deeply symbolic of ‘in-group’ 
and ‘out-group’ identity. In this way, by adopting a fervent language of ethnic identity 
and championing the ideals of either the FKM or Laskar Jihad through illustrative 
historical examples and reverence to particular elites, informants presented 
compelling evidence that the nationalist visions of the FKM and Laskar Jihad 
constituted powerful causal factors which transformed individual perceptions of the 
evolving conflict in Ambon. 
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The following section will now discuss the sources and methodology used within this 
thesis. First there will be a review of the scholarly literature on ethnicity and 
nationalism in the Moluccas, and second there will be discussion of the field research 
undertaken in Indonesia during 2001. 
 
1.1   Sources and Methodology 
 
As state above on page 3, the study of the content of nationalist ideologies in Ambon 
is examined in the context of processes of social change. A subsequent examination of 
the disruptions in Ambon naturally requires a review of the scholarly literature on 
ethnicity and nationalism in the Moluccas. In general there is very little written on 
Ambon. Anthropologist Frank Cooley
5 examined the traditional cultural and political 
systems in Ambon in the early and late 1960s. Almost a decade later, Dieter Bartels
6 
provided a comprehensive treatment on local alliances and the local ascendant powers 
through the system of pela. More recent works have shown a tendency to examine the 
region in a context of rapid social transformation. Anthropologist David Mearns
7, for 
example, explored the effects of migration and development on the island, while 
Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Tanja Taale
8 have carried out studies on the 
complexities of property relationships in village communities on Ambon.  
 
Based in a large part on Dutch and Portuguese colonial government archives dating 
from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, there exists some contemporary 
published work on the historiography of Ambon and the region during the sixteenth, 
                                                                 
5 Frank L. Cooley, Ambonese Adat: A General Description, Cultural Report Series No.10, Yale 
University, Southeast Asian Studies, New Haven: Conn., 1962; Frank L. Cooley, ‘Village Government 
in the Central Moluccas’, Indonesia, no.7, April 1969, pp.139-163. 
6 Bartels, Invisible Mountain, 1978. 
7 David Mearns, ‘Class, Status and Habitus in Ambon’, in D. Mearns and C. Healey (eds) Remaking 
Maluku: Social Transformation in Eastern Indonesia, Special Monograph No.1, Centre for Southeast 
Asian Studies: Northern Territory University, Darwin, 1996, pp.95-105. 
8 Franz Von Benda-Beckmann and Tanja Taale, ‘Land, Trees and Houses: Changing (Un)certainties in 
Property Relationships on Ambon’, in David Mearns and Chris Healey (eds), Remaking Maluku: Social 
Transformation in Eastern Indonesia, Special Monograph No.1, Centre for South East Asian Studies, 
Northern Territory University, Darwin, 1996. 
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries of European intervention. While not allocating 
any special attention to Ambon or the Central Moluccan region, Leonard Andaya
9 has 
given significant evaluations of Maluku as a region in general, in examining European 
and Moluccan interactions over three centuries. Similarly, Paramita Abdurachman
10 
has treated Ambon as part of a region representing several centuries of colonial rule 
that heralded a recurrent history of profound change, while Harold Wright
11 examined 
the reorientation of Ambonese society during the establishment of the Moluccan Spice 
Monopoly by the Dutch in 1770-1824. 
 
The events of 1945-50 were crucial in relation to the formation of Ambonese 
nationalism in 1950 during which the declaration of independence by Sukarno and 
Hatto in 1945 was plagued by the surfacing of nationalist sentiment in the Indonesian 
peripheries. The political unification of Indonesia’s diverse ethnic communities was 
achieved through the imposition of order from Jakarta onto the Outer islands. The 
polarising effect of such centralisation was instrumental in perpetuating a series of  
nationalist movements in the territories striving to form their own nation-state (see 
Wee 2002: 497-516) Indeed, it was the proliferation of dissensions from both within 
Java and from the Outer Islands which propelled the early suggestion of a federal 
Indonesia from by Dr. H.J. Van Mook, the Dutch Lieutenant Governor General, in a 
memorandum in late 1945 and which was officially reflected in a Government 
Declaration in February 1946 for an Indonesian Commonwealth.
12 This in response 
provoked renewed friction from the regions and ultimately failed to reach an accord 
with the government of the Republic of Indonesia due to a lack of consensus on the 
nature of federal state, and sudden Dutch military action in 1947 which impaired 
                                                                 
9 Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early Modern Period, University 
of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 1993. 
10 Paramita R. Abdurachman, ‘Moluccan Responses to the First Intrusions of the West’, in H. Soebadio 
and C. du Marchie Sarvaas (eds), Dynamics of Indonesian History, North-Holland: Amsterdam, 1978. 
11 Harold R.C. Wright, ‘The Moluccan Spice Monopoly 1770-1824’, Journal of the Malayan Branch 
Royal Asiatic Society, vol.31, no.4, 1958, pp.1-127. 
12 Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia 1945-49, W. van Hoeke: The Hague, 1955, 
pp.19-20. 
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relations between the two governments.
13  During this period it was the RMS 
movement in Eastern Indonesia which developed as the first significant outbreak of 
separatism against the newly formed Indonesian Republic, which was integrated as a 
nation-state in 1950 after the Dutch were defeated. 
 
The expression of an Ambonese ambition to secede from the Indonesian nation-state 
accounted for one of the most violent and organised separatist struggles at the time, 
and subsequently gave rise to a great deal of scholarly interest in Ambon . Published 
material quickly emerged as researchers sought critically to examine mainly the legal 
position of the RMS and its precarious relationship with the Netherlands.
14 As the 
Indonesian Republic began to be plagued by problems of ethnonationalist movements 
with renewed violence in West Java, Aceh and West Papua, historiographers sought 
to provide a regional dimension in modern Indonesian history by examining the 
historical events surrounding the advent of the South Moluccan Republic movement 
in Ambon. Hence, there exist publications from scholars such as Richard Chauvel
15, 
Clive Christie
16, and Ronald May
17 who have contributed an examination of the South 
Moluccan Republic (RMS) of 1950 and its implications for Indonesian nationalism. 
 
The advent of the Moluccan Sovereignty Front (FKM) in Ambon in 2000 and 
rumours of an RMS return indicate a need to incorporate contemporary ethnic and 
political dynamics into the study of Indonesian nationalism. Scholars who have 
                                                                 
13 Schiller, Federal, 1955, pp.20-5. 
14 Over the years, the debate concerning whether the RMS legally asserted its right of self-
determination has been a contested issue. For further discussion on this see Gesina van der Molen, ‘The 
Legal Position According to International Law’, in Jan C. Bouman, C.E.L. Helfrich, N.J. van de 
Coppello (and others) (eds), The South Moluccas: Rebellious Province or Occupied State, A.W. 
Sythoff: Leiden, 1960, pp.65-84; Richard Z. Leirissa (ed), Tantangan dan Rongrongan Terhadap 
Keutuahan Negara dan Kesatuan RI: Kasus Republik Maluku Selatan, Departemen Pendidikan dan 
Kebudayaan, Jakarta, 1993, pp.40-57;  Justus van der Kroef, ‘The Republic of the South Moluccas after 
Eleven Years: A Review’, World Justice, vol.3, no.2, 1961, pp.184-98. 
15 Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands from Colonialism to 
Revolt 1880-1950, KITLV Press: Leiden, 1990. 
16 Clive J. Christie, A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism, 
I.B. Tauris Publishers: New York, 1996. 
17 Ronald J. May, ‘Ethnic Separatism in Southeast Asia’, Pacific Viewpoint, vol.31, no.2, October 
1990, pp.28-59. 
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already produced works in an attempt to identify and understand the complex 
dynamics of the recent conflict in Ambon (and Maluku) include Nils Bubandt
18, 
Jacques Bertrand
19, Gerry van Klinken
20, Greg Acciaioli
21, and George Junus 
Aditjondro.
22 These analyses of the conflict have demonstrated a variety of 
approaches, from Acciaioli’s anthropological perspective on migration patterns, to 
Bertrand’s historical view of ‘critical junctures’ in Indonesia’s political history. 
Further reports from Human Rights Watch (HRW)
23 and the International Crisis 
Group (ICG)
24 have examined the characteristics of the conflict and possible theories 
for the outbreak of violence.  
 
1.1.1 Interviews 
 
As noted above on page 4, the second focus of this thesis is a study of the content of 
the Ambonese and Laskar Jihad nationalist ideologies, that is, of the processes which 
have led each side in the dispute to develop counterposed nationalist ideologies. In 
order to illuminate the issues involved, this author undertook field-work interviews in 
                                                                 
18 Nils Bubandt, ‘Moluccan Apocalypse: Themes in the Dynamics of Violence in Eastern Indonesia’, in 
Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (eds) Violence in Indonesia, Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 2001, 
pp.228-253. 
19 Jacques Bertrand, ‘Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia’s Moluccan 
Islands’, Pacific Affairs, no.75, April 2002. 
20 Gerry van Klinken, ‘What Caused the Ambon Violence?’, Inside Indonesia, no.60, October-
December 1999. 
21 Greg Acciaioli, ‘Principles and Strategies of Bugis Migration: some contextual factor relating to 
ethnic conflict’, Masyarakat Indonesia, vol.25, no.2, 1999, pp.239-268. 
22 George Junus Aditjondro, ‘Guns, Pamphlets and Handie-Talkies: how the military exploited local 
ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges’, in Ingrid 
Wessel and Georgia Wimhofer (eds) Violence in Indonesia, Abera Verlag: Hamburg, 2001, pp.100-
128. 
23 Human Rights Watch (HRW) [online], ‘Communal Violence in Indonesia’, Press Backgrounder, 29 
June 2000. Accessed 10 August 2000; HRW [online], ‘Indonesia Must Control Troops’, Human Rights 
Press Release, 29 June 2000. Accessed 10 August 2000; HRW [online], Ambon, 1999 Report. 
Accessed 20 October 1999. 
24 International Crisis Group (ICG), ‘Indonesia: Violence Erupts in Ambon’, Asia Briefing No.32, 17 
May 2004. Accessed 24 May 2004; ICG, ‘Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku’, Asia Report 
No.31, 8 February 2002. Accessed 01 March 2002; ICG, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims’, 
Asia Briefing No.10, 10 October 2001. Accessed 12 October 2001; ICG, ‘Indonesia’s Maluku Crisis: 
The Issues’, Asia Briefing No.2, 19 July 2000. Accessed 30 July 2000; ICG, ‘Indonesia’s Crisis: 
Chronic but not Acute’, Asia Report No.2, 31 May 2000. Accessed 16 June 2000. 
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Indonesia. The following section will now examine the nature of these interviews and 
the research methodology through a discussion of four key themes: i) field-sites and 
research targets, ii) the research method, iii) elements of the interview, and iv) 
specific problems in conducting the interviews. 
 
i) Designating Field Sites and Research Targets 
 
Two major factors influenced the task of identifying research sites. First, the political 
and social volatility of the Moluccas at the time rendered the area of Ambon and its 
surrounding islands unsafe to undertake research. In June 2000, a state of civil 
emergency was declared in Ambon, and elsewhere in the Moluccas, by the Indonesian 
President, Abdurrahman Wahid. This status was maintained for the next three years 
and was only revoked on 15 September 2003. Second there was greater ease of access 
to sites where displaced Ambonese had chosen to settle either on a temporary or 
permanent basis. International observers identified, at the time, that tens of thousands 
had fled the island of Ambon and settled temporarily in many areas outside their 
immediate region. Most of those fled to Sulawesi, West Timor or West Java and 
remained either in large refugee camps or resided collectively with friends or 
relatives.  
 
The importance of selecting research participants was dependent upon gaining a wide 
cross-section of Ambonese society irrespective of sample size.  The intention was to 
collect data that would reflect as much as possible, the religious, residential, and age 
variability of Ambonese society. Interview participants were therefore chosen in order 
to first, reflect the religious composition of Ambon and its surrounding islands. 
Approximately 85% of the Indonesian population profess to be Muslim, while the 
province of the Moluccas has been acknowledged as having a majority Christian 
population: approximately 57.5% Christian and 42.4% Muslim.  
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Second, research participants were chosen to reflect residency, particularly within the 
Muslim population of Ambon. This is because that the Ambonese Muslim population, 
more so than the Christian population, consists of both new migrants from outer 
islands and indigenous Muslims who migrated to Ambon many generations earlier. 
The latter, more so than the former, are recognised as having a strong affiliation with 
indigenous Ambonese culture, including their familiarity with pela or the customary 
alliance system between both Christian and Muslim villages.
25 Such affiliation is less 
characteristic of new migrants, predominantly from Java and Southeast Sulawesi, who 
have been forced to compete for work alongside indigenous Ambonese.  
 
Third, interview participants were chosen to reflect age variability. While it is not 
possible to specify contextual political, economic and/or social influences which may 
have had a positive or negative impact on individual perceptions in Ambon, the 
intention was to select participants with a diverse experience of significant past 
political, social and economic events. For example, participants were selected who 
were of the age to be still familiar with the RMS movement of 1950 and were in 
Ambon during the village government reforms of the late 1970s and the 1980s. 
Selected interview participants were also those who were in Ambon just after the fall 
of President Soeharto in May 1998 and participated in the widespread protests against 
the New Order regime. 
 
In order to maximise the usefulness of specific field sites by reflecting as much as 
possible of those variables, the following sites were chosen: 
1.  Kupang, West Timor 
                                                                 
25 Pela has been an ingrained feature of Ambonese life that has not only tied both Muslims and 
Christians economically but has also traditionally transcended religion by the system’s operation on the 
basis of a common Ambonese identity. The island of Ambon is well known to have enjoyed a history 
of relatively peaceful coexistence between Christian and Muslim communities as a result of this unique 
traditional alliance system with only occasional sources of tension based on local land boundaries and 
property rights.  See Dieter Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain: Intervillage Alliances, Religious 
Syncretism and Ethnic Identity Among Ambonese Christians and Moslems in the Moluccas, PhD 
Thesis, Cornell University, University Microfilms International: Michigan, 1978, pp.28-31. 
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2.  Makassar, Southeast Sulawesi 
3.  Malang, East Java (also site of a regional Laskar Jihad office) 
 
Information from local Indonesian academics and local non-government organisations 
tended to indicate that these areas were characterised by a high degree of variability 
amongst the refugee population in terms of age, religious affiliation, employment 
status, and residency.  
 
Interviews averaging approximately 2-3 hours were conducted both in groups of 2-4 
and on a one-to-one basis. Notes from the interview were recorded in written form 
after the completion of the interview itself. Interviews were conducted in Malang 
from 23 to 30 July 2001, then Kupang from 31 to 11 August 2001 and finally in 
Makassar from 12 to 21 August 2001. Names of interviewees have been omitted for 
reasons of confidentiality but other details of the interview participants are featured in 
Table 1 on the following page. 
 
Table 1: Details of Interviewees 
 
Malang  Gender  Age  Religion  Resident in Ambon Employment status 
A M  62  Muslim 35  years  Retired 
B F  29  Muslim  12  years  Mother 
C  M  45  Muslim  5 years  Civil servant 
D  M  42  Christian  8 years  Civil servant 
E M  37  Christian  9  years  Teacher 
F M  33  Muslim (none)  (Laskar  Jihad) 
G M  37  Muslim  (none)  (Laskar  Jihad) 
Kupang Gender  Age Religion  Resident in Ambon Employment status 
I M  35  Christian  18  years  Teacher 
  13    
J M  58  Christian  58  years  Retired 
K  M  26  Christian  26 years  Tertiary Student 
L M  29  Christian  6  years  Unemployed 
M  F   46  Christian  21 years  Mother 
N  M  22  Christian  4 years  Tertiary Student 
O M  60  Christian  45  years  Retired 
P M  42  Christian  8  years  Lecturer 
Q F  23  Christian  23  years  Student 
R M  24  Muslim 4  years  Soldier 
Makassar  Gender  Age  Religion  Resident in Ambon Employment status 
S  F  51  Muslim  8 years  Petty trader 
T  F  46  Muslim   7 years  Petty trader 
U  M  35  Muslim  3 years  Civil servant 
V  M  34  Muslim  5 years  Civil servant 
W  M  48   Muslim  12 years  Retired 
X M  26  Muslim 26  years  Student 
Y M  36  Muslim 4  years  Soldier 
 
As shown in Table 1 on page 10, the 24 selected interviewees reflect a wide cross-
section of Ambonese society shown by the variability in age, gender, occupational 
profession and religious background. In order to approach these individuals in the 
most effective and appropriate manner, a research method and interview strategy were 
developed which will be discussed in the following two sections. 
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ii) Research Method 
 
The fieldwork was based on qualitative methods for the studied use and collection of 
interview material.
26 The advantages of such an approach are firstly, that it allows the 
researcher to develop the analytical, conceptual and categorical components of 
explanation from the data itself, rather than imposing preconceived categories.
27 In 
other words, qualitative research is less likely to impose restrictive a priori 
classifications on the collection of data and does justice to the character of discovery 
in research. Secondly, this type of approach aims to elucidate and understand the 
internal dynamics of relationships and is, for that reason, highly appropriate in 
studying process, especially since the participants’ perceptions are a key consideration 
in this thesis.   
 
The aim of this type of research, therefore, was not to reduce individuals to single 
variables but to study them in their complexity and entirety. In order to do justice to 
the diversity of the interviewees, the methods were characterised by an openness 
towards the individual. As Kleining indicates, it is necessary to regard the 
understanding of the object of research as preliminary until the completion of 
research, because the object ‘will present itself in its true colours only at the end’.
28 
Subsequently, the application of the method was orientated towards four general 
principles: generative narrative questions, non-direction, specificity, and depth. 
 
 
                                                                 
26 Qualitative research is a field of inquiry within a rather complex historical tradition. There are 
separate and detailed literatures on the many methods and approaches that fall under the category of 
qualitative research. For a useful discussion, see Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S.Lincoln (eds) 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, Second Edition, Sage Publications: London, 2000. 
27 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, Sage: California, 1990; 
Matthew B. Miles & A. Michael Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis, Sage: London, 1988. 
28 G. Kleining, ‘Umriss zu einer Methodologie qualitativer Sozialforschung’, Kolner Zeitschrift Fur 
Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, vol. 34, 1982, pp.224-53. Quoted in Uwe Flick, An Introduction to 
Qualitative Research, Sage: London, 1998, p.8.  
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iii) Interview Strategy 
 
As part of the design of the interview guide and the conducting of the interview itself, 
this author’s interest was linked to the expectation that the interviewed subjects’ 
viewpoints were more likely to be expressed in a relatively openly designed interview 
situation than in a standardised interview or questionnaire. While attempting to cover 
relevant topics and issues in the interview, this author recognised that it was important 
that the interviewee was given the opportunity to introduce new topics or initiate 
changes in the topic. 
 
The next step was to structure the interview broadly. It began with narrative enquiries 
for a twofold purpose: firstly, to enable the author as a researcher to approach the 
interviewee’s experiences, and secondly, to stimulate important discussion in the 
context of biographical details. Similarly, focus was directed to the element of ‘non-
direction’ so that non-directive style of conversation took place. This was achieved 
with several forms of questions which may have defined a certain issue: for example, 
“How did you feel about the intervention of the Laskar Jihad?”, allowed the response 
of the individual to be left open.  
 
Often the interview needed to expose specific elements in order to prevent the 
interview from remaining on the level of general statements. This was achieved 
through a type of retrospective inspection where questions were deliberately explicit 
in their attempt to try and elicit an answer that would illuminate the individual’s 
response to a situation in question. There was the attempt, also, to encourage a degree 
of depth or, in other words, to focus on feelings or the emotional responses of the 
individual when referring to a particular situation or event. This meant that general 
suggestions were posed in order to shift simple assessments by the individual using 
expressions such as ‘good’ or ‘bad’.  
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In conducting the interviews, the intention was to obtain the participants’ views on the 
phenomena under investigation. The qualitative approach and broadly structured 
interviews enabled this author as the interviewer to gain explanations and information 
on individual perceptions, attitudes and values that is not directly accessible by 
alternative methods. However, there were a number of problems in conducting the 
interview: first was the degree of control of the process of obtaining information from 
the interviewee, second was the degree of rapport established with the interviewee, 
and third was the unwillingness to impart information as a result of the sensitivity of 
the topic. These will be discussed in the following section. 
 
iv) Problems in Conducting the Interview 
 
The assumption from the type of broadly structured interviews described on pages 12-
13 is that a frame has been constructed within which the interviewee responds. 
However, there is the initial problem that the interview becomes a one-way 
construction in which respondents are likely to seek information from the interviewer 
to discover the boundaries of the interview, a process that can continue throughout the 
course of the interview.  While it was advantageous to have an established set of 
directions that allowed myself as the interviewer to make appropriate decisions or 
establish necessary priorities in the interview situation, the carrying out of such 
interviews depended essentially on the interviewer’s situational competence. It 
became clear that it was a matter of negotiating through the responses as the actual 
interview developed. Thus, choices were made whether to mention certain issues or 
questions, or being completely open to the individual’s way of talking about these 
issues and other topics.  
 
Secondly, there was the problem of the willingness of the people interviewed, 
especially as a Westerner approaching a foreign culture. Admittedly, this was 
alleviated by conducting the interviews in Indonesian in order to convey a sense of 
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familiarity. However, maintaining the relationship with the informant was often very 
difficult. An obvious problem which had to be faced was the negotiation of proximity 
and distance in relation to the individual being interviewed. This may have been a 
result of various factors apart from assuming that they were naturally shy and reticent 
individuals. There may have been expectations by either party in regard to how the 
interview should take place, depending on whether an individual considered these 
expectations as being violated or not.  
 
Thirdly, some interviewees appeared reluctant to be communicative as a result of 
being defensive about the topic being discussed. While stressing the anonymity of all 
answers and attempting to phrase questions in an open a way as possible, there were 
clear problems of disclosure and transparency within the interview situation. The 
sensitivity of the informant’s current refugee status and the delicacy of touching upon 
recent conflict circumstances in Ambon may have aroused the fears in some 
interviewees of passing on information because of the possibility of negative 
sanctions by third parties.  
Overall, the process of obtaining quality data from these interviews depended heavily 
on the quality of interaction with the respondent/s. While this author was in control of 
the process of obtaining information from the interviewee, but flexible enough to 
follow new information, the quality of data could be also attributed to the skills of 
careful listening and responding well. At this point, this chapter will now turn to the 
third concern of the thesis.  
As mentioned on page 4, the third focal concern of the thesis is a study of the 
implications of the clash between two nationalist ideologies. The thesis will use the 
theory of constructivism in order to examine the impact of contemporary nationalist 
ideologies in the transition from riot to nationalist conflict in Ambon. The next 
chapter will develop a constructivist approach to ethnic nationalism. Using the 
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constructivist framework, this thesis contends that the disruption of authority 
structures in Ambon unsettled social cohesion with two effects: the disillusionment of 
ordinary individuals who sought new sources of identity and social security on the one 
hand, and the dislocation of incumbent elites on the other. It will be argued that, in 
such circumstances, nationalism became a liberating and inclusive force. It was able 
to fulfil the political demands of disgruntled elites and promised the Ambonese people 
a ‘Golden Age’ of stability and tranquillity. It is this approach which is developed in 
this thesis in order to understand the changes in ethnic and national consciousness 
which had taken place among the Ambonese. 
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NATIONALISM IN INDONESIA  
AND CONSTRUCTIVISM 
 
 
2.1   Approaches to Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia  
 
There have been numerous academic attempts to make sense of Indonesia’s 
nationalist politics, in particular, its problematic pursuit of a national identity. The 
varied responses of writers, in this respect, have generated distinct accounts of the 
nature of contemporary nationalist politics in Indonesia. These different approaches, 
moreover, reverberate some of the conceptual works on the subject of nationalism in 
general. In particular, they echo widely-held assertions amongst theorists of 
nationalism that nationalism arises out of an instinctual or primordial sense of identity 
and, alternatively, that national identity is tied to the instrumental pursuit of particular 
interests. 
 
As a preliminary step in order to draw attention to the context of scholarly work on 
nationalism and identity in Indonesia we begin with an examination of the 
complexities of Indonesia’s nationalist politics. A perusal of the existing literature 
related to the dynamics of Indonesian history reveals a strong fascination with issues 
of integration and nationalism in the region.
1 The nature of Indonesia’s diverse 
composition makes these issues unsurprising topics of interest. The mosaic of 
differences in Indonesia’s ethnic composition, its geographical spread, religious and 
                                                                 
1 Some of the more notable books on Indonesian nationalism and integration are George M. Kahin, 
Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1952; David Henley, 
Nationalism and Regionalism in a Colonial Context, KITLV Press: Leiden, 1996; Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities, Verso: London, New York, 1991; Clive J. Christie, A Modern History of 
Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism, I.B. Tauris Publishers: London, 1996; R. 
William Liddle, Ethnicity, Party, and National Integration - an Indonesian Case Study, Yale 
University Press: New Haven, London, 1970. 
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 cultural disparities, linguistic differences, and so on, could be seen as inhibitors of 
integration or an impediment to the achievement of a ‘national culture’. Yet 
Indonesia, as a multi-ethnic state, has attempted to promote a national identity through 
feelings of a collective ‘we’. With Indonesia’s tremendous diversity, nation building 
and national integration have been consistent goals in the past for both nationalists 
and successive Indonesian governments.  
 
Prior to colonist intervention, there was no common sense of identity or unifying 
historical memory, with many of the pre-colonial kingdoms only exercising authority 
over extensive or limited sections of the Indonesian archipelago. The Dutch made 
various policy attempts to integrate the East Indies, or modern day Indonesia, such as 
the development of a centralised administrative service, the unity of coinage, and the 
use of Dutch and Malay as the languages of instruction. In the Old Order and New 
Order periods
2, the government rapidly developed new symbols of nationhood to 
rekindle that nationalist feeling spurred by a common struggle against the colonialists. 
Since the 1950s, the Indonesian government initiated projects of directed economic, 
social and cultural change among minority groups under the auspices of the 
Department of Social Welfare. These projects were initiated by Presidential decrees in 
an effort to integrate minority groups into Indonesian society.
3  
 
In Indonesia, ideas about a ‘national culture’ and the policies designed to ensure the 
integration of the various cultural groups have affected the way in which these groups 
have chosen to define their identity. The state’s imposition of a unifying nationalism 
has clearly come at the expense of a long history of adverse regional reactions to 
                                                                 
2 Soeharto, early in his tenure as President of Indonesia, described his regime as the ‘New Order’ as 
opposed to the ‘Old Order’ government of Indonesia’s earlier and first President Soekarno. 
3 These projects became a regular part of social policy even into the New Order government. Under 
Soeharto, a program entitled ‘Development of the Isolated Tribal Society/Societies’ (Pembangunan 
Masyarakat Suku Terasing/PMST) included hundreds of village projects and intended to involve over 
28 thousand families. See Lioba Lenhart, ‘Ethnic Minority Policy and National Development in 
Indonesia’, in Ingrid Wessel (ed) Nationalism and Ethnicity in Southeast Asia, Proceedings of the 
Conference ‘Nationalism and Ethnicity in Southeast Asia’ at Humboldt University, Berlin, October 
1993, Humboldt University: Berlin, 1994, pp.88-9. 
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 nationalist feelings and national policies. Since the late 1990s, it has been increasingly 
evident that there has been a decline in the mobilising power of the state’s 
legitimatory nationalist ideology, including its vision of a national identity. A history 
of significant inter-ethnic unrest and communal violence among different groups in 
Indonesia has drawn attention to problems inherent in the state’s control over some of 
its territories.  
 
Many scholars have drawn particular attention to the existence of internal challenges 
to the Indonesian nation-state which emphasise the extreme fragility of Indonesia’s 
integrative endeavours and its claim to legitimate authority. Despite Indonesia’s 
‘feverish search’ for symbols of nationhood and sources of national inspiration, long-
standing separatist demands from West Papua, Aceh, Ambon, and East Timor
4 have 
demonstrated the historical delicacy of the relationship between regional groups and 
the state’s interpretation of the national community. Indeed, nationalist challenges 
have increased dramatically in Indonesia in recent years with renewed separatist 
claims in these areas. 
 
Given this background of the complexities of Indonesian national identity, there are a 
number of approaches in the literature on nationalism that could potentially provide a 
map of terrain on how nationalist politics in Indonesia could be examined. The 
literature itself offers a great number of works on the subject, which offer diverse 
disciplinary perspectives and have investigated various geographical regions from 
Europe (Hans Kohn
5, Carlton Hayes
6, Shafer Boyd
7 and Frederick Hertz
8) to the new 
states in Africa and Asia (Benedict Anderson
9, Elie Kedourie
10, Crawford Young
11, 
                                                                 
4 Only until recently, the Indonesian Government’s war against the East Timorese ended with the 
sudden and influential transformations in Government in 1998 and the subsequent Referendum, the 
result of which realised the aspirations of the East Timorese to claim a state of their own.  
5 Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism: the first era of global history, Harper: New York, 1962. 
6 Carlton Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, Russell & Russell, 1968. 
7 Shafer Boyd, Faces of Nationalism: new realities and old myths, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972. 
8 Frederick Hertz, The German Public Mind in the Nineteenth Century, Allen & Unwin, 1975. 
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, 
Verso: London, 1991. 
10 Elie Kedourie (ed), Nationalism in Asia and Africa, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1971. 
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 and Benyamin Neuberger
12), and more generically on the contemporary nature and 
types of national identity and nationalist movements (Walker Connor
13, Anthony D. 
Smith
14, Montserrat Guibernau
15, David Brown
16, and Christopher Dandeker
17).  
 
A reading of Anthony D. Smith’s major distinctions within the study of nationalism 
provides a grasp of most of the issues of central concern to scholars in this field and, 
at the same time, represents important individual discourses. His five major 
paradigms of nationalism are primordialism,  perennialism, ethno-symbolism (also 
related closely to constructivism), modernism (also related closely to instrumentalism 
or situationalism), and postmodernism
18 each of which have attempted to give some 
precision to nationalist politics. Despite his five-fold typology, however, a deeper 
reading of Smith would reveal the fundamental distinction between the primordialist 
and instrumentalist approaches to nationalism which is central to this thesis. 
 
The competing assumptions of both theories represent an influential part of the 
literature on nationalism and are pertinent to understanding the increasing frequency 
and intensity of nationalism and ethnic group conflicts. A comparison of these two 
conceptual languages where one asserts nationalism as an instinct of collective 
primordial beliefs, and the other as rational self-interest, provides a useful map that 
will lead the way to the development and application of the constructivist approach in 
the subsequent chapters. The significance of this debate for this thesis also lies in its 
ability to pinpoint key points of reference within which various writers on nationalism 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
11 Crawford Young, ‘Ethnicity and the Colonial and Post-Colonial State in Africa’, in Paul Brass (ed) 
Ethnic Groups and the State, Croon Helm: London, 1985. 
12 Benyamin Neuberger, ‘State and Nation in African Thought’, Journal of African Studies, vol.4, no.2, 
1977, pp.199-205.  
13 Walker Connor, ‘Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond’, in J. Hutchinson and A. 
Smith (eds) Ethnicity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
14 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: a critical survey of recent theories of nations and 
nationalism, Routledge: London, 1998. 
15 Montserrat Guibernau, Nations Without States: political communities in a global age, Polity Press: 
Malden, 1999. 
16 David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural & Multicultural Politics, Routledge: 
London, 2000. 
17 Christopher Dandeker (ed), Nationalism and Violence, Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, 
1998. 
18 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, Routledge: London, 1998. 
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 may be located, especially those whose research may be found in issues related to 
nationalism and national integration in Indonesia. It is possible to recognise various 
characteristics of these theoretical formulations in the literature.  
 
Two alternate paradigms, primordialism and instrumentalism, will be examined, in 
the first place, to show how each one has generated different stories on nationalism 
and may be located in the literature on nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia 
and second, to show how specific problems arise in their overall theories of 
nationalism. This will be followed by a discussion on constructivism which might be 
viewed as a synthesis in the overall theory of nationalism. 
 
2.1.1   Primordialism 
 
The theory of primordialism, which fundamentally perceives nationalism as 
something basic and founded on attachments which are innate and emotionally 
powerful, argues that nations are organic and natural, and therefore have natural rights 
to self-determination. These ideas have essentially diverged into two well-known 
theoretical assumptions of nationalism, where one is fundamentally biological in 
character and the other cultural. Pierre van den Berghe is the main exponent of the 
biological approach and argues for the propensity to favour close kin groups and that 
nations are thus a matter of kin selection.
19 Clifford Geertz and Edward Shils, on the 
other hand, are known to have pioneered the distinction of ‘cultural givens’, like 
religion, language and race, to which individuals attach a ‘primordial quality’.
20  
 
Advances in recent decades have given a more detailed treatment of these ideas and 
rendered primordialism into a more sophisticated thesis. Divergent versions of the 
                                                                 
19 Van den Berghe, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 1978, pp.402-11. 
20 Clifford Geertz, ‘The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New 
States’, in C. Geertz (ed) Old Societies and New States: the quest for modernity in Asia and Africa, 
Free Press: New York, 1963, pp.107-13; Edward Shils, ‘Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties’, 
British Journal of Sociology, vol.7, 1957, pp.13-45. 
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 primordial thesis have evolved rapidly, primarily in an attempt to take into account 
several logical and empirical problems when applying the thesis to more modern 
contexts of ethnic conflict.
21 As a result, the primordialist thesis has expanded more 
explicitly into an array of disciplines including evolutionary psychology, biological 
anthropology, neurobiology, behavioural ecology and others.
22 Many of these tend to 
explore the interaction between van den Berghe’s genetic preference and Geertz’s 
cultural selection theories, and subsequently have brought about various 
methodological and conceptual divisions within primordialist theory and across 
nationalist theory in general. 
 
However, in recognising the conceptual diversity surrounding such formulations, it is 
still possible to identify the characteristics of these approaches to nationalism within 
the existing literature on Indonesia. Often, primordialism is used in the literature as 
the ‘default’ position in which ethnic conflicts are assumed to derive from cultural 
incompatibilities whose existence is left unexamined or taken for granted. Indeed, 
some writers on ethnic movements and nationalism in Indonesia have pinpointed the 
primordialist nature of these movements with an emphasis on cultural differences, that 
is, ‘the coexistence within a single society of groups possessing mutually 
incompatible institutional systems’.
23  
 
In these approaches to nationalism and ethnic conflict there is the assumption of an 
underlying primordial theme of ethnic emotional bonds and primordial sentiments, 
implying that, as a consequence, the conflicts are so intractable as to be beyond our 
ability to influence them. The following example could be referred to as ‘explicit 
                                                                 
21 For examples of key problems associated with the primordialist assumption and its application to 
cases of nationalism in Eastern Europe, see Frank P. Harvey, ‘Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and 
Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and Constraints for Theory and Policy’, Canadian 
Journal of Political Science (CJPS), vol.33 no.1, March 2000, pp.37-65.  For a broader critique of the 
primordialist theory, see Jack Eller and Reed Coughlan, ‘The Poverty of Primordialism’, in John 
Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds) Ethnicity, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1996, pp.45-51. 
22 Harvey, CJPS, pp.42-3. 
23 Michael G. Smith (1965) quoted in Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of 
California Press: Berkeley, 1985, p.136. 
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 primordialism’ for its overt primordial stance. When commenting on the Dayak-
Madurese conflict in Kalimantan in 1996 and 1997, commentators from Human 
Rights Watch referred to deep-seated ethnic hatreds based upon an inherent trait from 
both the Dayaks and the Madurese for ‘drawing blood’.
24 It was said, for example, 
that the Madurese possessed a ‘penchant for using knives to settle scores and the 
Dayak belief that if the blood of a single Dayak is shed, the group as a whole must 
respond’.
25  
 
The primordialist perspective asserts that the development of individual identity is 
inherent and defined by the culture of the community in which a person is born. 
Therefore, animosity between two opposing sides is the result of inherent cultural 
differences. Consequently, it is often implied that Indonesia could never become a 
unified nation because of its tremendous cultural diversity. While not overtly labelling 
themselves as primordialist, some authors have in this way perceived nationalistic 
consciousness in Indonesia’s history as a cultural phenomenon. Ethnic loyalties are 
often treated as ‘givens’ and thus not carefully examined. However, it is argued here 
that primordialism refers not just to the view of history as a ‘cultural phenomenon’ 
but rather to the view that cultural affinities and differences may have an impact on 
the development of ethnic and nationalist consciousness. As a description of 
perceptions of identity, primordialism may thus be accurate. However, it is suggested 
here that the development of such ‘primordialist’ ethnic or national consciousness 
needs to be examined in terms of the social and political factors which influence its 
development.  
 
As demonstrated above, the primordialist perspective asserts that the development of 
individual identity is inherent and defined by the culture of the community in which a 
person is born. Therefore, animosity between two opposing sides is the result of 
                                                                 
24 Human Rights Watch (HRW) [online], West Kalimantan, 1997 Report. Accessed 16 May 2000. 
25 HRW [online], West Kalimantan, 1997 Report.  
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 inherent cultural differences. Consequently, it is often implied that Indonesia could 
never become a unified nation because of its tremendous cultural diversity. While not 
overtly labelling themselves as primordialist, some authors have in this way perceived 
nationalistic consciousness in Indonesia’s history as a cultural phenomenon. Often 
they do not take ethnic loyalties into account, but instead take these for granted as a 
self-evident phenomenon or simply a natural variable affecting political behaviour.  
 
If only inadvertently, these assertions assume the self-evidence of primordial 
sentiments and thereby the ‘natural’ right of minorities to demand independence from 
the Indonesian nation-state. In such an approach, Ingrid Wessel has implied that the 
nationalist movements for independence in West Irian, Aceh and East Timor have a 
right to self-determination and thus in some sense the ‘natural right’ to assert 
themselves as a separate community. She states for example, 
 
In Irian Jaya, the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka- 
OPM)  was founded in 1963 with the strong determination to fight for 
independence, and armed clashes and resistance escalated in the late 
1970s    and 1980s. It was formed when Irianese nationalists 
experienced the “Indonesianization” policy. This official policy is 
applied against “backward” people or against “younger brothers” and 
is understood as a development programme. The official 
understanding of the place of ethnic  minorities within the Indonesian 
nation as bluntly formulated in 1985 by the Minister of 
Transmigration...The transmigration policy, the educational 
programme and the pembangunan policy in Irian Jaya reduced the 
Irianese to a minority in their own province.
 26
 
And in regards to East Timor, 
 
  The 17 years since 1975 have shown that Indonesia, presenting itself 
  as the generous, helpful big neighbour and – after the occupation – as 
  a brother to whom the East Timorese ought to be grateful did not act 
  as a brother, but rather as an enemy or a colonial power.
27
 
                                                                 
26 Ingrid Wessel, ‘State Nationalism in Present Indonesia’, in Wessel, Nationalism, pp.43-4. 
27 Ingrid Wessel, ‘State Nationalism in Present Indonesia’, in Wessel, Nationalism, pp.45. 
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 Similarly, there have been other scholars who have simply assumed the existence of 
nationalist attachments amongst Indonesia’s ethnic and regional communities without 
any overt explanation of its nature. As Jamie Mackie has stated, 
 
  Indonesia’s geographical diversity is an appropriate starting point for 
a discussion of the country’s difficulties, for there is no doubt that it 
has contributed to and aggravated some of her recent problems.
28    
 
In this way, the nature of nationalist attachment is taken for granted and examined 
from the way in which nationalist sentiments may have emerged as a result of 
different factors. In this way, the nature of nationalist attachment is taken for granted 
and examined from the way in which nationalist sentiments may have emerged as a 
result of different factors. In this sense, ‘innate’ ethnic or nationalist attachments are 
analysed by the type of catalysts to which they respond. For example, Walker Connor 
in his book on ‘Ethnonationalism’ explains the idea that instinctive ethnic or national 
attachments might be taken for granted until triggered by certain external factors. He 
illustrates that the propensity towards the bifurcation of humanity may be triggered by 
an external threat which can broaden primordial fault-lines that separate groups, 
thereby eliciting the powerful response of national consciousness.
29  
 
However, most of these analyses do not explain the politics of nationalism in 
Indonesia as solely based on the manifestation of instinct. Scholars often supplement 
their explanations of a basic ‘primordial’ nature to nationalism with other alternative 
arguments. It is clear that ethnic and national identities which portray themselves in 
the primordialist language of historical continuity, may also involve rational 
responses to changing situations. Whereas the primodialist view indicates that 
individuals subscribe to nationalism on the basis of linguistic, racial and cultural 
affinities, there is the alternative approach that support for nationalism comes from 
                                                                 
28 Jamie A.C. Mackie, ‘Indonesia’, in Rosemary Brissenden and James Griffin (eds) Modern Asia: 
Problems and Politics, Jacaranda Press: Milton, 1974, p.87. 
29 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: the quest for understanding, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, 1994, pp.203-8. 
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 those whose interests have been threatened by economic change and political 
oppression.  
 
Both approaches have in common the recognition that nationalism is facilitated by the 
push of political elites promulgating ideological symbols of nationhood, but differ 
markedly in their depiction of the dynamics of nationalist construction. From a 
primordialist perspective, the pre-modern or primordial origins of the nation are 
stressed so as to appeal to the ‘innate feelings’ of the masses. From an 
‘instrumentalist’ approach the ‘innate feelings’ harnessed by elites appear as 
‘primordial’ only because they appeal to interests which resonate closely with the 
fears and aspirations of individuals so as to mobilise the masses more effectively.  
 
In the latter case, it is the rational self-interests of individuals which are harnessed by 
elites who are seeking to mobilise a nationalist movement by appealing to 
commonalities of interest and the defence of such interests in the face of economic or 
power disparities. Since it is rational for individuals to identify with the social, 
economic or political unit which best promotes their interests, individuals then make 
choices in response to situational constraints and align themselves with the 
corresponding national community. The result is a communitarian feeling of 
constructed ‘common interests’ that makes collective claims. As the following section 
will explore, this idea forms the foundation of what has been referred to as 
situationalist or instrumentalist theory. 
 
2.1.2   Instrumentalism 
 
The argument of instrumentalist theory begins with the explanation that nationalism 
becomes one resource for the defence of individual interests and the common 
economic interests of groups. The main premise of this line of thought is the idea that 
nationalistic consciousness develops on an economic level. Through a process of 
  29 
 contact and competition in the workforce, the balance of power is affected by the 
relative economic advantage that groups can obtain from exploiting new 
opportunities. In the case of nationalist movements or ethnic conflicts, importance is 
allocated to inter-group differences in income, occupation, and general living 
standards, where the implied message is that a reduction or eradication of economic 
discrepancies would tend to reduce the likelihood of conflict. Moreover, the approach 
is sometimes presented in ‘elite versus masses’ terms, indicating that individuals may 
rely on elite activists to explain the nature of prevailing circumstances so as to lead 
individuals to identify with an interactive community. For Paul Brass
30 and Elie 
Kedourie
31, educated elites manipulate explanations of inter-group differences in 
order to mobilise support for an appropriate group response.  
 
Instrumentalism has also been likened at various points to the Marxist explanation of 
class identity, which involves perceptions of exploitation in the production process. 
Scholars like Tom Nairn
32 have thus formulated instrumentalism along Marxist lines 
and depicted nationalism as a form of class-consciousness, hence its ability to 
mobilise large-scale intra-class support. Nationalism, in this respect, is regarded as an 
‘internally-determined necessity’ associated with, for example, the creation of a 
national market economy and a viable national bourgeois class in a competitive 
working-class environment. There is a familiar connection between class-
consciousness and ethnic and national consciousness where both are often regarded as 
developing from rational reactions to a perception of a threat to discernible 
competitive interests.
 
 
Similarly, it is possible to identify such characteristics in the literature on nationalism 
in Indonesia which tends to emphasise the economic dimension of the struggle in 
                                                                 
30 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: theory and comparison, Sage Publications: New Dheli, 
1991. 
31 Elie Kedourie, ‘Nationalism and Self-Determination’, in Hutchinson and Smith, Nationalism, pp.49-
55. 
32 Tom Nairn, Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited, Verso: London, 1997. 
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 nationalism and ethnic conflict.  It is often implied that both nationalistic movements 
resisting the Indonesian State and conflict between rival ethnic groups in Indonesian 
history have been a reflection of economic interests and rational working-class group 
competition. This is most explicit when the rise of nationalistic sentiment is attributed 
to industrialisation and other forces of modernisation. It is argued as a central point in 
instrumentalist theory that the spread of industrialisation has been conducive to 
developing social and economic networks, which in turn generate a perception of an 
‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy between rival groups.  
 
It has been suggested that one of the possible preconditions for contemporary 
nationalistic contention in Indonesia has been in the changes to the Indonesian 
economy through New Order developmental policies. It has been suggested, in fact, 
that these economic initiatives promoted economic and social interaction between 
ethnic groups and forged a sense of solidarity based on a common interest in the 
pursuit of economic benefits and social status.
33 In this way, new investments and 
economic activities in Aceh, West Irian and Lampung are seen to be examples where 
commercial and industrial growth has initiated social contact in the workplace and the 
development of nationalist and ethnic consciousness within each regional community. 
Expansion of industrial and service sectors of these economies have increased rates of 
ethnic mobilisation and collective action because of diminishing ethnic segregation 
and increased competition between ethnic groups for jobs.  
 
The instrumentalist approach also recognises that the sense of community, based on 
ethnic or national identity, can be a response to the defence of these interests in the 
face of economic or power disparities. Many examinations of contemporary incidents 
of ethnic conflict in Indonesia have focused on economic rivalry, particularly with 
regard to trading minorities and immigrant minorities as undercutting business rivals 
                                                                 
33 Lenhart, Ethnic Minority, 1994, pp.96-7. 
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 in their ‘host societies’.
34 Thus, studies of the conflict in Aceh and West Papua often 
focus on the Indonesian government’s transmigration policy, resulting in many of the 
indigenous population competing heavily with ethnic Javanese and others for 
employment opportunities, especially in the civil service and in development projects. 
Hence, analysts of the 1997 inter-ethnic clashes in Kalimantan have evaluated the 
conflict as a response by the Dayaks to the perceived threat of economic 
marginalisation: 
 
The region’s commercial development has brought with it government-
sponsored transmigration, or movement of people from the more 
crowded islands of Java, Bali, and to a lesser extent, Madura, to work on 
the plantations. It has also brought more government administrators, a 
better infrastructure permitting greater penetration of the interior, 
including by migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia, and increasing 
competition for resources.
35
 
Scholars who reflect a sympathetic view towards the instrumentalist approach 
articulate an explanation for nationalism and ethnic consciousness in Indonesia as 
being formed on the basis of interest-based responses to changes in the structure of 
the global economy. As situations change and new opportunities or threats emerge, 
individuals are exposed to new opportunities for power and privileges. 
Instrumentalism essentially identifies that there are discernible competitive interests 
which individuals pursue to promote a sense of self-fulfillment or self-realisation. Not 
surprisingly, individuals will strive to attain more power and wealth and will ally 
themselves with others in the pursuit of these common interests. Hence, for example, 
Richard Chauvel in his discussion of ‘regional resistance’ in Indonesia argues that it 
was the extent of economic exploitation in Aceh and Papua which propelled demands 
for independence.
 36
                                                                 
34 I refer for example to a Seminar presented at the Murdoch University School of Law on Thursday 7 
June 2001 by Dr. Fernand de Varennes, Senior Lecturer in Law at Murdoch University, entitled ‘Ethnic 
Conflicts in Indonesia: Aceh, Minorities and Transmigration.’ 
35 HRW [online], West Kalimantan, 1997 Report. 
36 Richard Chauvel, The Land of Papua and the Indonesian State: essays on West Papua, Monash Asia 
Institute: Clayton, 2003. 
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 The important issue to be recognised here is that nationalism may then be one 
possible resource for the defence of individual and group interests. In other words, 
instrumentalism can be understood as explaining the construction of a sense of 
community and identity based on various factors of the modernising process. It 
follows that the emergence of reactive communities is produced by unequal social and 
economic interactions in the state. On this basis, it may also be recognised that, 
because of the numerous interests involved, these interests can be associated with 
feelings of fear, confusion and anxiety. It is suggested here that the diversity of 
interests may be so intense as to prompt individuals to support nationalism as a way in 
which to defend a whole way of life, rather than the defence of a specific interest.
37  
 
This implies that the perception of the individual towards the group, and his/her 
willingness to engage in collective action for that group, can be motivated by both the 
rational pursuit of group competitive interests, and also the need to protect and defend 
the group based on a variety of fears and insecurities. This idea that nationalism is not 
simply a result of goal incompatibility is crucial to the constructivist approach. 
Nevertheless, the idea of an individual’s perception of the persistence of an unequal 
distribution of resources, either against the advantage or to the advantage of the 
group, remains a useful starting point in order to understand the nature of the 
constructivist theoretical viewpoint.  
 
2.1.3   Constructivism 
 
As shown in the previous section, changes in the contemporary world may affect 
people’s interests. However, this needs supporting by a study of how these changes 
have an isolating impact on individuals, making them prone to emotional feelings of 
apprehension and fear, and thus susceptible to ideological visions of harmony and 
stability. A constructivist approach, in this regard, allows for the examination of 
                                                                 
37 Brown, Contemporary Nationalism, p.75. 
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 national and ethnic identifications as a ‘construction’ in particular historical and social 
locations. It is in part a response to shortcomings in the literature embracing the 
instrumentalist idea that ethnic and national communities are communities with 
common interests.  
 
In general, constructivist studies of nationalism and ethnicity have been diverse and 
have not necessarily been a unified theoretical totality. Over the last decade, research 
findings and writings on the subject have mushroomed, so much so, that 
constructivists have been distinguished between transactionalists, inventionists, 
instrumentalists, and proponents of moral ethnicity - an analog of the concept of 
moral economy. Paris Yeros
38 identifies four different kinds of constructivism and 
their political implications which have evolved in the past several decades. This 
includes the work on ‘the invention of tradition’ by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence 
Ranger
39, in which ethnic ideologies were invented and supported in colonial periods 
as an ideological instrument of colonial administration and social control. 
  
Given the varying responses of different writers on constructivism, this chapter seeks 
to trace a map of constructivist thought which will be subsequently employed by this 
thesis. In summary, the thesis employs three central elements of constructivism: first 
the underlying principle that ethnic and national identities are socially and politically 
constructed as a category of understanding rather than innately given, second that 
ethnic national identities occur in the context of rapid social changes which disrupt 
and dislocate local communities, and third that the disruption of face to face 
communities leads to affiliation with new communitarian ideologies. 
 
                                                                 
38 Paris Yeros (ed), Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: constructivist reflections and contemporary 
politics, St.Martin’s Press: New York, 1999. 
39 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1983. 
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 The first suggests that the nation and ethnic groups are invented or imagined by local 
elites who select symbols that resonate with contemporary society and use mythical 
terms to convey a sense of unity. These elites mobilise the masses by employing 
cultural myths not in innate or rational self-interest terms, but rather in constructivist 
terms where elites articulate simplistic formulae which resolve anomic insecurities of 
the masses. Nationalism’s ability to diagnose contemporary events and offer certainty 
to resolve what would otherwise be perceived as contemporary complexities, enables 
it to offer a sense of security and well-being to individuals. 
 
The first thus suggests that the nation and ethnic groups are invented or imagined by 
local elites who select symbols that resonate contemporary society and use mythical 
terms to convey a sense of unity. This view of nationalist and ethnic identity as being 
socially and politically constructed has been argued by Benedict Anderson in 
Imagined Communities
 40 and in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s The Invention 
of Tradition. More contemporary studies of nationalism and ethnicity have resounded 
the relevance of pre-colonial collective identities, and how these associations and 
identities are actively ‘imagined’. Terence Ranger indicates, for example, that the 
ideological basis of pre-colonial ethnic identities in Africa was based on kinship, 
religious associations, lifestyle and occupations, and which required the presence of a 
powerful ideological elite.
41 Thomas Eriksen responds that ethnicity in Africa is tied 
to identities that are actively ‘imagined’ such as kinship, religion, language, political 
allegiance, class and locality and reasserts their importance in times of necessity when 
the state fails to deliver essential goods and services.
 42  
 
The second element of constructivism in this thesis examines how nationalism and the 
reversion of individuals to nationalist ideologies might be seen in the context of 
                                                                 
40 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 1983. 
41 Terence Ranger, ‘Concluding Comments’, in Paris Yeros (ed), Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: 
constructivist reflections and contemporary politics, St.Martin’s Press: New York, 1999, pp.133-43. 
42 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, ‘A Non-ethnic State for Africa? A Life-world Approach to the Imagining 
of Communities’, in Paris Yeros (ed), Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa: constructivist reflections 
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 social, economic and political processes which have disruptive impacts on 
individuals. In this view of nationalism, the construction of identities occurs when 
social cohesion is weakened and the authority structures of such communities are 
dislocated within the context of unprecedented changes caused by economic forces or 
political intervention. In an illuminating discussion, Eriksen indicates that the 
construction of collective identities is fundamentally tied to circumstances whereby 
interactive communities are unsettled by outside forces. Similarly, Edward Fischer
43, 
in his analysis of Mayan ethnic culture, asserts that Mayan identity has been 
‘dynamically constructed’, in that it has been an historically continuous construction 
that has adapted to changing circumstances.  
 
In these views of nationalist and ethnic identity, the way in which perceptions of 
identity are continually re-orientated as a result of changing  circumstances strongly 
underpin the dynamics behind subscription to nationalist ideologies and the manner in 
which nationalist elites appropriate and reinvent cultural ideas to suit their own 
purpose. Hence, 
 
  Power always assumes cultural dimensions, and various modern 
nationalisms both exploit and manifest this. Nationalism takes form in 
an already cultural and changing world. Nationalist cynically 
appropriate and reinvent cultural ideas to their purpose, but these ideas 
do not necessarily come from out of the blue – a fact that can help to 
explain their sometimes alarmingly passionate force and the direction 
that some of the appalling violence may take.
44
 
In these disruptive circumstances, nationalism emerges as a powerful force through 
the construction of institutional or ideological frameworks which offer individuals a 
sense of identity and emotional security by providing a precise diagnosis of 
                                                                 
43 Edward F. Fischer, ‘Cultural Logic and Maya Identity: rethinking constructivism and essentialism’, 
Current Anthropology, vol.40, no.4, August-October 1999 [online]. Available from Expanded 
Academic Index ASAP (Journal Database), accessed 4 September 2003. 
44 Bruce Kapferer, ‘Comments on ‘Cultural Logic and Maya Identity: rethinking constructivism and 
essentialism’ by Edward F. Fischer’, Current Anthropology, vol.40, no.4, August-October 1999 
[online]. Available from Expanded Academic Index ASAP (Journal Database), accessed 4 September 
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 contemporary disruptions and defining individuals as a member of a distinct member 
of a community. 
 
This thesis thirdly suggests within the constructivist view that individuals seek 
affiliation with alternative communitarian ideologies in the face of complex social 
problems. The link between the reversion of individuals to ideological formulas and 
disruptive social forces is argued to lie both in the psychology of the individual who 
feels insecure in the face of these forces, and also in the ability of nationalism to offer 
security and well-being. In the context of Indonesia, the argument then is that those 
sections of Indonesian society that have experienced severe rapid social change as a 
result of repercussions of economic globalisation or state policy interventions will 
reveal a resurgence of separatist tendencies. In these disruptive circumstances, 
nationalism emerges as a powerful force through the construction of institutional or 
ideological frameworks which offer individuals, in its most straightforward form, a 
sense of identity and emotional security. 
 
In recent times, it appears that these aspects of constructivist theory of nationalism 
and ethnicity, summarised above, have grown in popularity with the increasing 
number of claims for greater political and human rights under the banner of self-
determination. Hence, the beginnings of a volume of work that uses constructivist 
approaches to the study of nationalism and ethnicity, including those in the literature 
on Indonesia. It has only been in recent years that there has been the emergence of a 
degree of interest in elements of the constructivist approach in tackling some of the 
contemporary issues of nationalism in Indonesia.  
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 Researchers such as Ed Aspinall
45 have examined the case of Aceh, arguing that the 
conflict has been shaped in certain fundamental ways by the influence of international 
processes and structures. He shows how Acehnese nationalist agitation against 
Indonesia has involved a reconstruction of Acehnese identity where ‘its character has 
been shaped, in certain fundamental ways, by the influence of international processes 
and structures’.
46 He concludes that not only is Acehnese demands for sovereignty 
constructed in this way through a global discourse on human rights, but it is also 
constructed on the basis of a claim that the historical authenticity of Aceh 
automatically grants a right to sovereign statehood.   
 
These types of constructions have also been examined by scholars such as Vivienne 
Wee
47 who has depicted ethnic nationalist movements as a phenomenon of the 
periphery that arises when the gap between centre and periphery widens beyond a 
critical distance. Wee shows how separatist ethnic movements throughout Southeast 
Asia, including Riau in Indonesia, have employed and reinterpreted pre-existing 
historical myths of cultural minority communities to provide legitimacy for 
movements to combat this power disparity. She uses the concept of atavism to depict 
contemporary ethnic communities as constructed on the basis of a specific range of 
myths and symbols of identity. Thus, 
 
Atavism is an active reaching back to the past to draw upon ideational 
and moral resources. Atavistic construction of the past may or may not 
be historical. However, it is not veracity that is the point here. The point 
is temporal location. Cultural constructions that are temporally located 
in the past enable usages for present purposes. The present is thus 
reconstructed in terms of this constructed past, thereby legitimating a 
particular trajectory towards the future.
48
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 Nils Bubandt’s
49 depiction of the conflict in North Maluku also reveals this type of 
constructivist explanation within the framework of narrative constructions and the 
generation of myths. He examines what he calls ‘crisis discourse’ in which ‘rumours 
mobilise within a discursive logic that escapes instrumentalist theories of conflict.’ In 
this way, he argues that the constructions of conspiracy, which mobilised each side in 
the North Moluccan conflict, can only be understood as the politics of paranoia.  
 
Donald Horowitz makes an encompassing argument where he proposes  a 
psychological theory in which ethnic riots are not only generated by rational 
instrumental elements such as the competition of economic or political status, but also 
by irrational ideological elements of in-group and and out-group psychology. 
Amongst the vast literature on conflict and violence, Horowitz was thus chosen as 
being directly useful to the author’s constructivist approach which argues in a similar 
way that various economic or instrumental disruptions lead not just to deprived 
groups seeking to enhance their prospects of economic prosperity and equality, but 
also to insecure groups within society who seek the emotional and physical security 
provided by ideological formulas of nationalism. In addition, Horowitz’s proposed 
theory is specifically examined in the context of the ethnic riot, so that he is directly 
useful to an analysis of the conflict in Ambon which developed as a riot and evolved 
further from that basis.  
 
The aim of the remainder of this chapter will, therefore, offer clarification of how this 
dissertation intends to employ the constructivist approach by analysing the main 
elements of this intended approach as summarised previously. To begin with, this 
thesis seeks to examine how ethnic and national identities arise in the interplay of 
social dynamics rather than through attachment to situational factors of objective 
interests. It is important, for that reason, to identify how identities are not ascribed but 
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 emerge and develop in the dynamics of social intercourse and how these ideological 
visions are constructed as a result. The following section of this chapter will now seek 
to explain in detail those factors of contemporary change which cause the disruption 
of authority structures, in order to show how identities are ideologically constructed 
within this context.  
 
2.2   Social Disruption 
 
The argument of this thesis rests in part on the idea that individuals subscribe to 
ideological frameworks of national and ethnic identity in the context of social, 
economic and political processes which have disruptive impacts on individuals 
resulting in feelings of anomie and insecurity. The most explicit argument in the 
instrumentalist formulation of ethnic conflict and nationalism bases itself on theories 
of modernisation, in that nationalist tendencies are a by-product of globalisation and 
the accompanying modernisation process.  
 
The causes of disruption relate to the suggestion that the globalising and modernising 
nature of society presents challenges to notions of local community. As a result of 
economic globalisation, state economic policies, rapid social change, migration, 
and/or oppressive interventions by the state apparatus, the consequential occurrence 
of profound and complex social changes may promote these challenges to the society 
concerned. 
 
Within this complex scenario, it is suggested that the nature of these disruptions may 
weaken existing ties of community and expose individuals to new insecurities. This 
means that changes to economic and social structures through the industrialisation of 
developing nations may involve new industrial orientations according to 
governmental priorities and/or the increased participation of peoples within the 
workplace which have tended to erode the sense of family and locality communities. 
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 Related economic development and the migration of individuals, particularly from 
rural to urban communities, can increase social mobility and economic competition in 
the workplace. This may result in the emergence of the type of reserved cultures and 
segmented political institutions detached from traditional society which may 
invariably present challenges to traditional leadership. 
 
State interventions into ethnic minority homelands have involved disruptions to the 
social structure and the authority structure. Such attempts by the State to extend 
control over peripheral ethnic community regions may have long-standing effects on 
numerous aspects of an individual’s life. As in the case of Ambon, replacing local 
ethnic minority elites with government officials from the ethnic majority, and the 
imposition of new fiscal and administrative structures and migrations of labour 
provoked dislocated elites and disrupted communities to rebel through ethnic 
nationalist rebellion. These disruptions had widespread impact on traditional elites, 
educated elites, Christians, Muslims, migrants and the indigenous peoples, which 
ultimately caused resentment against the expanding influence of the modern State and 
thereby promoted the construction of nationalist ideologies.  
 
Further to this, changes or disruptions which may have occurred several generations 
ago can produce changes at the community level so as to disrupt the cohesion of 
community or its authority structure. In this context, traditional myths of communal 
identity, and its ways of defining relationships with others, might come to be 
perceived as inadequate in terms of being able to explain these changes within the 
community. Subsequently, notions of identity may be reconstructed in ways which 
offer explanations that account for changes within people’s immediate environment, 
hence the articulation of a nationalist ideology which tends to offer a simple diagnosis 
of contemporary events. 
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 There are also the subsequent disruptions of the conflicts themselves which might 
cause a change in the nature of the conflict. The transformation of the conflict in 
Ambon from riot into nationalist confrontation was a result of the emergence of the 
FKM and the Laskar Jihad and the process of ideological formation as each 
nationalist construction played off the other. The conflict in Ambon thus became 
characterised by a sense of interplay between the two nationalist visions as each 
responded to the other’s changing ideological depictions of themselves and their 
enemy on the basis of external social and political factors. These factors included the 
interventions of the Indonesian military and their perceived incapacities to offer 
security; the collapse of public services and the abrupt end to basic health and 
education services; the rise of Megawati into presidential power and her perceived 
lack of enthusiasm to resolve conflict in the Moluccas; and the events post September 
11 and the subsequent attention on Islamic militant groups.  Such disruptions 
managed to breed new insecurities and subsequently influenced the way in which the 
FKM and Laskar Jihad engaged in a process of transacting and redefining identity. 
 
Clearly, disruption is not the only precondition for separatist nationalism. While it is 
implicit within the thesis that disruption is the important mechanism by which 
individuals begin to seek a sense of security through identification with the 
community, there must be other conditions of an instrumental grievance which can 
link up with disruption, a myth of residence in the ancestral homeland, and the 
existence of a demonized ‘Other’ which can be convincingly portrayed as the cause of 
the problem. The construction of nationalism is therefore been explained as 
responding not just to socio-economic and political power disparities but also because 
of ideological absolutisms in which politics becomes simplified into stereotyped ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ identifications. 
 
From this perspective, the disruptions and insecurities for the main actors in Ambon 
included the centralizing expansion of the Indonesian state which  engendered 
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 profound changes to the orientation of regional autonomy in Maluku resulting in the 
loss of authority for both Ambonese educated and traditional elites. To add to this, 
structural inadequacies relating to decentralisation led to a greater personalisation of 
power and corruption and thence the further erosion of the legitimate authority of both 
traditional and educated elites over Ambonese society. While the disruptive impact of 
rapid migration and the exacerbation of existing poverty levels during the financial 
crisis created workplace tensions and economic discrepancies between different 
migrant groups and between migrants and the indigenous Ambonese community.  
 
These changes may have diverse ramifications for the emergence of nationalist 
tendencies but it is suggested here that the weakening of family communities and 
traditional authority structures may adversely affect individuals who have difficulty in 
grappling with these new and unfamiliar conditions. It is argued in this thesis that it is 
in these circumstances that it is more likely that these individuals will search for a 
sense of security and affiliation with alternative visions of community and identity. 
 
2.3   Displaced Elites and Insecure Individuals 
 
It is argued that unprecedented social change resulting from various aspects of 
globalisation and the process of economic growth, industrialisation and urbanisation, 
has a precise link with the resurgence of nationalism. This is not to say that 
nationalism is the rational basis for reaction to uneven development where nationalists 
act more on the basis of pragmatic interest calculations. It is suggested, instead, that 
the way these resource-interests are perceived might be determined by the 
construction of ideological goals.  
 
The rational voice of instrumentalism has attempted to justify reactive nationalism as 
stemming from uneven development and patterns of domination and inequality as a 
result of the inherent changes in modernising social, political and economic processes. 
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 However, it is suggested that there are two frequent impacts on local community 
which tend to mask the recognition of material interests and make nationalism an 
attractive ideological formula.  
The first consequence is the dislocation of local authority structures, so that traditional 
elites and/or aspiring elites lose their power and authority. It is suggested that it is this 
dislocation of authority structures of local communities which propels elites to find 
new political legitimacy in nationalist ideology. Processes of contemporary change 
thus tend to, 
 
dislocate the authority structure of such communities so that incumbent 
or aspiring elites lose both their power and authority and thus begin to 
search for new ways to re-establish their authority.
50
 
It is argued here that this constitutes the basis for the crucial role of elites in 
promoting nationalism. In this approach, 
 
Nationalism is depicted as an ideology, invented and employed by new 
political elites aspiring to power in the new modern state, who seek 
alternative sources of legitimacy to replace appeals to divine right or 
colonial mandate. Such elites construct new myths of unity for the 
control of societies characterised by socio-economic complexity and 
cultural diversity.
51
 
From an instrumentalist perspective, in articulating nationalism elites seek rational 
material self interest. While not overtly stipulating an explicit focus on the disruption 
of local authority structures Paul Brass, for example, specifies the independent role of 
elites in articulating nationalism.
52 In the process of modernisation, Brass indicates 
that the effects of social mobilisation and the differentiation between particular groups 
create circumstances whereby the authority of traditional elites is threatened. In this 
way, where traditional leaders and/or aspiring elites prove themselves to be 
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 unproductive, then new elites begin to create new leadership roles for themselves by 
articulating a new nationalist identity. Brass notes that, 
 
If (the native aristocracy) is collaborationist or has been imposed or is 
ineffectual, then the development of ethnic consciousness will depend 
upon the creation of new elites and social classes emerging out of the 
modernization process itself as literacy spreads, urbanization takes place, 
industrialization begins, and government employment opportunities open 
up.
53
 
Social mobility invariably involves competition and conflict for political power, 
economic benefits, and social status between competing elite groups within different 
ethnic categories. From Brass’ instrumentalist perspective, the community is 
perceived as a modern stratified system where the elite and non-elite compete in the 
economic order, and ethnic mobility will develop as elite individuals identify with the 
social, economic or political unit that best serves their interests. Here Brass places 
emphasis on the promotion of a nationalist consciousness by aspiring elites as a 
strategy to enhance their own individual status. In other words, nationalism as an 
ideology is manipulated by elites out of rational self-interest and to achieve control 
over the local society or to take advantage of new opportunities in the developing 
society. 
 
While there is the recognition by scholars such as Brass that elites manipulate 
nationalism for some rational ulterior end, it is argued here that in nationalist 
movements the elite’s conception of the nation tends to mask the search for economic 
gain in a competitive environment. Indeed, the way in which nationalism, articulated 
by elites, is transformed from being seen as a resource for the defense of individual 
and group interests to the defense of a whole lifestyle depends on the mass sentiment 
to which these elites appeal. If the mass sentiment lies with the pursuit of these self-
interests, elites may generate appeal through a nationalist ideology, which is tailored 
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 towards mobilising group support for the achievement and protection of certain 
material privileges. In this way elites characteristically select and define cultural 
elements of the community. Brass observes that, 
 
In the movement to create greater internal cohesion and to press more 
effectively ethnic demands against rival groups, ethnic and nationalist 
elites increasingly stress the variety of ways in which the members of the 
group are similar to each other and collectively different from others.
54
 
The articulation of a nationalist ideology by elites and the unifying symbols that they 
employ within it are fundamental in the appeal of nationalism and the political 
success to which these elites aspire. Clearly, numerous interests of different groups 
can be involved in nationalism, which means that nationalism can be seen by these 
groups as a resource to achieve their goals. It is suggested, however, that underlying 
individual and group interests might involve associated emotions of fear and anxiety 
owing to the complex nature of these interests. As these emotions become more acute 
within the pervading sentiment of the masses, it is more likely that individuals will 
respond through appeals to emotions rather than reason.
55   
 
As explained above, elites, dislocated by disruptions to authority structures, 
deliberately articulate a nationalism to obtain political legitimacy and authority 
attainable by gaining the support of the masses. The other crucial role of elites is that 
they independently attempt to appeal to and mobilise the support of ‘the people’, not 
out of rational self-interest but out of perceptions of self-interest that are constructed 
and changed by emotional insecurities of the masses. In this way, they articulate a 
nationalist ideology that selectively uses symbols of collectivity and commonality to 
activate individuals and groups. The ability of elites to exercise this influence lies 
within the strength of the ideological doctrine to fulfil the emotional needs of 
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 individuals who seek relief from the complexities generated by various aspects of the 
modernising and globalising process.
56  
 
Along with the dislocation of authority structures, the second frequent impact of 
unprecedented social change is the alienating impact of these disruptions to authority 
structures on individuals at mass level. It is argued that unprecedented social change 
causes individuals to feel insecure and isolated as a result of the transformation of 
familiar systems of authority and community, thereby making them more susceptible 
to ideological solutions. As Brown notes, 
 
When functioning kinship and locality communities are weakened, either 
by economic forces or by political interventions, one result is to disrupt 
social cohesion so as to make anomic people susceptible to visions of 
harmony and unity.
57
 
In an illuminating discussion on globalising trends in the late twentieth century, Eric 
Hobsbawm has indicated that the period was indicative of a characteristic surge in 
group anxiety and apprehension and also a simultaneous revival of an ethnolinguistic 
type of nationalism.
58  A comparison was made with the nationalism of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, which, he contends, was based rather on unitary 
aspirations of a combined nation-state and national economy, and emancipatory 
sentiment. It was the historical transformations of political, economic and social 
change in the late twentieth century which gave rise to a revival of nationalist 
consciousness, which was based on a form of ‘political paranoia’ challenging modern 
modes of political organisation. As Hobsbawm notes, 
 
What fuels such defensive reactions, whether against real or imaginary 
threats, is a combination of international population movements with the 
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 ultra-rapid, fundamental and unprecedented socio-economic 
transformations so characteristic of the third quarter of our century.
59  
 
Here Hobsbawm refers to massive population mobility as intensifying the 
disorientation of individuals and causing anxiety-laden perceptions. This has been the 
case, he argues, for various nation-states which reflect the experiences of both small 
and major demographic changes. Uncontrolled immigration into Wales and Estonia of 
monoglot speakers of the English or Russian language respectively, and hispanophone 
immigration into the United States, for example, have all demonstrated an underlying 
fear in the community ‘that is not unconnected with the rise of local nationalism’. As 
Hobsbawm observes, 
 
Whenever we live in an urbanised society, we encounter strangers: 
uprooted men and women who remind us of our fragility, or the drying 
up of our own families’ roots.
60  
 
Hobsbawm’s reflection on nationalism in the twentieth century concedes that the 
nation was ‘invented’ by political elites in order to legitimate their power in a century 
of revolution and democratisation. However, he considers that a focus needs to be 
made on the underlying sentiment from ‘below’ that is the fears and aspirations of 
individuals and community groups.
61 Hence, his analysis of nationalist movements in 
the late part of the latter century are essentially seen as ‘negative’ and ‘defensive’ 
reactions of individuals against perceived threats of modernising developments.  
 
The late twentieth century for Hobsbawm was in this way witness to massive 
economic transformations on a global scale, together with significant population 
movements. These served to generate inevitable discomfort and uncertainty amongst 
individual and group members of the community, who subsequently enlisted in 
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 nationalist movements directed against what was considered as historically obsolete 
modes of political organisation.  
 
The analysis shows that nationalism arose in the context of social, economic and 
political processes, which clearly had disruptive impacts on individuals. The argument 
that individuals subscribe to nationalist movements can therefore be recognised in this 
context. That is, those who recognise that nationalism is invented and propagated by 
elites must also acknowledge the anxiety reactions of followers in the face of 
contemporary change and disruptions. Similarly, explanations of nationalism in terms 
of its function in the modernisation process must take into account a subsequent 
search for a resolution to these emotions of apprehension. 
 
The formulation of the link between disruptive social forces, those individuals faced 
with the complexities of modernity, and the emergence of nationalism, is offered here 
as relating to the power of the nationalist ideology to induce individuals to act 
collectively on behalf of the group. In other words, the issue concerns the way in 
which individual identities are constructed by these ideologies and the reasons for 
individuals needing this form of ideological support. One part of the answer is the 
employment of myths in nationalist ideology. It is argued here that the core appeal of 
nationalism derives from nationalism’s inherent ideological myths, which articulate, 
firstly, a diagnosis of contemporary problems, and, secondly, a simple blueprint for 
national identity. As a fundamental focus of this thesis, the process whereby there is 
this distinctive myth-making in nationalism needs further exploration. The following 
will therefore examine in greater detail the nature of myth-making and its function 
within ethnic nationalist movements. 
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 2.4   Myth-Making  
 
The power of nationalist ideologies to induce individuals to act collectively on behalf 
of the group relates to how the nationalist ideology functions as a basis for people’s 
interpretations of current events, particularly during times of crisis and change. It has 
been stated earlier in this chapter that, during disruptive social processes, individuals 
experience feelings of anomie and insecurity. In this way, nationalism as an 
ideological construction can offer refuge and emotional security to individuals prone 
to feelings of anxiety and apprehension as a result of contemporary disruptions. By 
depicting the community as one based on myths of common ancestry and common 
residence, individuals discover feelings of security and certainty, which in turn 
enhances the psychological appeal of nationalism as a political attachment of identity 
and belonging. 
 
Within the context of social disruption, myths function as a form of ideological 
support. It has been suggested that nationalism is facilitated by the actions of aspiring 
or displaced elites who promulgate ideological myths and symbols of nationhood 
within which individuals may find a sense of identity and security. The adherence of 
individuals to nationalist claims is significantly influenced by the extent to which 
these myths, symbols and historical memories resonate within the society these 
nationalist claims purport to govern. The elites who ideologise national and group 
identities, therefore, have an important role in articulating the ideology of nationalism 
in terms of their selection of myths and visions of identity and destiny of the national 
community.  
 
Numerous writers express the opinion that there are two different types of nationalism 
which employ two different ‘languages’ or types of myth-making. Two types of 
nationalist language are distinguished here, the first is ethnic nationalist and the 
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 second is civic nationalist which both offer differing conceptions of what constitutes 
the nation.   
 
It is argued in the thesis that ethnic nationalism was intrinsically more powerful than 
civic nationalism in the situation in Ambon due to the widespread appeal of ethnic 
myths, symbols and memories which generated a powerful association with collective 
sentiments of a common homeland and kinship community, and the fact that the 
strength of Indonesian civic nationalism tended to wane in the light of growing 
disillusionment with the State. The conflict in Ambon was thus characterized by the 
polarization of two ethnic nationalisms perpetuated by both the FKM and the Laskar 
Jihad. These two nationalisms evoked powerful statements within the community of 
ethnic and kinship ties and yet offered two contrasting conceptions of what 
constituted the nation.  
 
The  Laskar Jihad represented an ethnonationalist vision of cultural sameness by 
employing a language of common ancestry and common residence but with a core 
Islamic constituency. In contrast, the FKM represented an ethnocultural nationalism 
which defined an ethnic community of common ancestry based on indigenous racial 
homogeneity using specific myths of common ancestry of an ‘Alifuru’ race and a 
common homeland. Both nationalist visions of ethnic community therefore offered 
two different types of membership whereby the FKM was based on a community of 
common language and culture, and the Laskar Jihad referred to all Indonesian citizens 
who formed the Islamic majority. 
 
It has been suggested earlier in this chapter that nationalism may be explained by the 
ability of nationalism to offer a sense of community through myths associated with 
family and kin relationships. One interpretation of this is denoted as ethnic 
nationalism, sometimes referred to as cultural nationalism, which refers to a 
community united by its ethnocultural sameness and genetic or biological ties. The 
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 other description of nationalism is denoted here as civic, which refers to a community 
united by their shared commitment to a common public culture embodied within its 
state and civil public institutions.  
 
It has sometimes been asserted that the mythology of ethnic nationalism is more 
powerful that the mythology of civic nationalism. John Hutchinson believes that the 
ethnic movement, or cultural nationalism, is potentially powerful and influential when 
the strength of civic nationalism tends to wane. He argues that, whereas civic 
nationalism is essentially modernist and conceives the state as a civic entity of equal 
citizens then ethnic nationalism presents the nation as a progressive culture. He 
indicates that its ideal nationalist vision is one which, 
 
Perceives the state as an accidental, for the essence of a nation is its 
distinctive civilization, which is the product of its unique history, culture 
and geographic profile.
62
 
It is therefore argued here that ethnic nationalism is evidently one which tends to look 
at the importance of historical memory and the passions it arouses in the formation of 
nations. According to Hutchinson, for the ethnocultural nationalist the nation is in this 
way a primordial expression and thus a natural solidarity that evolves organically. As 
Hutchinson notes, 
 
Nations are then not just political units but organic beings, living 
personalities, whose individuality must be cherished by their members in 
all their manifestations. Unlike the political nationalist, the cultural 
nationalist founds the nation not on ‘mere’ consent or law but on the 
passions implanted by nature and history.
63
 
However, this does not mean that the conception of the nation as a natural solidarity is 
to be taken as literally applicable. It is suggested here that ethnic nationalists instead 
                                                                 
62 John Hutchinson, ‘Cultural Nationalism and Moral Regeneration’, in Hutchinson and Smith, 
Nationalism, p.122, pp.122-31. 
63 Hutchinson, Cultural Nationalism, pp.122-31. (Original emphasis) 
  52 
 suggest a resemblance of the nation as an organic entity because of its power to 
convey an attachment to a specific identity. Ethnic nationalism may hark back to a 
glorious past but it encompasses a sense of unique identity of an active community 
with equal participation in contemporary affairs and each with equal rights and value 
to the community.  
 
Walker Connor specifically denies the power of civic nationalism and provides a 
discussion of ethnic nationalism which he perceives as a powerful force because of its 
beliefs in shared blood and soil. He indicates that this concept of ‘shared blood’ has 
been intrinsic to understanding how nations have mobilised successfully. He cites the 
Germans, the Italians, the Vietnamese, and the Chinese as examples of countries 
where there has been nationalistic zeal pervaded by appeals to common ancestors and 
the adoption of terms which connoted familial relationships. 
 
As manifested in emotion-laden terms such as homeland or native land, 
or land of my fathers, territory becomes mixed in popular perceptions 
with notions of ancestry and family, that is to say, blood...This 
emotional bond to homeland flows from a perception of the latter as the 
geographical cradle of the ethnonational group.
64
 
Connor’s evaluation shows how ethnic nationalism tends to evoke a sense of the 
family by equating literal genetic kinship and common ancestry with the kinship and 
commitment to a homeland or demarcated territory. On this basis, ethnic nationalism 
tends to be founded on seemingly objective criteria. Consider, for example, the 
construct of Bondei identity and the concept of the Bondei nation in Africa, 
particularly in the 1920s and 1930s. Nationalist identity in the region was, and in 
some ways still is today, linked to the language of common ancestry. It was built 
directly on that of the later nineteenth century where it was asserted that the Bondei 
were a people linked by common ancestral origins. According to those exponents of 
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 this view, the original Bondei clans had migrated from the north, a belief that served 
to cultivate aspirant Bondei leaders and the encouragement of group distinctions 
between the ‘pure’ Bondei and others; ‘Only those who can lay claim to this ancestry 
are ‘pure’ Bondei, and they should govern themselves’.
65
 
In comparison to ethnic nationalism, the civic formulation is argued here to be 
intrinsically weaker. While ethnic nationalism seeks the moral regeneration of the 
community, Hutchinson points out that civic nationalists are usually more modernist. 
He indicates that they generally aim to secure a representative state that will guarantee 
its members uniform citizenship rights. Usually based on one territorial homeland, 
civic nationalism seeks to secure a representative state acquiescent to their aspirations 
so that ‘it might participate as an equal in the developing cosmopolitan rationalist 
civilization’.
66  
 
Their nationalist ideal, as Hutchinson points out, is that of a 
 
Civic polity of educated citizens united by common laws and mores like 
the polis of classical antiquity. They reject existing political and 
traditional allegiances that block the realization of this ideal, and theirs is 
a cosmopolitan rationalist conception of the nation that looks forward 
ultimately to a common humanity transcending cultural differences.
67
 
It is further suggested that, whereas ethnic nationalism holds a belief in its uniformity 
and its ascriptive membership based on the ancestral origins of the community, civic 
nationalism is at least in principle more open and voluntaristic. The nation is 
perceived to be identical with citizenship and believes that nationality is based on, 
 
The belief that residence in a common territorial homeland, and common 
commitment to its state and civil society institutions, generate a 
distinctive national character and civic culture, such that all citizens, 
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 irrespective of their diverse ancestry, comprise a community in progress, 
with a common destiny.
68
Civic nationalism defined in this way as the attachment to the public culture and way 
of life could simply be regarded as a voluntaristic organisation with a weak sense of 
belonging and rootedness unlike ethnic nationalism whose sense of historical 
continuity gives nationalism its power. Certainly, several writers such as Kymlicka 
and Yack have discarded the idea of civic nationalism as an unattainable community 
on this basis.
69    
 
It is believed by some that the civic nations use of the concept of the ‘homeland’ to 
refer to the home of residence or the new family home in which there is a continuous 
integration of individuals with diverse backgrounds is problematic. Dandeker clarifies 
this civic concept in his discussion of the national identity espoused by the civic ideals 
of nation-states and the national identity of ethnic communities: 
 
Whereas in the case of ethnies the link with territory may only be one of 
historical association or myth, in the case of nations it is physical and 
actual: nations possess territories. Thus, ethnic communities need not be 
“resident” in their territorial homeland.
70
 
Connor is particularly critical of the potency of a civic nationalism and its 
predisposition to appeal to the ideas of common territorial residence. He classifies 
civic nationalism in a way where the constitutive principle of people’s attachment to 
the nation or ‘nation-ness’ is based on a type of ‘political socialization.’ Here he 
depicts the imagery of civic nationalism in the USA as an example where, through the 
control of public education, nationalism has celebrated the distinctiveness of their 
common forebears such as Washington and Jefferson.
71 In this respect, Connor 
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 equates civic nationalism to a type of patriotism which simply refers to national 
institutions and values that are used to reflect the cultural values of ethnic majorities.  
The persistence of myths and symbols such as these suggests that the appeal of 
nationalism and its emotional conviction lies with the way in which nationalism 
equips itself with a selection of memories, values and traditions, which resonate both 
a sense of unity and a sense of differentiation from other groups. Myths, in this 
manner, possess a powerful capacity to convey a sense of belonging and continuity 
through a simplified language of the extended family. They also possess an ability to 
demarcate differences between ‘in groups’ and ‘out groups’ through stereotyping of 
groups and the scapegoating of potential threats or enemies.  
 
Anthony Smith argues that it is pre-modern ethnic ties and histories which provide the 
nation with mythical and symbolic dimensions and which informs nationalist 
consciousness. Smith is careful to distinguish his own version of nationalism which 
he identifies as ‘ethno-symbolism’, positioning himself between primordialism on the 
one hand and modernism on the other.
72  He argues that the construction of nations 
can only be understood over the longue duree, that is over several centuries, and that 
this perspective shows that nations were not invented in the modern era but were 
founded on existing, long-standing and recurrent forms of ethnic identification.  
 
Smith recognises that ethnic and nationalist consciousness is articulated by activists or 
elites who promote ethnic symbols and help the community rediscover its ethnic past. 
These elites thus act as ‘historicists’ who manipulate authentic ethnic symbols and 
myths, such as common ancestry and homeland, which already exist in the memory of 
the ethnic community. Thus national identity is derived from the elite belief in the 
ideal of national authenticity and its embodiment in ‘irreplaceable cultural values’. 
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 The main task of the nationalist is to discover and discern that which is 
truly ‘oneself’ and to purge the collective self of any trace of ‘the other’. 
Hence, the rediscovery, authentication and correct interpretation of a 
unique ethnic past becomes the focus of nationalist labours. Of these 
three, the process of ‘authentication’ of sifting elements of the 
corrupting other from those of the pure and genuine self, is pivotal: and 
as a rough guide, that which is ‘of the people’ is pure and genuine. Like 
Lenin, who discovered in the simplicity and purity of the Russian 
peasant the secret of virtue, so nationalists discover the authentic nation 
in the life and values of the common people.
73
 
It is therefore argued here that nationalism is constructed on the basis of simple 
ideological frameworks which employ simply myths and symbols that enable 
individuals to locate themselves in relation to others.  Elites are seen to selectively use 
myths of unity in nationalism in order to define their own ‘mythical’ interpretation of 
a community united by ties of common history and ancestry. The consequent 
development of stereotypes of ‘us’ and ‘them’ suggests that the sense of unique 
descent or memories of historical events in many cases does not always agree with 
factual history. Particularly in ethnic nationalism which employs myths of common 
ancestry, the community is simply defined by its sentient or felt history of the group’s 
origin. Furthermore, myths and symbols of commonality are only a perception of 
commonality and belonging, which tends to obscure facts of actual genetic descent.
74  
 
It is the sense of cultural affinities, rather than physical kinship ties, 
embodied in a myth of descent, shared historical memories and ethnic 
symbolism that defines the structures of ethnic communities; and the 
same is true for any nations created on the basis of cultural affinity.
75
 
As an example, despite a strictly narrow definition of the ‘pure’ Bondei in Africa, a 
much wider simplified model of the Bondei community was in fact embraced. There 
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 was the possibility that some of those who migrated from the north were ‘more 
Bondei than others’. Certainly, ‘the Bondei’ could have included all those whose 
ancestors were known to have come relatively recently to the area of Bonde, which 
subsequently included various clan origins.
76 Therefore, a type of pan-Bondei 
community was embraced which resolved potential regional and clan complexities 
and focused on its ethnocultural sameness using imagery of home and family. 
 
The use of stereotypes to present simplified formulas of nationhood is usually 
intertwined with the articulation of stereotyped perceptions of an ‘immoral’ threat. 
Nationalism, in this form, with the exaggeration of a hated ‘other’, constitutes a way 
to direct communal unrest by providing a sense of threat or impending menace. In 
other words, the reactive construction of an inferior and threatening ‘other’ might be a 
scapegoat rather than an actual ‘real’ threat. In this sense, when seen from a 
constructivist point of view, nationalism offers a simplified morally pure vision of the 
‘us’, and externalises the evil on to others. The elites’ manipulation of historical 
continuity and their visions of identity, means, therefore, that the past is reconstructed 
to be consistent with this vision, so that it is not the real past which primordially 
influences the present. 
 
All nationalisms, whether civic or ethnic, make assertions of an identity demarcating 
the ‘us’ from the ‘them’ in which the ‘Other’ is the external enemy threatening 
societal unity, or that it is a suppressive authoritarian regime or ruler. Feelings of 
inferiority and envy represents powerful stimulants whereby the nation becomes more 
aggressive and more likely to exaggerate the perception of a threatening other and 
thence the need to mobilize as a collective entity against that threat.   
 
Horowitz’s discussion on ‘selective targeting’ in ethnic riots illuminates how this may 
be the case. He refers to ‘cumulative aggression’ or attacks produced by the 
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 combination of various grievances and directed at ‘fewer than all of the frustrating 
groups’.
77 Rather than suggesting that the target of aggression might simply be chosen 
for their availability and defenceless nature, Horowitz argues that if aggression 
against a particular group is inhibited then multiple antipathies for certain categories 
of people might make them more likely the target of aggression.
78  
 
This point is exemplified by Horowitz’s example of the 1938 Burmese riot. After anti-
British action appeared futile due to ineffective hostility against British security 
forces, Burman grievances were then channelled into violence against the Indians.
79 
This antipathy towards the Indians epitomised the historical roots of inter-group 
tension and the frequently harboured hostile feelings towards the Indians by the 
Burmese. From this perspective, the construction of a scapegoat may work not only to 
direct aggression but to complement it, especially if there is a connection with the 
original target of hostility. As Horowitz notes, 
 
The fact that some groups may receive violence that, under other 
circumstances, would have been directed at other targets does not 
suggest that they receive this violence because of their mere 
availability, because they are convenient, vulnerable, and helpless, but 
rather because they ‘have appropriate stimulus characteristics’.
80
 
As implied above and discussed earlier in this chapter, there is a certain historical 
basis of social change which have implications to group sentiments and the way in 
which a group either asserts or retreats from their identity. The idea that 
unprecedented social, economic and political changes affect this sense of identity, and 
the potential political ideologisation of group identity, also indicates specific ties to 
the functions of these myths. In other words, it relates to the psychology of 
nationalism and the appeal of nationalist myths and symbols. 
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As explained in previous discussions in this chapter, it has often been the case where 
the power of nationalism to induce the individual to act collectively has been 
explained through rational individual concerns for defending a way of life. This 
thesis, however, argues that the response to disruption is to construct new identities 
which employ and modify the meaning of available myths and symbols. Here, the 
employment of myths and symbols points to the idea not of a reawakening of pre-
existing instinctual attachments, but of certain internal needs of the society in 
question. As Ernest Gellner suggests, there is a need to examine ‘the search for a 
resolution by individuals to the stress and humiliation which the incongruences of 
modern life engender’.
81 Further explanation is needed to clarify the important role of 
individual emotional needs that, as Horowitz points out, deals with the role of group 
anxiety and apprehension. He suggests therefore that,  
 
The role of apprehension and group psychology needs 
specification...The sheer passion expended in pursuing ethnic conflict 
calls out for an explanation that does justice to the realm of the feelings. 
It is necessary to account, not merely for ambition, but for antipathy.
82  
 
The sudden assertion of elements of differentiation, or the exaggeration of the ‘us’ 
and ‘them’ dichotomy in nationalism, tends to point to a need to examine how the 
articulation of nationalism fulfils certain emotional functions of the individual. The 
same applies to the employment of myths and symbols in nationalism and the reasons 
for individuals seeking such a community based upon these myth-symbol complexes 
as described earlier in this chapter. In other words, the concern here is the 
psychological dimension of nationalism, in terms of the way in which individual 
identities are shaped by these ideologies and the reasons for individuals needing this 
form of ideological support.  
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 2.5   The Emotional Appeal of Nationalism 
 
Nationalism essentially has two psychological mechanisms. The first refers to the 
sense of security embodied in the nationalist myth of a shared territory or homeland. 
The second is a sense of security in the family or myth of common ancestry. The aim 
here is to refine those concepts which explain the non-rational aspects of these 
mythical constructions and the reason for being significant in the construction of 
individual identities.  
 
First, the appeal of the nationalist myth of a permanent and fixed homeland relates to 
the ability of the individual to develop a type of ‘static’ construction of him/herself 
during times of confusing societal disruptions that engender a sense of stress and 
anxiety. For John Breuilly, the symbolic power of territory lies in the way it acts as a 
‘cognitive map in a modern world of abstractions’ and so provides a demarcation of 
‘us’ and ‘them’ communities.
83 From one perspective, the physical territorial 
dimensions of nationalism can of course be largely treated as a designated arena for 
distinguishing between different material and economic arenas of state power, and 
thereby also claiming to represent a particular people based on these clear-cut 
boundaries. National identity can thus be fundamentally predicated on territory. 
However, its manifestations as ‘homeland’, ‘fatherland’ and ‘motherland’ are 
symbolically important in developing, as Hedetoft suggests, ‘a feeling of a natural 
bond of destiny between history, origins, people, and the land they inhabit’.
84
 
The concepts of historical continuity and the permanence of the national community 
are therefore important in developing a bond between individuals and the cultural and 
historical dimensions of land and territory. Smith points out, 
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 They only desire the land of their putative ancestors and the sacred 
places where their heroes and sagas walked, fought and taught. It is a 
historic or ancestral ‘homeland’ that they desire, one which they believe 
to be exclusively ‘theirs’ by virtue of links with events and personages 
of earlier generations of ‘their’ people.
85  
 
The type of catalyst to which individuals respond relates to the transformation of what 
the outsider may see as the territory populated by a nation into a motherland or 
fatherland. In other words, the construction of national categories is made into some 
extension or expression of that nation. According to psychoanalysis, national myths of 
historical continuity and a specific homeland provide an important channel for 
individual identification ‘because it responds to a collective need which assumes 
particular importance in complex societies’.
86 Further to this argument, Liah 
Greenfeld’s formulation conveys the effects of structural and cultural change that 
were accompanied by a ‘profound sense of insecurity and anxiety’. The specific 
nature of the change and its effects rendered a situation ‘ressentiment-prone’ where 
individuals engaged in ‘particularistic pride and xenophobia’.
87 The idea here is that 
the individual resorts to acts of demarcation of ‘us’ and ‘them’ communities based on 
the construction of national identities such as a common territory, statehood and 
shared history, in order to provide a sense of familiarity and security against the 
ambiguities of modern life.  
 
The second nationalist myth is the association of the nation as one based on common 
ancestry. The emotional power of these myths can be explained by psychoanalysis, 
which attributes the power of beliefs in common ancestry to derive from a need to be 
with the family. These psychological attachments have been described as ‘regressive 
narcissism’,
88 and ‘a desire for the cohesive extended immigrant family, or for the 
obedience of children to parental authority’.
89 Donald Horowitz also attributes the 
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 emotional intensity of ethnic affiliations based on descent and kin to the emotional 
underpinnings of birth principles and early socialisation. He says that ethnic groups, 
for example, tend to ‘internalise the significance of distinctions based on birth 
principle in cooperative organisations and the significance of distinctions based on 
birth’.
90  
 
The invocation of presumed kinship and ancestral ties has a certain potency to the 
individual psyche. According to Neil MacCormick, the concept of a familiar past 
relates to the liberation of feelings of anxiety and isolation by acknowledging, ‘I am 
not alone in being glad to know my roots’.
 91 It suggests that the idea of knowing one 
has a kindred community and is part of a familial affiliation provides a sense of 
inclusion. The concept of being with the family and at home naturally defines the 
individual as part of some distinct community. According to psychoanalysis, it relates 
to the ‘fragility of the sense of self’ and the surrounding complexities in their social 
environment and relationships.
92 It is asserted that the individual subsequently 
engages in an act of constructing self-labels and retreating to simple formulas of 
identity, ‘an infantile splitting of the world’.
93 It follows then, that individuals feel a 
sense of security by subscribing to identity labels or myths that connote a sense of 
continuity and sameness.  
 
The same applies to the subsequent scapegoating of the ‘other’ in nationalism as an 
emotional function for individuals. As discussed previously in this chapter, myths 
possess a powerful capacity to convey a sense of belonging through the demarcation 
of differences between ‘in groups’ and ‘out groups’. Such a construction includes the 
construction of an ‘other’ as part of this basic attribute of group distinctions. The 
situation whereby there is not only a stress on uniformity, common ancestry, and 
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 homogenisation, but also the demonisation of the ‘other’ in nationalist movements, 
relates to a myth of categorised identification. The act of marginalising or demonising 
the ‘other’ represents a clear diagnosis of contemporary circumstances which may 
otherwise be perceived by individuals as complex and confusing. Nationalism in this 
form, with the exaggeration of a hated ‘other’, also constitutes a way to direct 
communal unrest by providing a sense of threat or impending menace. 
 
Smith is useful in indicating that the appeal of nationalism derives from its adoption 
of all of these types of ethnic myths, symbols and memories which generate a kind of 
‘nostalgia’ for a ‘superior way of life in the distant past’ and its simultaneous 
association with collective sentiments of a common homeland and kinship 
community.
94 For Smith, the diversity and power of modern ethnic nationalisms can 
be understood better by examining the three sets of ‘deep’ ethno-symbolic resources 
underlying all nationalisms: the ethno-historical, religious and territorial heritages of 
an ethnic group. The nationalist appeal, he argues, therefore derives from these ethnic 
myths and symbols which invoke presumed kinship and residency ties.  
 
Smith does not however explain fully why claims to common descent and historical 
continuity are politicised by these activists and why they appeal to communities.  If, 
as Smith indicates, these types of nationalist myths fulfil ‘intimate, internal functions 
for individuals in communities’, then there needs to be an explanation of how and 
why this occurs. Smith also suggests that nationalists ‘can sometimes use the ‘ethnic 
past’ for their own ends’
95 and that ‘the failures of secular state nationalisms’ and 
‘relative economic deprivation’
96 form the basis for the articulation of some 
nationalist ideologies bent on societal transformation. If so, then there also needs to be 
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 further specification of the process whereby nationalist myths appeal to elites during 
such societal disruption.  
 
It was originally argued in the thesis that the theory of constructivism rests on the idea 
that individuals subscribe to ideological frameworks of national and ethnic identity in 
the context of social, economic and political processes which have disruptive impacts 
on individuals resulting in feelings of anomie and insecurity.  In other words, there is 
a straightforward argument to be made that individuals who experience economic or 
power disparities or possess feelings of exploitation, tend to develop a sense of 
identity and group consciousness. The constructivist argument need not seek to 
disagree with the instrumentalist argument which is explicit in the formulation which 
focuses on “relative deprivation” in that deprived groups tend to pursue their self-
interests. However, constructivism suggests that the pursuit of people’s self-interests 
is not an all-encompassing explanation of the formation of nationalist tendencies. 
Indeed it is important in this respect to examine how perceptions of self interest are 
socially, politically, and ideologically constructed. If social disruptions do indeed seek 
people to construct ideologies of ethnic stereotypes, then these ethnic stereotypes will 
influence how the instrumentalist/situationalist interests are perceived and pursued.  
 
The thesis argues that while instrumentalist theory is a starting point for 
understanding how and why identities are mobilized, it does not individually explain 
all the mechanisms involved. The disruption of an individual’s social structure 
including the dislocation of existing authority structures will cause that person to face 
cognitive and moral dilemmas. Changes in a person’s surrounding social, economic 
and political context engender disruptions and dislocations which in turn lead to 
feelings of stress and humiliation. These changes or disruptions to social and authority 
structures may vary as will the individual’s responses to the resultant anomic 
situations, for example, delinquency or conformism. However, if the existing 
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 community is too weak or dislocated to sufficiently offer a sense of collective hope, 
then nationalism may be the beneficiary. 
 
The emergence of nationalism is therefore merely one possible response to the 
disruptive impact of unprecedented social change. In such circumstances, nationalism 
will only occur when there are three conditions in place: 1) incumbent elites fear an 
erosion of their authority and choose nationalism as way in which to re-establish their 
authority by creating new leadership roles for themselves; 2) the resuscitation of 
myths of territorial homeland by these dislocated elites who will hold important 
discretion and autonomy in terms of their interpretation of historical continuity and 
their visions of identity of the community; and 3) the employment of a demonized 
“Other” which counterposes the vision of harmonious and virtuous “Us” with a 
culturally inferior and politically threatening enemy in order to mobilize mass-based 
support from their constituency.  
 
This type of nationalism may be denoted as ethnic or civic. Both refer to the distinct 
ideals of national development towards which the community may be mobilized by 
elites - ethnic nationalism depicting the aspiring religious or linguistic community as 
being built on an ethnic core, whereas civic nationalism depicts a community 
governed by principles of equal citizenship irrespective of ethnic or cultural diversity. 
The appeal of both rely on their respective abilities to make simplistic sense of 
contemporary problems by counterposing the vision of a virtuous Us threatened by a 
culturally inferior but politically dominant Other.  
 
From this perspective, the Indonesian nationalist myth during the 1940s which 
defined the Indonesian community in its relationship with a demonized Dutch Other, 
did not resonate with the general populace in Ambon due to their deep-rooted 
historical allied relationship with the Dutch. As a result, the construction of enemy, 
identity and destiny was reformulated through the emergence of two alternative 
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 nationalist versions, the Forum Kedaulatan Maluku (FKM) for the Christian 
Ambonese and the nationalism propelled by the Laskar Jihad employing a distinct 
rhetoric of Islamic brotherhood and thereby directly appealing to Ambon’s Muslim 
community.  
 
This thesis specifies and illustrates the role of disruptions to show how individuals 
who feel disempowered in the face of disruptive social forces are more likely to be 
acquiescent to ideological formulas. It is suggested in this thesis that the weakening of 
communities by economic forces or political interventions firstly disrupts authority 
structures thereby displacing elites who lose their authority and power and secondly, 
disrupts social cohesion by making individuals confused and insecure in the face of 
the complexities of modernity. In this way, elites seek to construct nationalist 
formulas in order to re-establish and re-legitimise their authority, while nationalist 
myths provide a sense of community for individuals seeking refuge in nationalist 
visions promising harmony and security.  
 
As discussed in this chapter on pre-colonial Ambon, there was not a precolonial 
stability which was disrupted by Dutch rule. Ethnic identity was instead a creation of 
continuous disruption, and not an innate remembering of a pre-colonial community. 
In a rapidly changing society, there is a continual search for cultural and ideological 
resolutions to the insecurities engendered by social, economic and political 
disruptions. Nationalism then attaches itself to the specificities of difference and 
cultural difference that these disruptions engender in the community.  
 
In this sense, the process of identity construction can be continuous, with interactive 
communities and authority structures being repeatedly modified by external forces 
and engendering repeatedly modified constructions of the ‘us’ in response. In Ambon, 
early Portuguese colonisation brought with it a large number of foreign influences 
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 including the introduction of the Portuguese language which resulted in the 
widespread use of foreign names and the emergence of a multitude of language 
creolisms used throughout the Moluccas.
97 The subsequent colonisation of the Dutch 
thus disrupted not a pre-colonial situation, but earlier Portuguese colonisation through 
the imposition of, for example, a Protestant Christianity and a further two alien 
languages (Dutch and Malay) which became the administrative and official languages 
of this region. Thus, constructions of an ‘Ambonese’ identity were actively modified 
as the Ambonese repeatedly sought to make simple sense of these incomprehensible 
changes which fostered advantages for some and left others underprivileged.  
 
It has been thus so far discussed that nationalism is most likely to occur in a specific 
context of social, economic and political processes which have disruptive impacts on 
individuals. In particular, it is suggested that the disruptions of authority structures 
and the disruption of communal cohesion are conducive to the formation of 
nationalism particularly when some pre-conditions do occur. It is thus shown in this 
thesis that the escalation of the severity of ethnic rioting, access to earlier myths of 
ethnic identity and the politics of nationalist contention have been crucial elements in 
the generation of widespread anxiety thereby making individuals susceptible to 
visions and identity constructions of nationalism. 
 
From this perspective, the reactive construction of an ‘Ambonese’ identity in 1950 
resulted from the combined impact of Dutch colonialism and the experience of rapid 
urbanisation and economic expansion.  James Collins describes the disruptive process 
of Dutch colonisation of Ambon as follows: 
 
In 1605 the Dutch wrested control of the islands from the Portuguese 
and expelled them from the islands. There was resistence to this 
expulsion but the Dutch were determined to wipe out all traces of 
Portuguese influence. An initial step was the introduction of 
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 Protestantism. At first administrators and clergymen tried to teach 
and to use Dutch in their dealings with the natives but by 1615 
Malay became the language of religious and secular instruction. It 
became the policy in Ambon to insist that the natives attend church 
services. (The clergymen and their assistants were paid by the 
Company). Along with the opening of churches many mission 
schools were established.
98
 
The dynamics of Dutch and Portuguese colonial intervention which perpetuated the 
emergence of the South Moluccan Republican movement produced certain changes at 
the community level. In the context of diverse racial, ethnic, religious and homeland 
boundaries, the consecutive colonial regimes managed to construct an over-arching 
ethnic category of the Ambonese. The resultant majority-minority complex influenced 
ethnic elites to adopt ethnicity as a way of defining relationships with others and to 
mobilise support against the colonists, hence the articulation of an Ambonese 
ethnonationalist movement (RMS) in 1950. During ensuing disruptions involving 
Indonesian state interventions into ethnic minority homelands which dislocated local 
Ambonese social and authority structures on the island, traditional notions of identity 
were subsequently reconstructed in ways which offered explanations that accounted 
for these changes within people’s immediate social and economic environment. Thus, 
during the rise of the FKM in 2000, an ethnic minority consciousness was rejuvenated 
in which the FKM adopted both concepts of identity from earlier periods and 
contemporary symbols of ethnic minority identity. 
 
This thesis will demonstrate that the process of identity construction in Ambon in 
2000 was characterised by a sense of interplay between two nationalist visions which 
responded to each other’s changing ideological depictions of themselves and their 
enemy. In this way nationalism can manifest itself in situations of conflict and rivalry 
which threaten to generate new insecurities and uncertainties. Thus during the course 
of social and ideological interactions, the Ambonese engaged in a process of 
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 transacting and redefining identity in the context of internal disruptions and external 
provocations. Clearly then this thesis does not focus on external provocations from 
political Islamists or the Indonesian military to examine this process of identity 
construction. However from a constructivist point of view, these external factors are 
taken into account as contributing to a ‘dialogue’ between the way others engaged in 
depicting the ‘Us’ and marginalising or demonising the ‘Other’. 
 
In this context, the emergence of Ambonese nationalism relates to a series of both 
internal and external disruptions which lead to stresses and insecurities that perpetuate 
a process of the reconstruction of identity within the community. This means that 
significant interactions between insiders and outsiders which bring about underlying 
insecurities or uncertainties of the ‘Us’ lead to a reconstruction of the ‘Us’ as a 
distinct community of unique heritage and one that commands virtuous strength 
against an immoral and evil Other.  
 
The following chapters will provide an illustration of how unprecedented social 
change in Ambon engendered the dislocation of traditional elites and the emergence 
of aspiring individuals who subsequently constructed nationalism on simple 
ideological frameworks. It is noted within the thesis that the disruptions in Ambon 
impacted to different degrees on different sections of Ambonese society, so that there 
were consequent variations in the extent of the ideologisations which occurred. In 
other words, this is a case of limited ideological mobilisation caused by limited 
disruption. The core aspect of the thesis’ argument, however, remains in that the 
disruption of social structures in Ambon explains the shift to nationalist ideology. 
This thesis seeks to show, therefore, that in both the 1950 and 2000 cases, nationalist 
politics in Ambon involved the construction of an ethnic nationalist identity opposed 
to a rival vision of the Indonesian nation, thereby perpetuating the politics of 
nationalist confrontation.   
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 CHAPTER 3 
 
SOCIAL DISRUPTION IN AMBON  
AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE SOUTH MOLUCCAS  
 
 
3.1   Introduction 
 
The core argument of this thesis is that it is the fears and anxieties of the disruption of 
social cohesion and authority structures and not the disruptions themselves, which 
have lead to the ideological construction of an Ambonese ethnonationalism defending 
themselves against an Indonesian threatening Other. Changes associated with socio-
economic processes which weaken existing ties of community may have various 
implications for nationalism, but it is argued here that a weakening of communal 
structures within which individuals seek a sense of security and meaning, means that 
it is more likely for those individuals to seek affiliation with a vision of community 
which promises a resolution to these otherwise complex circumstances.  
 
In colonial Ambon, various changes to the structure of the economy and the impact of 
Christianisation were processes of disruption which led dislocated traditional elites 
and marginalised individuals to construct myths of Ambonese racial purity and 
cultural identity. It was these myths of ethnic nationalism which provided a sense of 
direction to the existing insecurities and frustrations engendered by socio-economic 
change and under which the Ambonese could unite against a perceived common 
threat. This chapter will examine the various changes associated with these 
disruptions in order to show how in this way they contributed to the construction of 
1950s Ambonese nationalism.  
   
The following discussion of the ‘Ambonese’ during the colonial periods does not 
intend to assume that those people living in Ambon necessarily constituted an 
      71  ‘Ambonese’ community. Due to the fact that there was tremendous linguistic diversity 
and varying political membership according to specific kingdoms, no such 
‘Ambonese’ identity existed until this was explicitly constructed by various political 
which will be discussed later in this chapter. The following use of the term 
‘Ambonese’ therefore does not refer to a pre-colonial ethnic category and is only 
intended at this point to refer collectively to a regional social entity in Ambon 
consisting of diverse social and political groupings.  
 
As stated in the previous chapter, social and political changes can have disruptive 
effects on functioning locality communities. One of the factors contributing to the 
collapse of social cohesion is the disruption of existing structures of authority 
resulting in familiar authoritative figures no longer being perceived by the local 
community to be morally or formally legitimate. Another contributing factor to social 
discord is the sudden fragmentation of family units and community identity. These in 
turn weaken social cohesion and the sense of security and meaning with which 
individuals associate within their communal environment.  
 
Within this context, nationalism appeals to the masses through its strategic ability to 
offer resolutions to these disruptions and its ability to provide the opportunity for 
local elites (people with influence and degrees of authority) to re-establish their 
legitimacy and authority. In this way, both displaced elites and ordinary Ambonese 
have been able to unite around a community of common identity articulated through 
the ideological myths of nationalism. 
 
The following discussion seeks to explain the origins of Ambonese nationalism which 
culminated in the declaration of a Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS) in 1950 and 
which generated exclusivist tendencies of ethnic identity. It seeks to explain how, 
despite the linguistic diversity within Ambon and its separate political entities, the 
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reference to a myth of a unified and peaceful past.  
 
As the first stage of development in political consciousness it is proposed that the 
dramatic changes and deliberate economic reforms of colonialism disrupted local 
communal structures and contributed significantly to the rise of social tensions, which 
in turn generated claims based on ethnicity.
1 While these changes are myriad, it is 
shown how functioning kinship and locality communities in the Ambon region were 
weakened by the specific dimensions of structural economic change which include 
changes to traditional structures of authority, the proselytisation of Christianity, and 
changes to class structures with the emergence of a new class of colonial clerks and 
soldiers.  
 
It is suggested that the following transition to nationalist consciousness, where these 
ethnic claims were subsequently politicised into the RMS nationalist ideology, was a 
result of the disruptive impact of these factors and new complex political processes.  
In other words, the nationalistic movement of the RMS emerged to become an 
attractive prescription to resolve individual feelings of isolation generated by 
disruptive processes. Through the employment of familiar Ambonese symbols of 
group solidarity, such as those based on ancestry, religion, and language, the RMS 
attempted to create an ideological vision of the community, one that provided a sense 
of permanence and uniqueness, and one that promised a sense of identity and moral 
guidance. 
 
                                                                 
1 Bill Bravman engages in an interesting discussion on related views of scholars who either have 
treated ethnicities as specifically colonial creations, or have arguably observed how some groups 
embraced ethnicity before colonialism. While focusing specifically on ethnic group formation in 
Africa, Bravman argues that it is not so much the commonalities of communities which constitute 
ethnicity but the mobilisation of these similarities. See Bill Bravman, Making Ethnic Ways: 
Communities and Their Transformations in Taita, Kenya, 1800-1950, Heinemann: Portsmouth, 1998, 
pp.10-15. 
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The recognition that, despite factors of linguistic diversity and a history of political 
and economic rivalry, Ambon became witness to a unified community based on 
myths of ethnic commonality requires, as a starting point, an examination of the 
nature and extent of these disparities. As the following examination will show, there 
was no single Ambonese community in the pre-colonial era due to a heterogeneous 
group of languages, ancestries, extensive population movements, and kingdoms with 
a clearly ranked hierarchy rather than a citizenry based on equality. The constructivist 
argument which will be used in this thesis is that Ambonese nationalism formed a 
new basis for community characterised by the redeployment of old myths to construct 
a new ‘us’ and legitimated by the language of history. 
 
This thesis is concerned with the island of Ambon and the surrounding islands of 
Haruku, Saparua, Nusa Laut, Buru, and the coastal areas of southern and western 
Seram, which together constitute the Ambonese cultural area and are officially known 
as the area of Central Maluku or Central Moluccas (Maluku Tengah) (See Map 2). 
The island of Ambon is known in present-day Indonesia as the capital of the province 
of Maluku or Moluccas (See Map 1) as it was during the colonial regime. The RMS 
was based in Ambon and claimed as its territory all the islands of both the central and 
southern Moluccas, which then constituted the region of the South Moluccas.  
 
Primary sources related to the study of Ambon, and Maluku in general, before the 
nineteenth century, are almost exclusively derived from European colonial 
manuscripts. Information on the concerns of the Moluccans gleaned from this material 
is no doubt an interpretative task with the scholar having to undertake the task with an 
acute awareness of the problems involved. In the absence of any contemporary 
sources prior to initial European intervention in the Moluccas in 1512, certain 
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made as the following will show.  
 
European sources reveal the existence of linguistic diversity and internal power 
struggles in the Moluccan region. There is, however, an absence of evidence to 
support the existence of a collective cultural identity, one that could possibly give rise 
to a more broad ethnic and national identity. The Moluccan region has a proliferation 
of ethnic groups spread throughout its numerous islands, with a total of approximately 
117 indigenous languages. This includes nine indigenous languages and nine ethnic 
groups in the Ambonese islands of Ambon, Haruku, Saparua and Nusa Laut – known 
collectively as Ambon-Lease, and closely associated with the indigenous languages of 
neighbouring islands such as Seram (See Appendices 1-5). The linguistic constitution 
of the Moluccas is heterogenous owing to extensive population movements. It has 
been asserted that the languages of the Ambon-Timor area are the most widely spoken 
of all the Moluccan languages and are west Austronesian in character but also may be 
related to languages from the rest of the archipelago, the Philippines and Taiwan.
2
 
In pre-colonial times, power and authority in the Moluccas were divided between a 
multiplicity of separate political entities. According to information collected from 
archival resources, local narratives depict the region as being politically divided into 
four main kingdoms which were located in the area of North Maluku. These 
kingdoms were acknowledged as the symbolic centres of the Moluccas and politically 
encompassed the peripheral regions of the central and southern Moluccas.
3 Often 
there was a clear insistence by many of the northern kingdoms to create distinctions 
between the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’, as representative of the differences in power 
                                                                 
2 See Mark Taber (ed), Atlas Bahasa Tanah Maluku, Ambon: Universitas Pattimura and the Summer 
Institute of Linguistics, 1996, p.33. Roy F. Ellen, ‘The Centre on the Periphery: Moluccan Culture in 
an Indonesian State’, Indonesia Circle, no.31, June 1983, p.8. 
3 See Leonard Andaya’s published research on archival sources ad unpublished manuscripts on Maluku 
in the early colonial period. Leonard Y. Andaya, The World of Maluku: Eastern Indonesia in the Early 
Modern Period, University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 1993, for further explanations of centre-
periphery relations and notions of unity in Maluku. 
      75  relations. These often occurred as a result of the aggressive territorial expansion of the 
northern kingdoms of Tidore and Ternate and their rapid creation of appanages in the 
peripheral regions particularly in the Ambonese islands. According to Paramita 
Abdurachman, these rivalries had been in existence for centuries, with villages often 
waging war on each other in order to establish their hegemony in the area. Hence for 
example, 
 
In the oldest times there was a powerful ruler (Kolano  in the local 
language) at Loloda in Halmahera. However in the course of times he 
lost his power to the ruler of Jailolo (also on Halmahera), who assumed 
the title of First Kolano. He was powerful, but a tyrant. A rebellion of 
his people led to the island that was later called Ternate. The 
newcomers formed new villages and in the course of time – 1257 – the 
chief of the most powerful villages was declared Kolano...The same 
process must have taken place in Tidore, and the other islands in the 
neighbourhood. The powers of the Kolano of Ternate grew and a 
hundred years later he waged war against the Kolano of Bacan.
4
 
In Maluku, the continuous conquest of territories in the area by local kingdoms and 
ruling elites meant that politics and trading had always maintained an active rivalry. 
Wars between rival kingdoms remained a common occurrence in the fight for control 
of a specific territory. Usually a ruler’s strong position, in this respect, was based on 
his dominance of the spice trade with Javanese and Chinese traders.
5 Different island 
groups within the region were thus able to assert their political and economic 
dominance on this basis. For example, the Banda islands and the islands of the Central 
Moluccas were important as spice producing areas and attracted particular rivalry 
from the northern kingdoms in their attempts to establish hegemony of the economic 
interests in the area.
6
 
                                                                 
4 Paramita R. Abdurachman, ‘Moluccan Responses to the First Intrusions of the West’, in H.Soebadio 
and C. du Marchie Sarvaas (eds) Dynamics of Indonesian History, North-Holland: Amsterdam, 1978, 
p.163.  
5 Abdurachman, Indonesian History, pp.165-66. 
6 Abdurachman, Indonesian History, pp.165-66. 
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the Ambonese islands would seem to point to a weakness in being able to forge a 
sense of common identity. Ambon’s nationalist movement of the 1950s, however, 
used mythologisations of the past to construct this past in terms of unity. The process 
whereby a community, with a lack of overaching factors of commonality is mobilised 
by myths of ethnic unity will be explored in the following section. It will be shown 
how colonisation and colonial rule disrupted both existing social/political 
communities and traditional power structures. It is suggested that these disruptions 
allowed the RMS to emerge, firstly as a resource for displaced elites, and secondly to 
mobilise support by employing myths of Ambonese ethnic unity. 
 
3.3   Factors Generating Disruptions 
 
In order to explain the reconstruction of Ambonese society from a fragmented sense 
of community to one of common Ambonese identity by the mid-twentieth century, the 
rest of this chapter focuses on the period of colonial intervention in Ambon and the 
Central Moluccas. First, there will be a discussion of those factors generating 
disruptions as a result of economic restructuring. Those factors include changes to 
traditional structures, Christianisation, and changes to class structures with emergent 
new classes of the Ambonese burger and the KNIL soldiers. It will be shown how 
each of these factors had disruptive impacts in Ambonese society by generating 
village discontent against the traditional village rulers, developing suspicion between 
Christian and Muslim communities, and promoting leadership challenges from new 
social groups in the community. Second, this chapter will conduct an examination of 
the identity construction responses to these disruptions.  
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A section of Ambon’s traditional elite cooperated with the European colonial powers 
with the Dutch assigning them specific roles as intermediaries between the VOC and 
indigenous Ambonese society. These changes at elite level had structural disruptive 
impacts on the authority position of all rajas and the society as a whole. The raja’s 
cooperation with the colonisers in effect undermined their traditional authority within 
the village community. This led to widespread protests and disputes throughout the 
Ambonese islands although the basis for these disputes changed in the 1920s when 
the raja began protesting against reductions in their power and prestige. 
 
Initially, the sudden imposition of alien rule by both the Portuguese and Dutch 
became an immediate concern for traditional rulers owing to its potential to override 
local centres of power. The arrival of the Portuguese and the implementation of their 
overseas policies were ‘viewed with some alarm’ and a ‘sense of alienation’ as the 
traditional status of the raja within the village suddenly became redundant.
7 The 
underlying policy of Portuguese expansion was based on a ‘three-pronged’ premise 
embodied in a policy of feitoria, fortaleza e igreja or trading, military domination and 
the gospel. Subsequent changes to traditional authority systems included the alteration 
of views on succession and the introduction of new Christian principles and concepts 
within the traditional social system.
8  
 
The Dutch, who occupied the Moluccas in 1605, also implemented rather substantial 
changes to Ambonese society, including new administrative changes to local systems 
of governance. Similar to the Portuguese, Dutch conquest was aimed primarily at the 
control of the trade routes rather than territorial expansion. As a result, Ambonese 
social and political structures were reorganised to cater for new economic and 
administrative objectives. With the imposition of a clove monopoly controlled by the 
                                                                 
7 Andaya, World of Maluku, p.124. 
8 Abdurachman, Indonesian History, p.185. 
      78  Dutch East Indies Company (VOC), this meant that pre-colonial positions such as the 
village ruler were maintained but were allocated new functional roles within new 
community units. These units replaced existing Ambonese kingdoms such as Hitu and 
Hatuhaha which were subsequently dissolved. Other Ambonese kingdoms did not 
suffer interference thereafter by the colonial state as long as their status and power did 
not manifest as a challenge to the VOC’s authority.
 9  
 
Within this reorganisation by the Dutch, original community groupings known as uli 
federations were also abolished and replaced in favour of politically independent 
village settlements governed by councils or saniri. The saniri comprised the village 
ruler or raja, the soa heads
10 and a number of other traditional village leaders, such as 
lord of the land (tuan tanah), the adat chief, the war leader (kapitan), chief of the 
forest police (kepala kewang), and the village messenger (marinjo). Essentially the 
saniri was responsible for ensuring the security and prosperity of the village. Its 
functions tended to be carried out in a distinctly authoritarian manner, developed 
under the influence of the policy of indirect rule by the Dutch during the colonial 
period.
11  
 
Despite the lack of willingness to cooperate with both the Portuguese and Dutch 
colonial rulers, the Ambonese raja soon learnt that certain benefits could be achieved 
by establishing an affiliation with the rulers. Indeed, many raja  found a level of 
dependency on the Portuguese as cooperation heralded prospects of enhancing their 
own personal status and prestige. Ten years of Portuguese administration in Ambon 
was sufficient at least for a growing awareness that forfeiting one’s traditional 
responsibilities to work within the colonial network could produce new opportunities 
                                                                 
9 See Richard Chauvel, Nationalists, Soldiers and Separatists: The Ambonese Islands from Colonialism 
to Revolt 1880-1950, KITLV Press, Leiden, 1990, pp.19-20. 
10 Soa being a collective term for mata rumah, a unilineal descent group organised on patrilineal and 
patrilocal principles. See Frank L. Cooley, ‘Allang: A Village on Ambon Island’, in Koentijaraningrat 
(ed) Villages in Indonesia, Cornell University Press: New York, 1967, pp.140-2. 
11 Cooley, Villages in Indonesia, pp.154-5. 
      79  for power and reputation. Once within this network, many raja were entitled to adopt 
Portuguese names and titles as an overt statement of their newfound status.  
 
This level of habitual dependency of the Ambonese raja  on the colonial powers 
carried through with the ousting of the Portuguese by the Dutch in 1605. During the 
Dutch spice monopoly in the Moluccas from 1605 to 1863, the Dutch provided an 
increase in power to the raja as an agent of colonial rule and the VOC monopoly. In 
addition to certain symbolic privileges that were bestowed by the Dutch colonial 
government on the raja, the cooperation of local rulers with the VOC monopoly also 
entitled the raja and his family to personal services called heerendienst.
12  
 
Within the functioning of this new system of local government aimed to work in 
conjunction with the VOC apparatus, the Dutch colonial authorities provided the raja 
with the opportunity to integrate into the new governmental and economic system. 
The village elite or the raja were not only incorporated into the colonial system but 
elevated to positions of considerable authority, essentially as supervisors or managers 
of resources, and answerable to the Dutch. Some of the local raja were also assigned 
to certain civil positions of authority, for example positions within the Land Court 
system.
13 As useful agents of the VOC, the raja thus enjoyed relatively privileged 
positions of authority and responsibility. Under the spice monopoly, and even after 
the abolition of the monopoly in 1863 some twenty years afterwards, the raja and his 
family were the direct beneficiaries of the raja’s control over the allocation of labour 
resources in their respective villages.
14  
 
The elevation of the raja in economic importance and usefulness to the colonial 
powers was negated by the rumblings of disillusionment from ordinary villagers who 
                                                                 
12 A specified number of men called kwarto assigned to work for the raja each week while a certain 
number of women known as hakakil served the raja’s wife.  
13 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.20. 
14 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.41. 
      80  found that the economic and social structure of their society was increasingly 
disrupted. Evidence of the beginnings of grievances and unrest in Ambon began in the 
form of periodic protests. Traditional leaders felt their ruling position was being 
threatened by the disillusionment of the masses resulting from the changes to existing 
social and political structures. This was demonstrated in the first three decades of 
Portuguese settlement after their occupation of Maluku in 1596. During that period, 
Ambon and the region of the central Moluccas witnessed a continuous period of war 
between the Ambonese and the colonial authorities. Many Moluccans were 
disenchanted with Portuguese policies of expansion based on trading, military 
domination and the gospel. Thus, 
 
Portuguese trading-policies, the presence of a fortress with superior 
armament (in particular guns), and the proselytising activities, became 
an unwanted factor.
15
 
The early Ambonese wars between 1622 and 1656 also exemplified the initial 
widespread discontent of the Ambonese under Dutch colonial government.
16 As a 
figure who obtained social and economic privileges from the Dutch, the raja was 
often a target of abuse by lower-status Ambonese. Changes to the position of the raja 
and their dependence on the Dutch led to severe deviations from what the Ambonese 
perceived as the characteristics of a respected and legitimate ruler. Traditionally, the 
raja had been the most instrumental figure in the adaptation of new elements within 
the village political and social systems. However, during the end of the nineteenth 
century and the beginning of the twentieth century, the raja was often accused of 
deviating from tradition resulting in his loss of legitimacy as an authority figure in 
Ambonese society: 
                                                                 
15 Abdurachman, Indonesian History, p.173. Fortifications or strongholds were established by the 
Portuguese throughout the Moluccas, including Ambon in order to control trade routes. These were 
later developed into territorial enclaves bent on developing a Portuguese administration complete with 
trading, political, religious and missionary activities. See Abdurachman, Indonesian History, pp.185-6. 
16 There was also widespread rebellion on the island of Seram where successful raids were made on 
various districts in the Ambonese islands. See Harold R.C. Wright, ‘The Moluccan Spice Monopoly 
1770-1824’, Journal of the Malayan Branch Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 31, no.4, 1958, p.11. 
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That already for some years we have opposed our raja because we assert 
that we are not supposed to follow the wishes of a raja who has opposed 
adat and because of that had brought the curse of the ancestors upon 
himself.
17
 
Many ordinary Ambonese made numerous complaints about the abuse of power by 
the raja and demanded that there be new candidates for the position of village head.
18 
Forms of protest during this period ranged from complaints about the abuses of power 
wielded by the raja, preferences for a rival candidate, or the refusal to perform 
traditional obligations.
19 There were also bitter disputes in the coastal villages of 
southwest Seram between Seramese raja, and also between particular clans and 
leading village families. Jealousies often arose in these areas, where the raja was 
often suspected of unscrupulously manipulating the spice market to his advantage 
and, as a result, accumulating large amounts of wealth.
20 In most villages, clan rivalry 
also emanated from the fact that there were at least two clans considered to have some 
sort of prerogative, the clan in power before colonial rule and the clan elevated to 
power by the Dutch.
21  
 
Conspicuous privileges, such as annual payments in the form of commodities, were 
also a source of heated contention for many Ambonese, as the raja’s  obvious 
accumulation of wealth was in stark contrast with the poverty of many ordinary 
Ambonese. It was well-known by ordinary Ambonese that the Dutch provided annual 
payments in the form of commodities such as cloth and material used for ceremonial 
                                                                 
17 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.93. 
18 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.99. 
19 Chauvel, Nationalists, p. 99. 
20 Wright, Moluccan Spice, pp.7-8. Although it does appear that the Dutch were of the impression that 
the accumulation of wealth by the raja was a source of unwanted discontent with the villages. The 
Commercial Resident at Amboina, Farquhar, in the early nineteenth century when the Dutch were 
making precarious negotiations with the Sultans of the Northern Moluccas to collect spices for delivery 
to the Company at agreed prices, carefully indicated that “...proper care be taken not to permit the 
Rajahs to reap all the advantages to themselves, but that their subjects may also share as well in the 
profit as the labour attending the cultivation of the trees.” Wright, Moluccan Spice, pp. 34-5. 
21 The circumstance would sometimes occur when the Portuguese or Dutch would elevate the raja’s 
assistant to the position of ruler simply for the fact that the raja himself would be too proud to meet the 
foreign power directly. See Cooley, Indonesia, p.144. 
      82  purposes.
22 Significantly, the abolition of this type of ‘reward’ system in 1920 for the 
raja  and his family was based on an administrative decision to quell widespread 
grievances in the political systems of the village.
23
 
3.3.2   Christianisation 
 
For both the Ambonese elite and lower-status Ambonese, Christianity and a Christian 
education carried connotations of new status and power.
24 From the very beginning of 
the Portuguese Christian encounter, beginning in 1522 in Maluku when the first 
Catholic missionaries arrived in those islands, political loyalties of local indigenous 
kingdoms were often determined by religious preference. In this way, for the local 
elite, Christianity was looked upon favourably as being able to enhance their political 
power and standing. In northern Maluku, for example, an attack by the Ternaten 
kingdom on Mamuya, a powerful kingdom in northeast Halmahera, provided the 
impetus for the local King of Mamuya to seek conversion as ‘only by converting 
would he be assured protection for his soul and his state’.
25
 
Under the Portuguese it was initially only members of the local aristocracy or 
traditional elites who had privileged access to a Christian education from colonial 
authorities. Indeed, Portuguese policy laid a pattern for the perpetuation and 
formation of future Portuguese communities through Christianity by establishing 
good relations with local rulers. Religious instruction was, therefore, mainly for 
members of traditional authority
26 and thus commanded appeal for its exclusiveness 
and prospects for an enhancement of their existing authority. Portuguese officials in 
fact found a large degree of success in their missionary work through the 
                                                                 
22 Cooley, Indonesia, pp.145. 
23 Chauvel, Nationalists, p. 97. 
24 In the Ambonese islands, both education and Christianity were closely associated with each other 
until the twentieth century. 
25 Andaya, World of Maluku, p.122. 
26 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.25 (fn 1). 
      83  establishment of a culture of learning amongst the local aristocracy. Antonio Galvao, 
a Portuguese official in northern Maluku, found that he had leaders from other 
Moluccan islands sending their children to school to receive instruction in 
Catholicism: 
 
He also opened a casa de misericordia (almshouse) and a seminary, 
where the children of the Moluccan aristocracy came to learn reading, 
writing, arithmetic and the catechism. The school became popular and 
chieftains from even as far as Jailolo and Moro sent their children to 
attend. The best students were often sent to Malacca for further 
learning.
27
 
Thus, when Portuguese domination ended in Ambon in 1605, educational instruction 
was received warmly particularly by the raja, for its potential to enhance their 
existing status. When the Dutch assumed control of the Ambonese islands and the 
religious schools which were first established by the Portuguese in the villages, the 
reception from the village leaders was generally positive, particularly the raja who 
wished that religious instruction be a continued practice.
28 The local aristocracy were 
willing to cooperate with the Dutch, who were keen to both educate and Christianise 
local rulers and their families from the early stages of the seventeenth century.
29  
 
For the ordinary Ambonese masses, the serious threat posed by rival kingdoms in the 
sixteenth century encouraged many lower-status Ambonese to convert to Christianity, 
which was seen as acquiring not only a powerful ally but also a power in itself. 
                                                                 
27 Abdurachman, Indonesian History, p.175. 
28 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.25. 
29 Three sons of Ambonese rulers were sent to Holland in 1607 and a further four in 1620 for the 
purpose of training in theological studies. See Weinand H. Tutuarima, “Ecclesiastical Aspects”, in Jan 
C. Bouman (and others), The South Moluccas: Rebellious Province or Occupied State, A. W. Sythoff-
Leyden: The Netherlands, 1960, p.156. 
      84  Attacks by rival kingdoms were often brutal
30 and it was with relative ease that 
conversions were made throughout Ambon and Seram. Jesuit missions, who were sent 
by the Portuguese initially in 1563 to Maluku, claimed that some twenty thousand 
people had become Christian by the middle of the sixteenth century.
31 A Jesuit 
missionary who went to the island of Ambon and Seram and converted various village 
leaders into Christians observed that, ‘in these parts once the chief of a place becomes 
Christian there is no difficulty with the others’.
32
 
For ordinary Ambonese, Christianity embodied superior powers justified by the 
seeming invincibility of the Portuguese against rival Islamic convoys from Makassar, 
Java and Banda. As Dieter Bartels describes, the perception of the locals towards the 
Christian God was one of awe: 
 
How else could the Portuguese, far outnumbered, fighting an enemy 
who had the same weapons, be so invincible? Obviously, they had great 
“magical” powers at their disposal. The natives could even witness the 
transfer of this power in the form of the Holy bread and wine given to 
the foreigners by their priests. These priests claimed that they were 
consuming their God’s flesh and blood to give them strength.
33
 
From a more pragmatic perspective, the Ambonese also saw the Portuguese as a 
strong ally against rival kingdoms. Close ties with the Portuguese would, therefore, 
mean access to superior weaponry as Muslims from the northern kingdoms already 
                                                                 
30 The kingdom of Hitu on the island of Ambon appears to have become the first area where the 
Portuguese founded Christian villages on the island, as a result of increased political pressure from the 
Islamic kingdoms in Tidore and Ternate. The kingdom of Ternate launched periodic attacks on 
Portuguese settlements in Ambon during the sixteenth century. Many of the Portuguese missionaries in 
Ambon were convinced that the Ambonese were being encouraged by ‘false prophets’ who were 
‘sworn to kill everyone until the Portuguese were totally removed’. What followed in one year was a 
major siege of the island by Ternaten forces, which was called locally “the greatest war that has ever 
occurred in these parts”. Abdurachman, Indonesian History, p.174; Andaya, World of Maluku, pp.137-
8, 114-24. 
31 Andaya, World of Maluku, p.129. 
32 Andaya, World of Maluku, p.129. 
33 Bartels, Modern Indonesian Culture, p.287. 
      85  possessed cannons and other modern weaponry imported from Malacca, Java and 
Banda.
34
 
The transition from Portuguese to Dutch administration in 1605 changed Catholic 
religious instruction to a Dutch Calvinist-Protestantism.
35 While the form of religious 
service was changed, Ambonese perceptions of Christianity prevailed with many 
perceiving Dutch Christianity as a power even more superior to that of the 
Portuguese.
36 It was soon clear that the key to this new power was through 
Christianity and education. As such, the colonial Dutch government expanded 
existing educational facilities and made them open predominantly to the Christian 
community. 
 
The Dutch were aware that Christianity was a means by which they could promote the 
loyalty of the Ambonese to the new Christian rulers.
37 They accordingly decreed that 
the raja, who were links to the Dutch administration, could have access to a Dutch 
Christian education. However, by the mid nineteenth century, the advantages of an 
education became readily open to all ordinary Ambonese who professed Christianity 
only, as the Dutch saw Christianity as a means by which they could promote the 
loyalty of the Ambonese to their Christian leaders. Many ordinary Ambonese 
subsequently responded by readily accepting Christianity which was a Dutch 
prerequisite to access the sought-after educational facilities.  
 
                                                                 
34 It was reported by Galvao in his ‘A Treatise on the Moluccas’ that such weapons which were used by 
the northern Moluccas were acquired via the trading route through the Malacca, Java, Banda trade 
route. See Hubert Jacobs (trans), A Treatise on the Moluccas, Sources and Studies for the History of 
the Jesuits: Volume III, Jesuit Historical Institute: Rome, 1971. 
35 The Dutch imposed strict regulations on the Christian parts of the mix of Christian and Muslim 
communities in order to promote ‘the true reformed Christian religion’. The raja were subject to rules 
only allowing Christian marriages to be contracted while all Catholics were to be refused admittance. 
Karel Steebrink, Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: contacts and conflicts 1596-1950, 
translated by Jan Steenbrink and Henry Jasen, Rodopi: Amsterdam, 1993, p.67 
36 Dieter Bartels, ‘Politicans and Magicians: Power, Adaptive Strategies, and Syncretism in the Central 
Moluccas’, in Gloria Davis (ed) What is Modern Indonesian Culture?, Southeast Asia Series No.52, 
Center for International Studies, Ohio University, 1979, p.288. 
37 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.25. 
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administrative service in the early 1800s, aligning themselves with Christianity 
provided positions of power, prestige and advantage which they could not have 
experienced within their traditional village environment. By availing themselves of 
the education facilities that existed and later earning their living from wages or 
salaries, these Ambonese believed that they had earned a new social status within 
their community.
38 In this way, a Western or Christian education was perceived as an 
avenue to achieve a similar status to that of the Dutch or a personal status the local 
Ambonese eventually termed as ‘Black Dutchmen’.
39  
 
While Christianity in one way served to bestow these privileges on the Ambonese 
both at elite and mass level, the changes engendered through proselytisation led to 
fundamental disruptive impacts in Ambon. As a consequence of colonial policy mixed 
with mutual mistrust and misunderstanding, a relationship of distance evolved 
between the Ambonese Christian and Muslim communities.  
  
Under the Portuguese, the Ambonese witnessed a forceful segregation of their two 
religious communities.
40 Physically, barriers were imposed to sharply segregate the 
Christian community from the Muslims. In the process of propagating the Christian 
gospel, the Portuguese built fortalezas or fortresses to not only protect their trading 
posts but also to protect the new local converts. In this way, the building of the fort 
created more than a physical barrier, it also became a symbol of the divisions being 
imposed on local society and dividing traditional communities into 
Christians/Europeans and Muslims. The fortifications held a life completely separate 
from that of the territory that surrounded them. Converts to Christianity, including the 
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40 There were a large number of Muslims in the northern part of Ambon which included the Muslim 
village of Hitu. Efforts by the Portugese to convert the north coast Muslims did not succeed as Hitu 
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      87  local aristocracy, became involved in a separate enclave. In effect they became both 
physically and symbolically segregated from their Muslim counterparts who grew 
suspicious of the colonial power and their Christian religion. 
 
Under Dutch administration, relations between the local Christian and Muslim 
communities came under particular strain as Ambonese Christians were favoured over 
Muslims in the recruitment of personnel. A Christian religious affiliation became the 
prerequisite to gain a Western education and to participate in the colonial enterprise. 
Christians were preferred to fill positions within the expanding colonial administrative 
and military apparatus since there were those Dutch officials who ‘had a rather low 
opinion of the intellectual level of the Muslims’.
41 The religious issue was a central 
issue for the Dutch. Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587-1629), the organiser of power in the 
Dutch East Indies, asserted that Ambonese Christians were credible workers, even 
more so than the Dutch labourers: 
 
I understand that there are some older Ambonese children who have 
gone to school for a long time, are able to read and write reasonably 
well, come of good Christian parents and are devoted to the Christian 
religion. These may be more suited to management positions than many 
of ours.
42  
 
The relations between the two religious communities began to diverge as the Christian 
Ambonese developed a special relationship with the Dutch in their participation in the 
colonial administration. Ambonese Christians had access to education and managed to 
occupy important civil positions within the colonial regime while very few Muslims 
enjoyed the same level of privilege and material welfare.  
 
The deepening divide between Christian and Muslim communities in Ambon also 
stemmed from Muslim suspicions of perceived religious pressure by the Dutch. A 
Dutch controller at the time, for example, commented that there was a deep-rooted 
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      88  fear amongst the Muslims that Dutch schools were an attempt to Christianise the 
Muslim population.
43 While the Dutch asserted that their attempts to educate were 
without religious pressure,
44 Islam was still regarded not so much a worthy, although 
heretical, partner of the Christian faith ‘as a backward and superstitious religion’.
45 
Muslim participation in Dutch schools was very limited
46, and indeed overall in the 
whole colonial enterprise, remaining instead segregated from their Christian 
compatriots.  
 
3.3.3   Colonial Changes to Class Structure: the Ambonese Burger and the KNIL 
 
The Ambonese Burger 
 
Changes in the economy meant a fundamental change in the class structure with the 
emergence of new class ideas which modified adat ideas of the community. Thus, the 
emergence during the Dutch spice monopoly in Ambon of a new generation of 
educated elite known to the Dutch as Ambonsche Burgers
47 eroded the traditional 
standards of the Ambonese adat-based hierarchy and increasingly marginalised the 
stalwarts of Ambonese adat such as the raja. Ambonese identity and sense of 
community was in this way influenced by the small but growing new economic class 
who had the colonial prestige, resources and support to dominate the old traditional 
oligarchy.  
 
This term was initially coined by observers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
to denote a new social class of Ambonese living around Ambon city as a part of the 
burger or civilian community of the city. Later, the label was used to mean more 
                                                                 
43 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.37. 
44 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.36-7. 
45 Steenbrink, Dutch Colonialism, p.24. 
46 In the early 1920s a number of schools were established in Muslim villages although the educational 
facilities available were significantly less that those enjoyed by Christian schools. See Chauvel, 
Nationalists, pp.35-7. 
47 A. B. Lapian, (ed) Sejarah Sosial Di Daerah Maluku, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 
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      89  generally those workers who earned their living from wages or salaries.
48 This thesis 
uses the term burger to denote a specific social category; one that earned wages, lost 
their status as villagers, and subsequently liberated themselves from compulsory 
labour. The following section will examine how these changes had structural 
disruptive impacts in the Ambonese community despite this new social class being 
clear beneficiaries of Dutch colonisation.  
 
From the time Western education was first introduced into Ambon by the Portuguese 
to the time the Dutch government assumed control, educational instruction to the 
Ambonese was rudimentary with the emphasis on mainly religious teaching.
49 It was 
not until the early 1800s with increasing government involvement of the Dutch 
throughout the archipelago that education became a distinct priority in order to fill 
positions in its lower and middle ranks of bureaucracy. By 1867 there was already 
underway a considerable expansion of educational facilities with the new government 
sufficiently interested in providing a practical orientation to local education.
50
 
A new educated class of Ambonese emerged prominently after the establishment of 
the Ambonsche Burgerschool (ABS), an elementary education facility for the burgers 
of Ambon, in the mid nineteenth century.
51 Those who passed with satisfactory marks 
were guaranteed the civil service and many of those obtained important posts in the 
colonial system. Through the expansion of Dutch educational facilities there was an 
increase in the number of those abandoning the village community. The Ambonese 
were drawn to areas outside the village because the Indies government proposed to fill 
the lower and middle ranks of the bureaucracy.
52   
                                                                 
48 See Richard Z. Leirissa, “Social Development in Ambon during the 19
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49 Chauvel, Nationalists, pp.25-6. 
50 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.27. 
51 Leirissa, Cakalele, 1995, p.5. 
52 It has been argued that by the early decades of the nineteenth century, the substantial increase in the 
number of Ambonese classified as burger may be attributed to the brief intervention of the English 
colonists who abolished the lengthy application procedures of the Dutch for an indigenous person 
wishing to become a burger in order to attract the support of the local population. Lapian, Sejarah 
      90  By 1817 there was a great demand for the status of burger among the Ambonese 
villagers who were keen to work in Ambon City and smaller towns in Hila, Saparua, 
Haruku, Nusalaut, Buru and Seram. This created an exodus of Ambonese from their 
traditional village environments and subsequent relinquishment of adat  rights and 
obligations.
53 By the mid nineteenth century, the number of burgers was 
considerable.
54 Towards the end of the nineteenth century there was an increase in the 
number of Ambonese villagers migrating to urban centres looking for new work 
opportunities. By 1855 there were approximately 10,396 Ambonese classified as 
burgers in the Ambonese islands. The total population of these islands at that time 
was approximately 48,608 persons, meaning that roughly 21% of the islands’ 
population had become burgers.
55  
 
The Ambonsche Burger were fortunate beneficiaries of colonial policy. Towards the 
end of the seventeenth century the indigenous burgerij (citizenry) possessed leaders 
of their own who were nominated within the various burger village communities that 
soon emerged around the city of Ambon.
56 In this way the burgerji at least felt that 
they had achieved a certain status which was considerably higher than those within 
traditional village communities, despite the fact that many burger were financially 
quite poor.
57 For other reasons, they also justified their privileged position: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Sosial, p.55. However it is likely that the British need for manual labourers as a result of the neglect of 
forced cultivation and compulsory labour, provoked the colonists to allow villagers to work as wage 
earners in the city by way of a pass from British authorities. See Leirissa, Cakalele, p.3. 
53 There has also been a similar analysis of the mestizo (Ambonese Mestiezen) or those of mixed race, 
usually those of both European and indigenous blood. It has been said this new social group in 
Ambonese society conspicuously refused to participate in the village arena of traditional rights and 
customs. Instead they strove to associate themselves with the Dutch by attempting to find work within 
the colonial administration and outwardly appearing Dutch through their dress habits and use of the 
Dutch language. See Lapian, Sejarah Sosial, pp.52-4. 
54 Leirissa, Cakalele, 1995, p.3. 
55 Lapian, Sejarah Sosial, p.52. 
56 These leaders were usually nominated by the Political Council which was lead by the Governor and 
which made the major decisions concerning the town’s administration.  Control from the Council 
meant that the indigenous burgerij lacked any real decision-making authority. See Gerrit J. Knaap, ‘A 
City of Migrants: Kota Ambon at the End of the Seventeenth Century’, Indonesia, no.51, April 1991, 
p.111. The non-Company servant population of Ambon City was vertically divided by the Dutch into 
three sections: the European, Chinese, and the indigenous burgerij. 
57 Lapian, Sejarah Sosial, p.59. 
      91  As  burger  they did not have obligations of heerendiensten. In this 
position they were “free persons” or vrijman. Even every burger village 
had their own head, although the head of a burger village did not have 
the right to obtain labour (kwartodiensten) from its citizens as it was 
with the traditional village head.
58
 
As already indicated, access to educational facilities enabled many Ambonese to 
occupy professional positions within the colonial administration, and earn a level of 
respect and economic wealth which would not have normally been experienced within 
the traditional village environment. In reality, however, these benefits were only a 
façade for the ensuing structural disruptions which occurred as a result. The rise of the 
burgerij middle-class firstly resulted in considerably diminishing the raja’s support 
base. The loss of many village members through migration and the clear abandonment 
of traditional obligations and services usually rendered to the village and village 
leader, resulted in the raja’s loss of reputation and status when, in previous times, he 
was the instrumental figure in the synchronisation of new elements within the village.  
 
Secondly, the exodus of people from the villages to the city severely disrupted 
internal village and family life. Not only was there a distinct loss of labour resources 
to the activities of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) in Kota Ambon, but the 
burgerij  also exposed an increasing tendency to deviate from traditional locality 
communities. In growing accustomed to a life of relative privilege, the burgerij were 
keen to maintain this sense of status amongst the Europeans, especially after the 
abolition of the burger as a special status group. The following section will show that 
in this way, enlisting within the Dutch Army became an attractive alternative for the 
Ambonese  burger  who became increasingly keen to contest existing positions of 
village authority.  
 
                                                                 
58 Lapian, Sejarah Sosial, p.59. My translation of “Sebagai burger mereka tidak mempunyai 
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      92  The KNIL 
 
Further structural changes at elite and mass level were engendered by Dutch 
recruitment of Christian Ambonese into the Dutch East Indies Army (KNIL). On one 
hand, the KNIL were recipients of a new status and privilege outside their village 
environment owing to their special relationship with the Dutch. On the other hand, the 
KNIL’s sense of status and privilege induced new uncertainties within the village and 
caused internal leadership rivalries as the raja’s authority was directly challenged by 
individuals from within this new social group.  
 
Initially, the KNIL recruited soldiers exclusively from among the Christian 
population. These soldiers were then sent to Java and stationed there for military 
service. A large proportion of these recruits were former burgers who enlisted within 
the colonial army around the 1870s as a result of new government regulations in the 
last decades of the nineteenth century. The decline and demise of the Ambonese 
burger was prompted by a number of government regulations which attempted to 
discourage villagers from becoming burgers. The Dutch perceived that there was no 
further need to provide special avenues for people to work in the towns.
59 Thus by the 
mid nineteenth century, the prerogatives of the Ambonese burger had disappeared 
with the implementation of these regulations which removed their legal status as a 
group.  
 
Additionally, the formalisation of a government bureaucracy through the education 
system was a significant factor in displacing many of the Ambonese burgers and 
encouraging the burger to enlist in the KNIL. Despite the fact that schools had been 
established by the Dutch to cater for the provision of a rudimentary education for 
burgers, the recruitment of government officials was not always based on professional 
criteria. Instead, the selection of recruits for government positions became based on 
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      93  the individual’s particular clan status with heads of their respective villages. In this 
way, the Dutch no longer regarded burgers  as the main supply of workers and 
government officials in the Ambonese islands.
60
 
For both the burgers and the Ambonese in general, the KNIL was seen as an attractive 
occupational alternative, first and foremost because it was recognised as a position of 
privilege and also because it placed them on a comparative par with the Europeans. 
The recruitment of mainly Christian Ambonese into the KNIL meant for many 
Ambonese that they could assume a highly attractive new image or identity based on 
their Christianity, their favourable treatment by the Dutch, and staunch service to the 
colonial authorities. It was noted in the ‘Manual of the Military Geography and 
Statistics of the Dutch East Indies’ of the Royal Military Academy (1919) that, 
 
The Ambonese is proud of his religion; and in this regards himself as 
superior to the other peoples in the archipelago – for which reason it is 
wise to recognise them as good Christians. Those who profess this faith 
are indeed granted a privileged position in the Army of the Dutch 
Indies.
61     
 
Second, the KNIL was an incentive for burgers to escape from potential economic 
burdens, when the introduction of new government regulations in 1927 suddenly 
required some burgers to perform compulsory labour and pay taxes from which they 
had previously been exempt.
62 For other Ambonese, the KNIL offered attractive 
material privileges at a time of a struggling Moluccan economy. A significant number 
of Ambonese enlisted with the KNIL after 1890 at the approximate time of the 
collapse of the spice cultivation.
63 It was also at this time when the Moluccan spice 
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      94  monopoly ended that Ambon suddenly became a ‘peripheral region’ politically and 
economically, as the Dutch subsequently shifted its trading nucleus to Java and 
Sumatra. This sense of ‘peripherality’ counterposed against the developing economy 
of Java was to become an important point in the forthcoming nationalist period.
64
As the Dutch endeavoured to expand and control their position throughout the 
archipelago, there existed an obvious need for loyal and skilled soldiers. The raja was 
paid 150 guilders and 200 guilders in 1873 as an incentive to encourage the 
recruitment of Ambonese villagers.
65 As Table 2 below indicates, numbers did 
increase after this, and it has been of general consensus that the fall in the spice 
market and the consequent decline in the Ambonese economy influenced many locals 
to look toward the KNIL as an attractive alternative to the hardships experienced 
within the village.
66  
 
Table 2: The Total Number of KNIL Soldiers between 1827-1917 from Ambon-
Lease
67
 
Between 1827 -1873 
1827 103  persons 
1829 197  persons 
1860 – 1867  300 persons 
1867 - 1873  280 persons 
Between 1885 - 1916 
1885 1661  persons 
1895 2777  persons 
1900 4093  persons 
1905 5104  persons 
1910 5706  persons 
1912 6080  persons 
1914 9277  persons 
1916 9495  persons 
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      95  With recruitment numbers continuing to grow by the 1940s, the KNIL soon 
transformed itself into an independent identity among the Ambonese, where even 
some institutional expression evolved, including the publication of soldier’s 
magazines and local Ambonese newspapers which contained accounts glorifying the 
deeds and expeditions of the soldiers.
68 The exclusive mentality of the soldiers to the 
rest of the Ambonese community could be particularly highlighted in the tangsi or 
army barracks, which signified a preference for living in closely associated 
communities, within or located around, the walls of the Dutch forts.
69 To add to this 
exclusiveness, a school resembling the Ambonese burger school, mentioned 
previously, was established in 1889, specifically for Ambonese, Manadonese and 
Timorese KNIL soldiers. Schooling was conducted in Dutch and was intended to train 
the KNIL community in military and administrative service with overall emphasis on 
their loyal relationship to the Dutch. 
70  
 
The recruitment of Ambonese into military service had structural impacts within 
Ambonese society in several ways. From the beginning of colonial rule in Ambon, the 
recruitment of men from villages for military purposes introduced a new attitude 
towards traditional concepts of rank and status. Looking back at the time of 
Portuguese rule, local rulers were particularly concerned with the fact that the 
recruitment of men on the basis of remuneration meant that these men relinquished 
their status as anak negeri (village member) and subsequently relinquished this 
contact with the traditional way of life encompassing traditional rights and 
obligations. In the traditional system, any person who left the village community was 
no longer bound by certain obligations to the community, including the defence of 
their territory and lands. Subsequently those male villagers who became part of the 
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      96  new militia forfeited their commitments to the tradition and were immediately 
classified as ‘Portuguese’ rather than Ambonese.
71  
 
In physical terms the number of those who pursued a soldier’s career was a disruptive 
element in the village as a traditional social entity. In the Ambonese islands, the 
effects of Dutch KNIL recruitment had quite a significant impact on village family 
units as demonstrated by the sheer numbers. 
 
By approximately 1930 there were 22,773 Ambonese. Amongst these, 
there were 9366 Ambonese situated outside Ambon-Lease, and from 
those there were a total of 4257 who were members of the KNIL. This 
meant that practically every family on Ambon-Lease had one or more 
family member a soldier within the KNIL.
72
 
The mass departure of villagers to the KNIL not only had a significant impact on the 
disruption of familial communities, but also represented an economic loss of manual 
labour with the departure of each recruit.  As a result, villages in Ambon experienced 
an alarmingly rapid decline in clove production and subsequent income from its 
production. Money sent to individual families by soldiers and money from KNIL 
pensions became an important supply of alternative funding: 
 
In 1936, for example, it is estimated that money sent from soldiers and 
soldier pensions totalled f 416,945, - and f 745,905, -. And income from 
the sale of cloves in the same year only reached f 91,000, - for the 
whole of Ambon-Lease. This meant that families of soldiers became a 
very important source of income for the inhabitants of Ambon-Lease.
73
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      97  By the second decade of the twentieth century, rivalries between the KNIL soldiers 
and the raja gained momentum as each raja was offered a financial incentive or 
payment for every military enlistment from a member of his village.
74 Many 
Ambonese did not view favourably the raja’s financial gain from payments made by 
the government as a result of their cooperation with the Dutch authorities. Criticism of 
the  raja was considerable as controversy over the position of the KNIL soldiers 
ensued in the early years of the twentieth century. The pervading attitude at the time 
towards the raja was exemplified by J. Teeuwen, a representative of the nominated 
the Indies Nationalist Party (Insulinde / Nationaal-Indische Partij -NIP), who argued 
in 1918: 
 
The raja get their hands greased with f 50 for every Christian and heathen 
youth...and thus promote the recruitment out of self-interest, and this 
works against the interests of the people.
75
 
These grievances provided impetus for new status claims by the KNIL soldiers who 
overtly challenged the legitimacy of the raja as a rightful leader of the Ambonese 
community. Traditional issues which were dealt with purely within village boundaries 
by existing structures of resolution were suddenly forced beyond the village 
periphery.  Retired KNIL soldiers who returned to the village expected to play a role 
in the affairs of the village based on their assumed superiority to the raja as a result of 
their more worldly experience. Conflict, therefore, occurred when the KNIL soldiers 
were forthright with their grievances and demands, whilst the raja and the adat elite 
were not always willing to concede to the demands and ambitions of these soldiers. 
 
On retirement, the reassimilation of the veterans into negeri society 
was often a difficult one. The soldiers were admired for their services 
to the KNIL and the protection they offered their compatriots 
throughout the archipelago. However, once in the negeri they tended to 
be treated in the same way as their fellow-villagers. The established 
status system in the negeri was adat-based, and most of the soldiers 
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      98  came from the ordinary people rather than from families in the adat 
hierarchy, least of all the raja families.
76
 
The rivalry between the KNIL soldiers and the raja who was traditionally the most 
respected and most feared in the Ambonese village hierarchy, remained a source of 
visible antagonism within the local community until the early nationalist movement in 
the 1920s. Even ordinary Ambonese became disconcerted with the perceptible 
disruptions to authority structures. They coined the nickname ‘laskaar compania’, or 
slave to the Company or the government, to refer to the KNIL soldier and protested 
that the raja was supplying the equivalent of ‘slaves’ to the Dutch in exchange for 
money and a premium.
77
 
This trend towards disputes, rivalries and protest became the basis for inflaming 
widespread discontent within the Ambonese community. Gradually, as disputes and 
rival challenges increased during the twentieth century, the pervading discontent was 
channelled through the introduction of new nationalist structures articulated by 
educated elites who became politically active in Ambon. The following discussion 
will, therefore, shift away from an examination of the factors of disruption towards a 
focus on how these disputes acquired a new nationalist dimension. 
 
3.4   Constructions of Identity: Loyalist versus Nationalist 
 
The process between elite level involvement in Indonesian nationalism, and the intra-
Ambon disputes and disruptions was linked by the desire of villagers to find a new 
channel to air their grievances, and for the elites to find a new channel to mobilise 
support. From this perspective, these disputes provided the basis for the initial split 
within the ranks of educated elites, which gradually emerged in the twentieth century 
in the form of clashes between loyalists and nationalists. Urban educated elites or 
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      99  intellectuals, who became politically active in Ambon in the early 1900s, began to 
establish new political movements for Indonesian decolonisation and, at the same 
time, new ideas of Ambonese identity. It is argued here that these new constructions 
represent an important stage towards later constructions of Ambonese nationalist 
rights claims. 
 
This section will show how discontent amongst the Ambonese was channelled 
through the introduction of new nationalist visions which in general terms can be 
categorised as those loyal to the Dutch government and those that advocated anti-
colonialism in the context of a ‘unitary Indonesian nation’. During this stage, there 
were also indications of a burgeoning cultural, religious and political awareness, and a 
preliminary sense of Ambonese identity.  However these initial visions of nationalist 
identity did not work due to ‘structural ambivalence’ in that Ambonese loyalties 
remained ambiguously divided. Subsequent political disruptions during 1945-49 and 
the return of intellectual Ambonese from Java, initiated another process of identity 
construction engendering a modified construction of the ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
 
At the core of these developments, there were those Ambonese who favoured the 
Dutch and gravitated towards Ambonese nationalism directed against Indoensian 
nationalism, while others were more inclined to be anti-Dutch and pro-Indonesian. 
The origin of these specific nationalisms can be easily explained purely in 
instrumentalist self interest terms. However a constructivist approach can supplement 
the idea of self interest calculations with the point that those individuals whose 
careers and lives were most closely linked to the Dutch presence found a sense of 
security and identity in the idea of a Dutch-related national community; while those 
who had been most disrupted by colonial rule, sought security-refuge in the 
construction of ideas which demonised the Dutch and imagined a virtuous Indonesian 
us directed against Dutch rule.  
 
 
      100  In the initial wake of nationalist fervour, political alignments in Ambon indicated that 
there was a distinct 2-way factional split between those who could be broadly 
described as ‘loyalist’ and those who were regarded as ‘nationalist’ communities. The 
loyalists were generally those who had been supported by the Dutch administration, 
that is, mainly the Christian Ambonese, the traditional elite and some educated 
Ambonese given their reliance on Dutch education and employment. As will be 
shown in this section, the degree to which the loyalists wished to maintain their 
relationship with the Dutch often varied in emphasis and included those who espoused 
an Ambonese nationalism under Dutch leadership. The nationalists generally included 
the Muslim community and a growing number of urban educated Ambonese who 
were tending to adopt an ‘Indonesian’ perspective, that is, they emphasised anti-
colonialism and the need to integrate within a unitary Indonesian nation.
78  
  
The educated elite from this latter group began to articulate new interpretations of 
Ambonese identity. One of Ambon’s principal educated nationalist leaders was A. J. 
Patty who established the Sarekat Ambon (Ambon Association) in 1920. This party 
became one of Ambon’s major nationalist parties
79 and sought to promote a ‘unity of 
the people’. It voiced popular concerns from the Ambonese community and was 
particularly vocal regarding their objections to government financial contributions 
being used as a payment to the raja and the discretionary power of the government to 
reject popularly chosen candidates by village members.
80 As Christie describes, 
 
Although this was primarily an educational and welfare organization, it 
definitely formed part of the new ‘cultural revolution’ that was beginning 
to sweep through the Indies, challenging not only the grip of local adat 
and the status of the traditional regents, but also, eventually the 
legitimacy of the Dutch rule itself.
81
                                                                 
78 Christie, Modern History, p.112. 
79 Sarekat Ambon was founded in 1920 by A. J. Patty, a Christian Ambonese. The organisation’s 
membership was open to all Ambonese, both Christians and Muslims, soldiers and civilians. Chauvel, 
Nationalists, p.101. 
80 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.101. 
81 Christie, Modern History, p.117. 
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Sarekat Ambon was careful from the beginning to reflect Ambonese interests despite 
remaining convinced that Ambon’s future was within an independent Indonesia where 
Ambonese society would have to be radically transformed. Under E.U. Pupella’s
82 
new leadership in the 1930s, they believed in particular that in order to create a bond 
amongst both Muslims and Christians in Ambon, Christians would have to direct their 
focus on economic development at home rather than their preferences for government 
and the military service.
83  
 
From a very early stage, there were indications of a burgeoning cultural, religious and 
political awareness amongst political parties in Ambonese society during the 
disruptive colonial period. As early as 1908, under the leadership of J.P. Risakotta, the 
Vereniging Wilhelmina was established for the so called ‘children of Ambon’ (anak-
anak Ambon) with a view to bringing members of the KNIL more closely together; in 
1909 ‘Ambon’s Bond’ was founded by an association of Ambonese public servants; 
and in 1924 Sou Maluka Ambon was also established, both aiming at ‘advocating and 
furthering the material and spiritual interests of the population of the Moluccas in 
every sphere’.
84 Thus in every endeavour Sarekat Ambon focused on Ambonese 
interests by advocating the promotion of the material and spiritual interests of the 
Ambonese and the need for a parliamentary form of government for the people.
85
 
‘Nationalism’ did not initially bring with it a sense of cohesion, certainty, and identity 
which might resolve existing disruptions in the community. Indeed it seems to have 
added a new level of uncertainty. Nationalist political parties encountered difficulties 
in Ambon during their campaign activities, particularly in the 1920s to the 1930s. 
                                                                 
82 Pupella was born in Ambon in 1910. He later joined the political party Sarekat Ambon and attended a 
teachers training college in Yogyakarta, Central Java in 1933. Chauvel, Regional Dynamics, p.242. 
83 Chauvel, Regional Dynamics, p.242. 
84 Manusama, J. Alvarez, “Political Aspects of the Struggle for Independence”, in J.C. Bouman, and 
others (eds) The South Moluccas: rebellious province or occupied state, A. W. Sythoff: Leyden, 1960, 
pp.52-3. 
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      102  Inherent within Ambonese society was a ‘structural ambivalence’ in that Ambonese 
loyalties remained ambiguously divided. For those who had benefited from the 
colonial system, such as the Ambonese burgerij, the KNIL, and the raja, to accept the 
nationalist position would mean relinquishing their social status and life of relative 
privilege. As Ellen describes, here was a people ‘whose interests became 
subsequently linked so closely with those of the colonial power’, but who were also 
keen to improve their fortune.
86 The problem thus arose when, 
 
The means advocated to promote Ambonese interests implied criticism of 
past or present Dutch policy or challenged the prevailing feeling of 
‘loyalty’ to the crown.
87
 
On the other hand, there were those in Ambon who were opposed to colonial rule and 
felt that a common ‘Indonesian’ identity needed to be shaped. Muslims in Ambon 
who felt excluded from the privileged relationship with the Dutch did not identify 
themselves with the colonial power. The Dutch promotion of Christianity and the 
elimination of the Muslim elite as independent political actors meant that the Muslim 
community was relegated to a position subordinate to the local Christians. At the 
same time, educated Ambonese, both Christian and Muslim, became aware that a 
common identity, either as a citizen of an Indonesian Republic or not, needed to be 
forged if anti-colonial political parties were to succeed.
88
 
Organisations such as Moluks Politiek Verbond (MPV) which was founded in 1929, 
sought to reach a compromise in this situation by aiming for the emancipation of the 
Moluccas within a future federal constitutional structure for the whole of the East-
Indies archipelago. According to its constitution, the MPV aimed at self-government 
based upon the possibilities of development in the Moluccas. At the same time it 
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      103  presented a provision within its constitution with regard to its relations to The 
Netherlands: 
 
The MPV will support every loyal aspiration for self-government of all 
these population groups with a view to attaining to a federative union of 
the autonomous parts of the Netherlands East Indies.
89
 
Factional splits among the Ambonese presented a rather ambiguous picture of 
political activity in Ambon. On the one hand there was a deep-felt commitment to the 
colonial system, which had provided many Ambonese with a secure and privileged 
position. On the other hand there were ambitions for greater improvement in 
Ambonese political activity and economic welfare, which was resonated in many of 
the socio-cultural associations developed in the early 1910s and 1920s. Sarekat 
Ambon endeavoured to a certain degree to promote a strong nationalist movement but 
it, as Chauvel indicates: 
 
never resolved the dilemma of wanting to pursue its nationalist ideals at 
the same time as feeling the need to appear ‘loyal’ and non-
revolutionary in the eyes of their fellow-Ambonese and gain the 
approval of the government.
90
 
The articulations of these nationalist ideas by the Ambonese educated elite served as 
legitimisations in local disputes. In other words, the Indonesian nationalist movement 
was an avenue by which the Ambonese intellectuals sought to find accord with the 
other Ambonese. Complaints against the raja, as discussed previously in this chapter, 
provided a basis for the emergence of political parties in which the educated elite 
could become directly involved in village disputes that originally were the 
responsibility of the traditional authority structures.  
 
                                                                 
89 Manusama, South Moluccas, p.53. This was the first time one of the indigenous populations within 
the Dutch East Indies formulated and expressed the desire for a federal constitutive structure for the 
archipelago. 
90 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.84. 
      104  In this way, widespread support in Ambon for some Indonesian nationalist parties was 
a result of disillusionment towards the changing position of the raja and the overall 
changing village environment. Many Ambonese who had long found fault with the 
raja’s claim to authority discovered a new avenue through the nationalistic movement 
to not only air their grievances concerning village leadership but to contest the raja’s 
position. The fragile position of the raja in Ambon in maintaining a strong centralised 
focus of power which had developed under the colonial regime, was directly 
challenged by the educated elite and their political parties who gained considerable 
support, especially during the post-war period from 1945.
91 In Pelauw, on the island 
of Haruku in southern Seram, and in Hutumuri in Ambon, members of the local 
population became affiliated with one of the mainstream Indonesian nationalist 
groups, Insulinde, which challenged the raja as legitimate leaders of the people.
92 
Residents of Pelauw, for example, complained in a letter stating, 
 
That already for some years we have opposed our raja because we 
assert that we are not supposed to follow the wishes of a raja who has 
opposed adat and because of that had brought the curse of the ancestors 
upon himself.
93
 
Owing to pervading uncertainties of how the Ambonese should articulate their sense 
of identity in a changing atmosphere of nationalist sentiment, much of the 
organisational development in Ambonese politics in the 1910s-1930s was 
subsequently debated in terms of ‘loyalty’ and ‘disloyalty’. In the wake of the 
Japanese occupation of Indonesia in 1942, Ambon was still characterised by a 
confusing choice of nationalist visions which in general terms either envisioned 
integration within a united Indonesia or maintaining colonial links with the Dutch.  
 
                                                                 
91 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.103. However for the initial years of the nationalistic movement in Ambon, 
the Dutch responded quite strongly in their defence of the raja and attempted in various measures to 
consolidate the position of the raja and the administration against the threat from a movement 
vouching for independence from the Dutch. 
92 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.88-97.  
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      105  Ambon, therefore, entered the Second World War with unanswered questions of 
cultural and national identity. The division of loyalties allowed the educated 
nationalists to lift their profile through the expansion of their autonomous 
organisational experience in the political arena. Their channelling of popular 
expressions of discontent in Ambon through new nationalist structures and ideas 
exacerbated the increasing tensions and factional splits within the Ambonese 
community. These contesting alignments came to a head with the rise of Ambonese 
ethnonationalism and the formation of the Republic of the South Moluccas in 1950.  
 
3.5   The Construction of an Ambonese Identity 
 
The construction of an ethnic identity was an indigenous initiative and had principle 
support and leadership from the Ambonese intellectuals and the raja, all of whom had 
been confronted by profound social, economic and political change. The construction 
of Ambonese identity and the commitment to self-determination sought to transcend 
internal splits and alignments and reward elites with political authority. Support for a 
Moluccan state was, therefore, not necessarily pro-Dutch or anti-Indonesian but it was 
a means by which Ambonese elites could mobilise a support base by showing that 
they were not indifferent to the problems facing their homeland. For many civilian 
Ambonese who experienced the frightening economic and social changes to their 
traditional society and the overall lack of political and authoritative certainty, the 
Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS) provided a resolution to the existing feelings 
of dislocation.  
 
From 1945-1949 there was widespread division amongst elites as to how to respond 
to the Dutch proposal for federalism. After the capitulation of the Japanese and the 
declaration of the Indonesian Republic in 1945, a proposal for a Commonwealth was 
put forward by the Dutch in an attempt to reach a settlement with the Indonesian 
Republic. The proposal suggested the incorporation of the Republic as a unit in a 
      106  wider federal state. An agreement was reached in 1947 – the Linggajati Agreement – 
to form a federal ‘United States of Indonesia’ which would consist of the Republic of 
Indonesia, Borneo and the ‘Great East’. It was also agreed that a new political entity 
the ‘State of Eastern Indonesia’ (NIT) would be created as a component state of 
federal Indonesia.
94 Within this framework, the newly formed region of the South 
Moluccas would join this new state as a subordinate administrative unit.  
 
In response to the proposal for a federation, new constructions of Ambonese identity 
were supported and led by Ambonese who had been educated outside Maluku. 
Significantly, these individuals began to emerge as a more discernible group in local 
politics. Two of these were J. A. Manusama
95 and CH. R. S. Soumokil
96, both key 
figures in the RMS movement of 1950. Manusama and Soumokil claimed to be 
sympathetic to an independent Indonesia but at the same time harboured ambitions for 
a prominent role in their plans for the emancipation and reform of their own society.  
 
These new Ambonese elite were acutely aware that the declaration of the Indonesian 
Republic had brought little encouragement from within Ambon
97 despite their 
personal sympathy for the national cause. Throughout Ambon, there was a heightened 
concern as individuals became more politically aware of the immediate importance of 
Indonesia’s proclamation to their future. Linked to this was the increasing fear among 
                                                                 
94 May, Pacific Viewpoint, 1990, pp.115-6. 
95 Alvarez Manusama was an intellectual and an Ambonese émigré, born, raised and educated in 
colonial Indonesia. He returned to Ambon and worked as a school teacher after graduating as an 
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NIT and DMS. In 1948 he founded the Democratic Movement of the South Moluccas which sought an 
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several Ambonese organisations. See also Chauvel, Nationalists, pp.315-92. 
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      107  the Ambonese of their probable dominance by Java
98, which was as much an 
expression of current political pressures as the disruption in Ambon and the disunity 
regarding Ambon’s relations with the outside world. With increasing political 
tensions throughout Indonesia that often exploded into serious violence
99, aspiring 
Ambonese leaders constructed a desire for autonomy by offering the option for a 
separate status outside Indonesia while also encouraging participation within the 
Dutch colony.  
 
As explained in the previous section on political developments in Ambon, Muslims 
and Christians expressed different political orientations based on whether they had 
been supported by the Dutch administration - Christian Ambonese, the traditional elite 
and some educated Ambonese supported political affiliation with the Dutch 
government, while those within the Muslim community supported integration within a 
unitary Indonesian nation as a protest vote against perceived Dutch colonial bias. The 
subsequent impact of the Japanese occupation, the later collapse of the federal 
proposal, and outbreak of political violence were crucial influencing factors towards 
generating the reorientation of these political alliances away from support for an 
Indonesian nationalism as well as support for the Dutch, towards allegiance to 
nationalist alternatives which espoused expressions of a distinct Ambonese identity. 
The precise impact of these factors is discussed in the following. 
 
The impact of Japanese rule was a key disruptive factor to the proposal for a federal 
entity.  Disagreement amongst Ambonese elites and the masses as to how to respond 
to the proposal was influenced by the issue of Ambon’s relationship, not so much 
                                                                 
98 Prior to 1950, there is no record of significant Javanese migration to Ambon. During VOC times, 
Kota Ambon’s Asian migrant population consisted primarily of freed slaves of usually Makassarese, 
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Javanese families to the less populated Outer islands but this never included the Moluccas. Likewise, 
Indonesia’s transmigration program did not commence until 1950. 
99 Christie, Modern History, p.114. 
      108  with the Dutch as with their relationship with Java. The three and a half years of 
Japanese occupation of eastern Indonesia did much to change perceptions of the 
Indonesian Republic and its Javanese administration. Three main factors were 
involved. First, whilst nationalist leaders and the majority of the raja either retained 
their positions or were elevated to positions of authority within the Japanese 
administrative structure, their experience was not altogether appreciated. The 
Japanese remained suspicious of pro-Dutch loyalties and thus many Christians 
suffered discrimination by the occupying force: 
 
During the Japanese occupation, many Christians suffered. Not less 
than 60 Protestant ministers were decapitated because they were 
considered to be Dutch accomplices. The Moluccan Protestant Church 
(GPM) experienced severe difficulties. Spies acted violently and 
arbitrarily especially in the beginning of the Japanese occupation. Every 
person they accused of being a Dutch servant would certainly suffer an 
unfortunate fate. It was not only certain Christians who would suffer as 
a result, but also community authority figures.
100
 
Second, Ambonese relations with Java became strained as their people suffered 
comparatively worse than those in Java, on account of their loyalty to the Dutch. For 
administrative purposes, the Japanese had divided the former Dutch East Indies into 
three areas: Java, Sumatra and the remaining territory. These areas remained in 
administrative isolation from each other, meaning that mutual contact between areas 
was extremely difficult.
101 Relations, therefore, became strained with many of those 
Christian Ambonese suffering under Japanese rule remaining distrustful of Java and 
their relationship with the occupying force. Such was its impact for these people that, 
 
                                                                 
100 My translation of , “Dalam masa pendudukan Jepang itu, orang-orang Kristen banyak yang 
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Belanda pasti akan mengalami nasib yang sial. Tidak saja orang-orang Kristen yang tertentu yang 
menderita karenanya, juga tokoh-tokoh pimpinan masyarakat”. Lapian, Sejarah Sosial, p.106. 
101 J. Alvarez Manusama, ‘Political Aspects of the Struggle for Independence’, in J. C. Bouman (and 
others) The South Moluccas: Rebellious Province or Occupied State, A.W. Sythoff: Leyden, 1960, 
pp.57-8.  
      109  In view of the experience acquired in the years of the Japanese 
occupation they [Ambonese] had no faith in an Indonesian regime for 
the East-Indian Archipelago.
102
 
Third, the transition from Japanese occupation to the proclamation of Indonesia’s 
Independence on 17 August 1945 was deeply regretted by Muslims in Ambon who 
were treated most favourably by the Japanese. The Muslim elite in Ambon were 
particularly favoured by the Japanese in stark contrast to the authority and power 
imparted to Ambonese Christians by the Dutch. Japanese support of Muslim 
activities, for example, gave the Ambonese Muslims the impetus to establish in 1943 
Djamijah Islamaijah Ceram, the ‘first supra-village organization for Moslems in the 
Ambonese islands.’
103  
 
Due to factors discussed above there was a movement away from Indonesian 
nationalism amongst the Ambonese towards political expressions which supported a 
separation from the Indonesian Republic. Divergent positions on the federal proposal 
constituted elements of disruption and insecurity as the Ambonese community began 
to be characterised by political disunity through the promotion of various versions of 
‘Indonesia’ by different parties. With the Dutch proposal for a federal state, there 
were those Ambonese who responded by disregarding the ‘Javanese’ Republic and 
directed their attention to the Dutch. During this 1945-50 period, some educated 
nationalists and members of the Muslim community emerged into the forefront of the 
public political arena to offer their support for the federal proposal. The Indonesian 
Freedom Party (PIM), established on 17 August 1946, led by former Sarekat Ambon 
leader, E.U. Pupella, and supported by several Muslim leaders
104, acquiesced to the 
federal structure and thus, at the same time, to groups who still relied on their colonial 
connections.   
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104 There appears to have been widespread support for the PIM from the Muslim community with the 
Muslim raja of Tulehu conceding that 90% of youths in Ambon came from his own village. Even 
Pupella in 1946 indicated that he felt confident of his political support with strong support from the 
Muslims in Ambon. See Chauvel, Nationalists, p.222. 
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Under Pupella’s undemonstrative and pragmatic leadership, PIM 
pursued a cooperative pro-federal policy carefully calculated to promote 
the Indonesia cause in an arena under uncontested Dutch control and in 
which influential groups still clung to their colonial links.
105
 
Pupella’s political position was counterposed by  pro-Dutch loyalists such as the raja, 
the soldiers, and Christian groups who posed an alternate depiction of Ambonese 
identity. While the Dutch proposal was attractive for the loyalists who wished to be 
separated from what was perceived as a Java-centric government, there was still a 
certain amount of disillusionment, 
 
They had expected the Republic to be dealt with by the Dutch in much 
the same way as Aceh and Lombok had been – with the help of 
Ambonese soldiers. What became incomprehensible to the rajas, 
soldiers and veterans was that the Dutch government itself should be 
working toward a supposedly independent Indonesia. Dutch insistence 
on the inclusion of Ambon in federal Indonesia amounted to a rejection 
of their loyalty. A pillar of their worldview had collapsed.
106
 
Instead, they formed the Federation of Five Associations (GSS) in 1946 which 
expressed a preference for a continuation of Dutch administration in the South 
Moluccas but with the possibility that the future administration could be placed in the 
hands of the Ambonese. Another conservative group, the Association of the Great 
East (PTB), had similar goals in its promotion for the separation of Ambon, Manado, 
and Timor from Indonesia in order to form together a separate entity within the Dutch 
colony.
107  
 
The Moluccan Commonwealth idea was proposed by three Java-educated Ambonese 
who returned home to Ambon. R.J. Maetekohy
108, M.P. Harmusial and J.S. Patty 
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member of the first NIT cabinet in 1947. He failed to retain his cabinet position in January 1949 and 
later reverted back to his separatist tendencies in his support for the Moluccas separation from the 
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      111  envisioned that the Moluccas would form a completely autonomous area within the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and remain on a provisional status within Indonesia. 
Implicit with this idea was a clear distrust of other Indonesians and a desire for a 
degree of autonomy. The proposal was looked upon favourably by Ambonese 
loyalists such as the raja who were still keen to retain relations with the Dutch and 
limit as much as possible their relations with Indonesia. The idea of a Moluccan 
Commonwealth did not succeed, however, owing to its rejection by the Sultan of 
Ternate who envisioned a broader federal unit that encompassed the whole of East 
Indonesia instead.
109 Significantly, it was also not compatible with the Dutch vision of 
a state structure that encompassed the eastern archipelago.  
 
As a way of imparting a degree of unity and, thus, partially resolving existing 
insecurities, Manusama began to cooperate both with the PIM and the conservative 
sections of society. He claimed to be sympathetic to an independent Indonesia but 
also campaigned for a greater voice for the Ambonese. He supported Pupella in his 
visions for the economic development of their islands while also campaigning for 
Ambonese political voice in the South Moluccan Council (DMS).  Manusama 
publicly announced the need to take into account the ‘interests of the South Moluccas’ 
and thus founded the Democratic Movement of the South Moluccas (GDMS) in 
February 1948, which sought an autonomous and democratic South Moluccas but one 
that was ultimately within an independent Indonesia.
110  
 
The GDMS did not succeed as a unifying movement demonstrated by their failure to 
gain support in the 1946, 1948 and the 1949 elections for the parliament in 
Makassar.
111 The unanticipated collapse of the federalism proposal in 1949 and the 
fears and insecurities produced by its disintegration, led to divisions at elite level. 
Factionalism existed between those who remained committed to an independent 
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      112  Indonesia and Manusama’s conditional support of a federal Indonesia. The Ambonese 
raja who were supportive of the GDMS became disillusioned with the Dutch for their 
withdrawal from the popular proposal of a federal system.
112  
 
Similarly, the unifying vision of the PIM could not provide the basis for Ambonese 
solidarity owing to factionalism and internal disputes within the party leadership. 
Pupella’s pursuit of a cooperative pro-federal policy, in which he could both support 
the Indonesia cause and allow others to maintain their colonial links, conflicted with 
the party’s co-leader, Reawaru, who wanted open support for the Republic. In a 
similar fashion, the relationship between the PTB and the conservative rajas of 
Ambon, who dominated the GSS, was uneasy despite the similarity of their goals. 
Traditionally distrustful of Ambonese politicians from Java, whether nationalist or 
loyalist, the raja never supported attempts by the Jakarta-based association to 
mobilise support in Ambon itself, preferring to remain in control of their own home 
ground. Furthermore, the attitude of the KNIL soldiers, who formed the primary 
support base of the PTB, was such that they still retained their principle characteristics 
of isolation and exclusiveness. 
 
These elite splits and the disruptions within the wider Ambonese society previously 
examined in this chapter produced the political alignments and violent clashes of 
1949. With the prospective departure of the Dutch which left an authority vacuum, 
there ensued mayhem on the streets with violent clashes between members of the 
different political parties. Reawaru, who assumed leadership of the PIM in Pupella’s 
temporary absence in The Hague, instigated provocative military marches by PIM 
youth groups which prompted many of the local KNIL soldiers to react concerned for 
their safety and future employment. Indeed, frequent clashes erupted throughout the 
islands. The situation was exacerbated in January 1950 with the arrival in Ambon of 
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Republic. 
      113  Indonesian elite special forces who clashed with the youth groups resulting in heavy 
casualties.
113
 
In such an atmosphere of complete disorder and instability there was a concurrent 
shift amongst the Ambonese away from supporting integration into the Indonesian 
Republic towards an ingrained cultivation of fear by both the pro-Indonesian 
intellectuals and the conservative Dutch loyalists. The frenzy that emerged after the 
collapse of the NIT brought into focus what the Ambonese began to perceive as a 
‘Javanese threat’ to the security of their immediate community.  Thus, 
 
The Dutch were no longer the problem; now the State of East Indonesia 
felt it was fighting for its very survival against pressure, both internally 
and from Java, for a unitary state.
114  
 
The most significant role left to nationalism in Ambon was through the unifying 
ideology of all those opposed to ‘Javanese domination’ and in favour of resolving 
contemporary disruptions. In this way, both the PIM and the loyalist groups could 
inscribe within the South Moluccan Republic their own aspirations. Support for a 
united south Moluccan community that was free from any political relations with the 
federal state of East Indonesia and the Indonesian Republic was voiced, particularly 
from the loyalists such as the raja and members of the KNIL, but also from members 
of the nationalists such as Pupella.  
 
The RMS was eventually declared on April 24, 1950 and its government ruled Ambon 
until December of that same year when the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) occupied 
the town of Ambon and effectively defeated RMS forces. During the brief governance 
of the RMS, Manusama and Soumokil sought to rise above the tensions and splits and 
offer a new vision of harmony to the Ambonese. When the Dutch nationalist vision 
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      114  had collapsed, and the Indonesian nationalist ideology failed to offer a simple 
resolution to the matter of a possible ‘transition’, they declared the RMS on 24 April 
1950 (See Appendix 6) as a vision to whom all could subscribe.  
 
Using the name of the Republic of the South Moluccas, the Ambonese political elites 
effectively used the political and administrative term coined by the Dutch to refer 
collectively to the cultural area of Ambon and surrounding islands including the 
coastal areas of southern and western Seram. In effect the name of the RMS gave it 
political clout as a fully-fledged separatist movement intent on establishing itself as an 
autonomous political entity, but at the same time allowing the RMS to refer to a 
cultural area which offered an underlying basis for a common ‘Ambonese’ cultural 
ethnic identity. 
 
Using ethnic symbols of solidarity, combined with added anti-Javanese sentiment, the 
RMS, in effect, allowed people to locate their sense of mutuality and origin. Based on 
ethnic symbols of solidarity of ethnicity, religion, language and territory, the 
ideological framework of the RMS allowed both displaced traditional elites and 
Ambonese individuals to unite collectively around these myths and symbols of ethno-
regional nationalism. 
 
3.6   A New Construction of Ambonese Identity 
 
The discussion thus far has centred on the dislocations of authority structure, elite 
rivalries, party factionalism, and popular protest which constituted a culmination of 
the diverse disruptions into a 1949-1950 crisis of identity in Ambon. The RMS idea 
offered practical protection for those needing Dutch patronage and fearing Javanese 
domination. More importantly, it offered a sense of security to a dislocated Ambonese 
society by not only harnessing existing fears of Javanese domination and thus using 
      115  the depiction of a hated Javanese ‘Other’, but also offering a clear and simple 
diagnosis and prescription of complex disruptions. 
 
The RMS was able to offer the simple idea that independence from Java would solve 
all problems and provide the emotional and physical security which an Indonesian 
Republic could not. At the time of the RMS proclamation, Manusama and Soumokil 
were both able to develop support in a widespread atmosphere which was described at 
the time as being one of dread and confusion.
115 This important element in identity 
construction included the ideas of the symbol of the Proclamation, and the aggression 
of the TNI attack in order to validate and dramatise the nationalist diagnosis.  
 
The proclamation of the RMS was significant in endorsing the RMS nationalist cause 
through two distinct symbolic representations of Ambonese identity. By looking to its 
forebears’ struggle against colonialism for inspiration, an RMS flag was presented to 
the Ambonese, which sought to replicate the colours and design thought to have been 
used by the anti-colonial hero, Pattimura.
116 In a similar act, Pattimura’s nationalist 
struggle became the symbolic inspiration for the declaration of an RMS national day 
on the 15
th May, which was the day the Pattimura revolt of 1817 began on the island 
of Saparua. In this way, the employment of a nationalist language linked ideas of 
cultural identity with a reinterpretation of Pattimura’s struggle as a symbol of moral 
superiority and political unity. 
 
Furthermore, the proclamation came to represent a nationalist promise of security and 
authority which could not otherwise have been perceived possible under a Java-
                                                                 
115 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.360. 
116 Pattimura or Thomas Matulesia led a revolt against the Dutch in 1817 on the island of Saparua 
which later spread to the island of Nusa Laut, the south coast of Seram and also to Hitu in Ambon. The 
revolt lost against the superior weaponry of the Dutch and Pattimura was executed on 16 December 
1817. Other armed revolts occurred in the Moluccas against Dutch rule in 1858, 1860, 1864 but never 
on the same scale as 1817. For further information see Ben Van Kaam, The South Moluccas: 
Background to the Train Hijackings, C.Hurst & Company: London, 1980, pp.5-25. Also, M. Sapija, 
Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pattimura: Pahlawan Indoneia, Djambatan: Djakarta, 1957. 
      116  dominated Republic. Soumokil, in particular, was convinced that a South Moluccan 
Republic was the only way they could feel safe, that is, in a state which was 
‘absolutely independent of Indonesia.’
117 This sentiment was echoed by a general 
pervasive feeling of apprehension in Ambon towards the Indonesian Republic. Two 
senior Dutch civil servants gave the following impression of the proclamation of the 
RMS at the time: 
 
The fear of Javanese domination which is felt in many circles, partly 
also among the Ambonese Muslims, has made all this possible and has 
won the government the support of the majority of the people.
118
 
For the Ambonese who were undergoing the strains of disruption, the depiction of the 
Indonesian Republic as a threatening force served to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
nationalist movement. This was then dramatically validated by the subsequent 
blockade and invasion by the Indonesian armed forces in July 1950. Whilst the TNI 
troops effectively crushed RMS forces within two months, the effect of the initial 
blockade was to consolidate support for the RMS and its nationalist cause.
119
 
The exclusivist aspects of Ambonese nationalism can thus be traced to the clear 
ideological dichotomy which defined the Ambonese ‘us’ in opposition to the 
Indonesian/Javanese ‘them’. As the following section will examine, the RMS 
ideology used the ethnocultural symbols of common ancestry, territorial homeland, 
language and religion, which, in effect, allowed people to locate their sense of 
mutuality and origin. Once constructed in this way, these visions of Ambonese and 
Indonesian identity offered a simple diagnosis of the complex pattern of interactions 
which were changing Ambonese society in disorientating ways. 
                                                                 
117 Soumokil had already been detested by Indonesian nationalists for his earlier, albeit unsuccessful, 
campaign to proclaim East Indonesia as an independent state from the Indonesian Republic. His 
involvement in the Azis military coup in Makassar to prevent Indonesian troops from landing was 
especially resented by unitarist groups. A personal version of these events was written by Soumokil in 
1950. See Chr. Soumokil, Rondom de affaire Kapitein Andi Abdul Aziz, The Hague, 1950. 
118 Van Kaam, Moluccans, pp.120-1. 
119 Van Kaam, Moluccans, p.121. Also May, Pacific Viewpoint, 1990, p.32. 
      117  3.6.1   Common Ancestry and Territorial Homeland 
 
As aforementioned, by articulating ideas of common ethnic ancestry, the RMS sought 
to overcome its image as a Christian movement. The RMS developed ideas of a 
common ethnic South Moluccan ancestry and territorial homeland in seeking to 
distance an Ambonese identity from an identity associated with institutions of the 
Dutch East Indies.
120  
Many Ambonese will refer to the negri lama which literally means ‘original village’ 
and refers to the place of first settlement prior to European contact.  The negri or the 
village is based on genealogical inherited territory associated with the mata rumah 
raja or the ‘original’ or ruling lineage.
121 In fact, many villages remember a negri 
lama where ancestral memorial stones are located.
122  These have been located in 
various areas of north and west of Ambon from where it is believed that the ancestors 
or original inhabitants of most central Moluccan villages migrated.
123 General 
consensus is that most of the original inhabitants came from Seram.  
 
In an Ambonese tradition, the word Nusa has been adopted to refer to specific islands 
within the region. Nusa meaning ‘island’ has been associated with the Sanskrit word 
nesos, also meaning island.
124 For example, Nusa Apono for Ambon, Nusa Ina for 
Seram, and Nusa Laut for the smaller islands that lie east of the island of Saparua.  
Seram has always been given particular emphasis as the island believed to the 
homeland of the Ambonese ancestors, hence Nusa Ina which literally means Mother 
Island. In folktales Seram has been epitomised as the ‘mother’ who looks after her 
                                                                 
120 Chauvel, Nationalists, pp. 111, 144. 
121 Jacob W. Ajawaila, ‘Orang Ambon dan Perubahan Kebudayaan’, Antropologi Indonesia, no.61, 
2000, p.18-20. See also Lebar, Ethnic Groups, p.118. 
122 Kennedy (1995) quoted in Lebar, Ethnic Groups, and p.117. 
123 Cooley, Allang, p.130. 
124 The word ‘nusa’ has also been found in the old Indonesian epic story of Nagarakertagama where 
the word ‘Nusantara’, which in modern circumstances has been used to refer to those islands outside of 
the island of Java, was used instead to refer to ‘foreign land’. There have also been history writers who 
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Pattimura, pp.7-8.  
      118  ‘children’, the smaller islands within the Ambonese cultural area.  This analogy has 
also been reflected in popular Ambonese songs that are often sung at local primary 
schools: 
 
Beautiful Island Homeland 
You are the store of bread 
Amongst hundreds and thousands 
Of your community of children 
Homeland, Mother Island 
The Land of my Mother, Father and family 
That is what I love.
125
 
The Ambonese also possess a tenacious belief in being able to trace their ancestry 
through clan names. ‘Wattimena’, for example, is a name common to other clans 
located in Seram and Saparua, and thus assumed to be their place or origin.
126 The 
Ambonese ability to trace their descent to a common ancestor often inscribed the 
name of the first person who was the first of their clan to arrive in their present 
locality from another place on a memorial stone which became a centre piece of the 
village.
127  
 
There is also the persistent belief in the Nunusaku myth of the legendary mountain in 
West Seram, which traditionally has been regarded as the origin of all Ambonese and 
sacredly as the source and destiny of life.
128 Dieter Bartels argues that the myth has 
been accepted throughout the central Moluccas and over centuries has been subjected 
to the processes of semantic accretion.
129 A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  s ynchronising foreign 
elements of Christianity and Islam, the myth has thus come to represent an important 
preserver of identity for both Muslims and Christians. 
 
                                                                 
125 My translation. “Nusa Indah Pulau, hai, Gudang roti adamu, Diantara ratus ribu, hai, Rakyat anak-
anakmu, Nusa Ina, pulau Ibu, Tanah Ibu Bapa dan saudaraku Itu kusayang”. Sapija, Perdjuangan 
Pattimura, p.14. 
126 Lapian, Sejarah Sosial, p.12. 
127 Bartels, Invisible Mountain, p.22. 
128 Cooley, Village Government, p.154. 
129 Bartels, Invisible Mountain, p.315. 
      119  In their approach to existing religious divisions in the community, the RMS leaders 
utilised this knowledge of the Ambonese to trace a common homeland and territory. 
During the brief existence of RMS government, it was acknowledged that there were 
particular difficulties in obtaining the support of the Muslim community, as the RMS 
was initially perceived as mainly a Christian-led movement. In attempting to alleviate 
these difficulties of gaining a wider support base, the RMS leadership attempted to 
create a sense of solidarity by referring to a common place of origin.  
 
Alex Nanlohy of the DMS executive and later a member of the RMS government, 
referred to the ‘defence of the homeland’, particularly in regard to the prospect of 
Indonesian troops landing on the Ambonese islands after the newly formed 
Indonesian Republic intended to transfer some of its troops to Eastern Indonesia.
130 
The idea of a core territorial homeland was in this way used to try and bring 
Christians and Muslims together as Ambonese. Similarly, both Muslims and 
Christians were referred to as ‘brothers’ deriving ancestral heritage from the same 
place of origin. It was highlighted that the similarity of clan names by both Ambonese 
Christians and Muslims proved to denote common origin; ‘the relationship between 
Islam and Christianity is like that of brothers...both have the same family names’.
131
  
It has been acknowledged that the RMS leaders, during their brief period of 
governance of the Ambonese islands in 1950, stressed the cultural uniqueness of the 
Moluccan Republic at the time.
132 During the surge of Indonesian nationalism and the 
activities of many Ambonese nationalists there was little fervent enthusiasm for the 
incorporation of an all-encompassing Indonesian Republic. Many were already 
anxious about their future and disillusioned with the increasing disengagement of the 
Dutch from supporting the Ambonese when the Republic of Indonesia worked to 
                                                                 
130 Chauvel, Nationalists, pp.347-348. 
131 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.371. 
132 Justus M.Van der Kroef, ‘The Republic of the South Moluccas after Eleven Years: A Review’, 
World Justice, vol.3 no.2, 1961, p.185. 
      120  dismantle the proposed federal structure.
133 In the months preceding the proclamation 
of the RMS, both Manusama and Alex Nanlohy
134 of the RMS government spoke 
enthusiastically of an Ambonese identity depicted against a Javanese ‘other’. 
Manusama was known to have seen the RMS as an alternative to integration into 
Indonesia rather than a first priority, and was active during RMS rule in 
compromising with many of the pro-Indonesia nationalists.
135 However, Manusama 
also expressed doubts regarding the viability of an independent Indonesia based on its 
large ethnic diversity.
136 His speeches at meetings held in the months prior to the 
declaration of the RMS attracted large numbers of the local population and were often 
pervaded by references to a distinct Ambonese or South Moluccan nationalistic zeal.  
 
I do not start my speech with the catch-cry Merdeka because I do not 
feel it is necessary to shout from here this foreign catch-cry, which in 
fact is not used by Ambonese who possess the genuine feeling of the 
Ambonese nationalism.
137  
 
  Alex Nanlohy was less conciliatory in his aspirations for the establishment of a 
separate Moluccan republic. Instead, he was bent on developing an adat based 
Ambonese nationalism that was anti-Dutch as much as anti-Javanese. He indicated the 
heterogenous nature of Ambonese culture, with both east and west affiliations and the 
subsequent need for the Ambonese to go back to their ethnic roots and look again at 
their own adat.
138 There seemed, however, to be little consensus as to how adat would 
play a role in an independent government. Others subscribed to the definition of their 
Amboneseness as the ‘return to adat’, but in a more extreme manner by returning to 
early traditional practices of headhunting and the taking of adat oaths.
139 Some even 
                                                                 
133 Christie, Modern History, p.118. 
134 Alex Nanlohy was an émigré and member of the South Moluccan Council executive. 
135 Chauvel, Nationalists, pp.367-9. 
136 Chauvel, Ambon, p.251. 
137 Manusama quoted in Chauvel, Nationalists, p.350. 
138 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.367. 
139 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.369. 
      121  expressed ethnic uniqueness by claiming that they were not racially Indonesians at all, 
but rather Melanesians.
140  
 
Political organisations such as Sarekat Ambon were seen by several prominent 
Ambonese leaders as important in promoting group solidarity through their promotion 
of an Ambonese identity.
141 For example, Dr. Apituley, a representative in the 
Volksraad (People’s Council), defended the Sarekat Ambon indicating that it kept in 
mind ‘the exuberant character of the Ambonese’.
142 Despite the organisation’s 
argument for Ambon’s inclusion in an independent Indonesia, Latuharhary, leader of 
the Sarekat Ambon, often spoke in strictly Ambonese terms by referring to aspects of 
Ambonese ethnic heritage and character. For example, Latuharhary in 1945 rallied 
local support for the newly formed Republic of Indonesia by appealing to the 
Ambonese to demonstrate respect to their ancestors (Tetek-Nenek-Mojang).
143 In other 
speeches, he provided versions of Ambonese historical experience, especially with 
reference to the Pattimura revolt of 1817. Latuharhary spoke fervently of Pattiumura’s 
mass revolt during early Dutch occupation as having been instigated by their 
‘Moluccan ancestors [who] were not wild animals who killed their enemies only to 
drink their blood’.
144
 
References to a common ancestry were not exclusive to nationalistic speeches prior to 
the declaration of the RMS. For many Ambonese, there were those who traced the 
origin of their ancestors to the island of Seram, an area also inhabited by indigenous 
tribes predominantly located in the more mountainous areas of Seram and known as 
                                                                 
140 Ellen, Centre on the Periphery, 1983, p.12. 
141 Educational opportunities overseas and professional placements elsewhere in Indonesia brought 
many Ambonese together and influenced an emerging tendency within Ambonese political leadership 
to stress cultural differences rather than similarities to distinguish an Ambonese or South Moluccan 
culture to that imposed by the colonialists.  
142 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.135. 
143 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.199. 
144 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.145. 
      122  Alifuru or Alifuro.
145 The Alifuru were known to have practised headhunting and were 
able to preserve much of their traditional belief system up to the first few decades of 
the twentieth century until they were pacified by the Dutch. The war-like and 
antagonistic character of Alifuru people was well known by the Ambonese and they 
were evidently a source of conflict with other neighbouring villages.  In 1820, for 
example, a letter was written on behalf of all the village heads in Central Ambon to 
the Dutch Governor at the time. The letter was essentially a request for permission to 
establish a pela
146 relationship with another village. It argued that the villages needed 
to establish this relationship, not only for the barter or exchange of goods and 
services, but for mutual assistance in the defence against ‘wicked Alifuru’.
147 During 
Dutch occupation, the Ambonese viewed the Alifuru as a primitive and uncultured 
people.  Subsequently, over time, the term Alifuru became a derogatory term referring 
to a people of an uncouth, uncultured and uncivilised character.    
 
In a reinvention of the term, Latuharhary, in his speech, referred to the Alifuru as a 
unifying concept of common ancestry and ethnic roots. In effect, Latuharhary 
changed the connotations of the Alifuru, or indigenous peoples of their ancestors, as 
epitomising something more honorific. Traditionally, the Ambonese have maintained 
a belief in their ancestors as a source of power and as a confirmation of their adat or 
cultural roots, and it has been argued that a ‘relapse’ into these traditional patterns 
                                                                 
145 For further explanation of this term see Dieter Bartels, Guarding the Invisible Mountain: Intervillage 
Alliances, Religious Syncretism and Ethnic Identity among Ambonese Christians and Muslims in the 
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Waai Kecamatan Salahutu, (no cited publisher), Ambon, July 1993, p.16. 
      123  was such a feature during the time of the RMS.
148  Besides Sarekat Ambon, other 
political organisations, such as the Indonesian Independence Party (PIM)
149 or 
Association of the Great East (PTB)
150, were convinced that Ambon’s future was 
within an independent Indonesia. Those who advocated the right to remain in the 
Netherlands East Indies Kingdom promoted solidarity among the Ambonese through 
the concepts of common ethnic origin and history.
151  
 
3.6.2   Language 
 
Although there existed nine indigenous languages spread throughout the Ambonese 
islands, Malay was used to promote the unified mobilisation of Ambon. As a result of 
European influences since the seventeenth century, the Malay dialect has become the 
dominant lingua franca throughout the Moluccan region. The use of Malay came into 
prominence when the Dutch used classical Malay instead of Dutch as the language of 
instruction in Ambon.
152 As of 1950, most inhabitants of Ambon city spoke a mixture 
of Dutch and Malay.
153 With the ousting of the Dutch and the formation of the 
Indonesian Republic, Malay has become the lingua franca of the region and for most 
inhabitants their mother tongue.  
 
From a linguistic perspective, cultural syncretisation and creolisation has meant that 
many indigenous languages were displaced. Factors such as early internal migration 
                                                                 
148 Bartels, Politicians and Magicians, p.294. 
149 PIM or Partai Indonesia Merdeka was established in August 1946 by E.U. Pupella and became the 
major pro-Indonesia party on Ambon. All of PIM’s leaders were Republicans whose ultimate objective 
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could unite politically. PIM’s campaign organisation (United Front for South Moluccan Council), 
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their right of self-determination by remaining within the Kingdom of The Netherlands.  
151 See Chauvel, Nationalists, p.257. 
152 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.26. 
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      124  patterns in the central Moluccas, which have seen migrants reconcile their language 
with the language of their new area, has also contributed to the extinction of 
indigenous languages.
154 As a result of this, early revolts against the colonial powers 
utilised Malay in order to mobilise general support from the population who would 
have adopted Malay. Considering the variety of indigenous dialects and languages of 
the central Moluccas, it would also seem appropriate, in a practical sense, to have 
utilised Malay as a symbol of group solidarity, disregarding any negative connotations 
of being intrinsically linked to the colonial powers. 
 
In order to linguistically encompass the peoples of the region more so than any other 
language, the RMS used Malay as its medium of communication. Both the RMS 
nationalistic government and political parties prior to the formation of the RMS used 
Malay, which at the time would have already developed as the predominant language 
throughout the central Moluccas, especially in Ambon city and particularly for the 
Dutch educated Ambonese including the RMS leaders. 
 
3.6.3   Religion 
 
Religion was not one of the main unifying bases for the RMS, and that the focus was, 
therefore, put on the unifying role of ethnicity and of anti-Javanese sentiments. Within 
a Christian-Muslim division in Ambon’s community, the RMS sought ways to gain 
support beyond its Christian core. By the 1950s, Christian-Muslim relations in 
Ambon were particularly strained primarily as a result of colonial policy which 
favoured Ambonese Christians over their Muslim compatriots, and likewise the 
favourable treatment of Muslims by the Japanese. The already strained relations 
suffered further during the nationalist period as a result of the various debates 
concerning Dutch loyalty and the consequential splits within political parties.  
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      125  Political parties in Ambon were cautious in denoting themselves as either Christian or 
Muslim-led parties, for fear of alienating a large proportion of a potential support 
base. During the Indonesian nationalistic movement in Ambon after the war, political 
organisations were reluctant to draw correlations between religion and political 
persuasion.  Sarekat Islam, with its clear identification of those of Islamic 
denomination, generated a considerable following throughout Java during the early 
Indonesian nationalistic period, in its blatant rejection of the Dutch government and 
its policies.
155 In Ambon it appears to have failed to achieve a comparable following, 
quite possibly as result of its decision to align its organisation with a group of 
Indonesian and radical Dutch representatives under the name of Radicale 
Concentratie, thereby associating Islam with rather radical connotations.  
 
Many political parties perceived the situation in such a way that they could not use 
religion as a unifying symbol, especially if they wanted to incorporate themselves 
within the Indonesian Republic. Amongst organisations such as PIM and Parindra
156 
there was an anticipated need to go beyond religion in order to seek a bond between 
the Ambonese.
157 As a result, leadership of parties often conspicuously comprised 
both members of the Christian and Muslim communities, and this diversity was often 
a crucial feature in attracting supporters from diverse sections of the community. 
Despite a reluctance to specifically draw upon religion as aforementioned, 
organisations were nevertheless vocal regarding their intentions to gain support from 
marginal sectors of the community. As Pupella stated in 1946 in reference to the 
support for the PIM, ‘I feel strong in the struggle for independence, because behind 
me stand the Moslem community’.
158
 
                                                                 
155 Rich, Modern Century, pp.66-7. 
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Senarjo. Its nationalist objectives were supported by leaders of Sarekat Islam. 
157 Chauvel, Nationalists, p.153. 
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      126  The clear problem for the RMS movement was that it was consistently portrayed as a 
Christian-based and Christian-led movement. It was argued by Chauvel that the 
evolution of the RMS and its propagation by its civilian leaders was an attempt to 
maintain Christian dominance in Ambonese society.
159 Indeed, most of the RMS 
ministers were Christians, and the movement itself attracted a large following from 
the KNIL soldiers who had long established themselves as a group with close 
affiliations to the Dutch and Christianity. It also appears that the RMS held support 
from local Christian churches, some of which later expressed their implicit solidarity 
for the realisation of an independent South Moluccan Republic
160, although many 
attempted to remain neutral at the expense of much spiritual tension.
161  
 
Despite clear support for the RMS and its leaders from prominent Ambonese 
Muslims, most notably the raja of the village of Tulegu, Ibrahim Ohorella, there 
appeared to be reservations from the general Muslim community. While it has been 
difficult to assess the extent of support for the RMS from the Ambonese community, 
the Muslim community in general appears to have possessed suspicions of the 
intentions of the RMS government. W. A. Lokollo, a member of the DMS, was 
particularly critical of the way in which the RMS leaders sought to establish the RMS 
which, he argued, had been the result of intimidation instigated by R. S. Soumokil and 
the soldiers (‘berets’).
162 Lokollo also commented on the RMS proclamation 
indicating that ‘the majority of Muslims did not agree, but were not brave enough to 
express their feelings’.
163  
 
While it is not easy to assess the extent of support from the Muslim community, it is 
recognised that Manusama, Soumokil and members of the RMS government at the 
time, had observed the explicit associations of the RMS with Christianity and the 
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      127  subsequent reservations emanating from the Ambonese community. As an 
independence movement seeking to establish a separate state from the newly formed 
Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch colonial federation, the RMS had to 
unequivocally distance Ambonese or South Moluccan cultural identity from that of 
anything Indonesian or Dutch. The use of a Christian Ambonese idiom would thus not 
be appropriate.
164 Explicit use of Christianity as a unifying symbol of group solidarity 
would clearly alienate the non-Christian or Muslim sector of Ambonese society.  
Despite the dominance of Christians in its leadership, the RMS employed ‘ethnicity’ 
rather than religion as its mobilising ideology. The cultural uniqueness of the South 
Moluccans was, therefore, given specific emphasis.
165 Manusama, Soumokil, Nanlohy 
and other members of the RMS government and DMS executive avoided any implicit 
identification of the RMS with Christianity, and instead, consistently spoke of the 
RMS as representing the interests of the ‘South Moluccan’ or ‘Ambonese’ people.
166 
In this way, the RMS attempted to create an inclusive grouping beyond local myths of 
origin, in order to incorporate and mobilise a type of ‘pan-ethnic’ community. 
Manusama particularly engaged in speeches where he overtly used these 
encompassing terms, implying also that as ‘brothers’, all members of the South 
Moluccan or Ambonese community were unambiguously linked as kin.
167  
 
The RMS is neither Islamic or Christian, because in the Moluccas the 
relationship between Islam and Christianity is like that of brothers, not 
only the pela relationship, both communities have the same family 
names and share the same adat-istiadat and culture.
168  
 
 
 
                                                                 
164 Ellen, Centre on the Periphery, 1983, p.12. 
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166 Chauvel, Nationalists, pp.347-363. 
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      128  3.7   Conclusion 
 
The RMS had some measure of success in providing a sense of security and unity 
which overcame the disruptions and rivalries of the late 1940s. Manuhutu and 
Wairisal described the Ambonese response to the proclamation as enthusiastic as 
‘people danced and shouted’ while ‘Soumokil was naturally pleased that his plan had 
worked’.
169 Generally, it appears that the proclamation was recognised by the 
Ambonese with heightened popular feeling especially at the time of the TNI attack on 
Ambon in September 1950.
170 The RMS was particularly welcomed by the Ambonese 
KNIL soldiers, church leaders, and other officials within the Dutch administration.
171  
 
Despite this, success was mainly in unifying the diverse Christian factions and groups, 
but there was only limited success in mobilising Muslims. A primary reason for this is 
the fact that the RMS could not avoid its specific Christian character with Soumokil 
occasionally appealing to what he perceived as a ‘Christian Ambonese society’
172 and 
the fact that all RMS ministers except one were Christian.
173 Political divisions among 
the Muslim villages also meant that the RMS enjoyed some support from conservative 
Muslim raja and PTB supporters, but relatively little support from others.
174  
 
In the few months that the RMS government commanded authority in Ambon, it 
served as a functioning government with a President and cabinet, with representation 
abroad, and with a temporary parliamentary body.
175 On September 4, 1950 a 
tentative Constitution was established stipulating the RMS to be ‘a sovereign 
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      129  independent state based on democratic principles’ and that its territory encompassed 
the South Moluccas as defined when under the State of East Indonesia.
176  
 
During RMS control of the Ambonese islands from April to December 1950, 
intensive negotiations were made between the Dutch and Indonesian governments in 
order to find a non-violent resolution to the matter.
177 The RMS government appeared 
to take no initiative in these negotiations for a peaceful settlement and instead sought 
international support from the Netherlands, the United States and Australia.
178 In 
September of that year the Indonesian armed forces launched an attack and finally 
occupied the island after three months of fighting with RMS supporters. Many of the 
RMS leaders retreated into the mountains and jungles of Seram to maintain some 
sporadic resistance for the next decade or so but most resistance was extinguished 
with the capture and sentencing of several members of the RMS government.
179  
 
An RMS government-in-exile was subsequently established in The Netherlands in 
1953 but it did not exert concerted efforts to pursue the RMS cause in Indonesia with 
its sporadic violence actions in The Netherlands condemned by the international 
community. For decades afterwards, it was wracked by factional movements and 
achieved very limited international recognition, with the Indonesian government 
perceiving the RMS issue officially as a problem for the Netherlands rather than for 
Indonesia. 
 
Post 1950, in the context of uprooting traditional social structure and the emergence 
of new governmental tensions, the RMS event became the raw material for the 
subsequent constructions of Ambonese identity – demonised as the Other by the 
                                                                 
176 Van Der Kroef, World Justice, 1961, p.188. 
177 This included the Leimena and Van Hoogstraten-Schotborgh missions.  
178 Chauvel, Regional, 1985, p.259. 
179 In 1953, Manuhutu and other RMS ministers were captured and sentenced to jail. Soumokil was 
captured in 1964 and sentenced to death two years later. Manusama escaped to the Netherlands in 1953 
were he succeeded Soumokil as president of the RMS government-in-exile. R. J. May, ‘Ethnic 
Separatism in Southeast Asia’, Pacific Viewpoint, vol.31, no.2, October 1990, pp.32-3. 
      130  Islamic  Laskar Jihad, and reconstructed as the Us by the separatist Moluccan 
Sovereignty Front. The following chapter will offer an illustration of the extent of 
rapid changes to existing Ambonese authority structures and social hierarchy by a 
centralising Indonesian State during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
      131  CHAPTER 4 
 
SOCIAL DISRUPTION AND ITS IMPACT IN AMBON:  
1950-2000 
 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter seeks to examine the link between the impact of social change on 
communal and traditional structures that took place in Ambon between 1950 and 
2000, and the ideologisation of Ambonese nationalism in 2000
1. It will seek to show 
how in the context of specific pre-conditions, dislocations of authority structures and 
disruptions of communal cohesion combined to generate nationalism as one particular 
response. Disruption in Ambon is referred to here as occurring at various levels and 
therefore this is not a case of disruption to an undisturbed situation.  
 
This chapter will explore how State interventions in Ambon involved disruptions to 
the social structure and the authority structure where intrusive state tactics provoked 
dislocated elites and disrupted communities to rebel through ethnic nationalist 
rebellion. However prior to this, changes or disruptions during colonization had 
already produced changes at the community level so as to disrupt the cohesion of 
community or its authority structure. In this context, the RMS had developed 
traditional myths of communal identity, and its ways of defining relationships with 
others subsequently disrupted traditional notions of identity.  
 
Further to this, there were also the subsequent disruptions of the conflicts themselves 
which included the interventions of the Indonesian military to suppress the RMS and 
the ensuing violence which managed to breed new insecurities and subsequently 
influenced the way in which the Ambonese engaged in a process of transacting and 
                                                                 
1 Limited material exists on the impact of Soekarno’s policies on Central Maluku and specifically on 
Ambon. As a result this section will deal mainly with Maluku as a region. 
  132redefining identity. In this way, post-colonial disruptions did not of themselves 
generate nationalisms in response, but merely generated the insecurities and 
dislocations to which nationalism was one possible response. 
 
The following key propositions will be made: first, under the authority of President 
Soekarno and later President Soeharto, profound changes to the orientation of central 
authority and regional autonomy in Maluku resulted in the loss of authority for both 
Ambonese educated and traditional elites thereby disrupting village communities. 
Second, that rapid migration and the exacerbation of existing poverty levels created 
workplace tensions and economic discrepancies between different migrant groups and 
between migrants and the indigenous Ambonese community. Third, that structural 
inadequacies relating to decentralisation led to it having an impact on generating 
greater personalisation of power and corruption and thence the further erosion of the 
legitimate authority of both traditional and educated elites over Ambonese society. 
Fourth, that these disruptions introduced new levels of insecurity and uncertainty for 
ordinary Ambonese, resulting in the adoption of new nationalist ideologies. 
 
4.2   Disruption of Authority Structures in the Old Order 
 
During the period of Parliamentary Democracy (1950-1957) under President 
Soekarno, new power groups and displaced elites faced legitimacy problems in their 
quest for authority in Ambon. President Soekarno’s active pursuit of centralising 
administrative and political control of all regions throughout Indonesia meant that 
firstly, new centralised government institutions were established which ensured that 
power and authority were gradually shifted away from traditional village government. 
Second, the development of a new civil administration meant that many positions in 
local government were occupied by many of the Dutch-educated Ambonese who were 
thus elevated to new levels of influence and authority.  
 
  133The South Moluccas existed as a separate colony of the Netherlands until 1949, when 
they were ceded to the newly independent Republic of Indonesia which was 
transformed from its federal state into a unitary form. As shown previously, after the 
declaration of a unitary republic in 1950, the South Moluccas attempted to secede 
with the declaration of the Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS). From 1950 until 
1957, with the abolition of the RMS by Indonesian armed forces, Maluku was simply 
an administrative centre within the Indonesian Republic. It was not until 1957 that 
the first provincial unit (swatantra)  of Maluku was formed with Ambon City 
becoming the capital of Maluku province.
2  
 
Ever since the demise of the RMS, Indonesia’s governance saw the centralisation of 
both political and administrative power. The lack of concession to any regional 
feelings of autonomy seemed to represent the determination of the Soekarno 
government in maintaining centralised control over the peripheral regions in the 
archipelago. In fact, President Soekarno indicated great resolve to achieve this with 
his increasingly tougher stance which led to the decision in 1957 to force a takeover 
of all Dutch enterprises in Indonesia, and the decision to force a resilient battle against 
the Dutch in bids to control West Irian.
3  
 
The fundamental issue here was the geographical, economic and cultural dichotomy 
between Java and the Outer Islands, including the province of Maluku in Eastern 
Indonesia, and how this generated regional resentment against a perceived Javanese-
dominated government, especially from local elites in pursuit of their own elite 
interests. The win of the Java-based Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) party in the 
                                                                 
2 John D. Legge, Central Authority and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia: a study in local 
administration 1950-1960, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1961, p.68-9. 
3 Stephen V. Harris and Colin Brown, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Australia: the Irian Jaya 
problem of 1984, Australia-Asia Papers No.29, Centre of the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, 
Griffith University, February 1985, pp.3-6. Indonesia argued that Dutch occupation of West Papua was 
illegal and that de jure sovereignty rested with them. After various campaigns by Soekarno to asset 
their claim over the territory, an agreement was reached by the Dutch and the Indonesian governments 
stipulating that West Papua be administered by the United Nations from 1962-1983 when it would be 
then turned over to Indonesia providing that, before 1969, an “Act of Free Choice” would be held in 
which the West Papuans could determine whether or not they wished to remain part of Indonesia. 
  1341955 elections did not help relations between the two regions of Java and the Outer 
Islands. With the PNI cooperating closely with Soekarno, the polarisation between 
Java and the peripheral regions of Indonesia mounted and the subject of regional 
autonomy became a matter of continuous political debate. Indeed, the debate was 
fraught with anti-Javanese sentiment and it was on this basis that it was argued by 
local elites that at least regional heads should be locally acknowledged heads of 
authority: 
 
The proponents of regional autonomy argued that in choosing the 
‘right’ person for the head of the region, the government should 
consider the ‘acceptability’ of the person. For people in the Outer 
Islands, this usually meant that person should be not only a native son 
but also acceptable to the dominant party of the region.
4
 
Soekarno and his PNI-led government were reluctant to concede to these regional 
demands for a greater distribution of administrative powers to local centres. Instead 
Maluku and other regions became subject to various new concessions and 
administrative and governmental arrangements. Under Soekarno, the object was to 
form suitable units of administration and governance that would take over the powers 
formerly exercised by Dutch Residents.
5 Arrangements were thus made to create areas 
and units that would not only alleviate regional discontent but arguably also provide 
an efficient territorial administration. 
 
As part of new decentralisation measures, Soekarno effectively marginalised the 
village  raja through the creation of new provincial structures such as the  new 
provincial representative council (DPRD) and the provincial executive council (DPD). 
These councils were part of Soekarno’s three-tiered system with provincial, regional 
and village levels of government. In Law 1/57 it was laid out that the provincial or 
regional government would be composed of the DPRD and the DPD, the two basic 
institutions that were designed for the purpose of providing avenues through which 
                                                                 
4 Amal, Central Government, p.5. 
5 Legge, Central Authority, pp.70-3. 
  135local people could express their opinions and aspirations. Members of both councils 
were predominantly civil servants and other groups, such as small traders and 
teachers, who were beginning to assume responsibility for the administration of local 
services.
6  
 
Membership of councils consequently reflected an obvious absence of traditional 
representatives from village authority, which inevitably left little scope for the 
exercise of genuine initiative by the traditional elite. Some level of authority was 
provided for the DPD to intervene in village affairs which thereby ousted the raja in 
his traditional role in this field. In the division of duties by DPD members, it was 
likely that one of these individuals could be entrusted in handling the ‘portfolio’ of 
village affairs.
7 Referred to as ‘general government’, village affairs were left 
ultimately in the hands of the Chairman of the DPD, who issued instruction in these 
matters on behalf of the central government.  
 
While Law 1 of 1957 attempted to alleviate the dominance of power 
vested in the Chairman’s office by making it responsible to the 
representative council, in general traditional systems of authority were 
eclipsed by the responsibilities of the Chairman who took on a very 
centralised role. Hence Soekarno’s insistence that the office of the DPD 
Chairman was not to be entirely elective and was to be filled by an 
appointment made by a specified authority representing the central 
government.
8  
 
Social control was becoming more complex and diffused as the DPD acquired greater 
control of village government. In the central Moluccas there was a distinct passivity 
evident in the local raja who were at a loss when faced with these circumstances: 
  
Little imagination is applied toward meeting new conditions with new 
techniques of leadership, and there appears little evidence of foresight or 
initiative being used in solving needs and problems. Affairs are usually 
                                                                 
6 Legge, Central Authority, pp.131-153. 
7 Legge, Central Authority, p.165-6. 
8 Legge, Central Authority, p.31. In special circumstances, different arrangements prevailed whereby 
the kepala daerah was to be appointed by the President from the traditional ruling family of the area. 
Normally then the kepala daerah would be the traditional ruler. However, at the time this only applied 
to the city of Yogyakarta in central Java which was deemed a ‘special region’. 
  136allowed to continue until circumstances force action to be taken. The 
observer’s general impression is that the people, leaders as well as led, 
have a basically passive attitude. The village tends to await instructions 
from the district level. Villagers wait for leadership from the village 
council, and if it is not forthcoming, they do nothing.
9
 
A new elite of Ambonese civil servants emerged who occupied positions within the 
DPRD and DPD. As the raja became displaced from their traditional position of 
authority, the new scope and weight of local authority shifted onto this new civil 
administration and its various officers.  
 
 
In this respect, the diminishing weight of village authority and the rise of new elites 
were signified by the exodus of village members to assume administrative positions in 
the towns. Civilian Ambonese were compelled to gravitate to towns and cities in their 
community to occupy positions in government and other spheres where substantial 
status and remuneration could be achieved. As local government assumed wider 
powers, the need increased for adequately trained administrators and technical staff.
10 
Prospects of greater economic and political influence propelled many Moluccans to 
migrate to towns in order to occupy these positions in the new government 
administration.  
 
Traditional authority began to be challenged by these intellectual Ambonese who 
came to dominate many official positions in local government. In contrast to the 
experience of other regions in Indonesia, Ambon’s colonial experience was 
exemplified by extensive access to Western educational opportunities as a result of 
widespread conversions to Christianity which allowed them to enter Christian 
institutions of higher learning. As a result, not only were the schools in Ambon better 
but also their standard of literacy was of a higher standard than the rest of Indonesia.
11 
In this respect, during the colonial period, the Ambonese were then more likely to 
                                                                 
9 Frank L. Cooley, ‘Village Government in the Central Moluccas’, Indonesia, No.7, April 1969, 
pp.161-2. 
10 Legge, Central Authority, pp.171-2. 
11 Roy F. Ellen, ‘The Centre on the Periphery: Moluccan culture in an Indonesian state’, Indonesia 
Circle, No.31, June 1983, p.10. 
  137occupy dominant positions in the lower echelons of the colonial bureaucracy.
12 As a 
result, the Indonesian Republic found it easy to access the existing pool of Ambonese 
technical and bureaucratic staff already trained under Dutch administration, to occupy 
administrator positions at the local level in Ambon.  
 
The combined impact of the disruptions brought about by the creation of new 
provincial structures which marginalised the raja and the rise of the new elite within 
public administration left traditional elites faced with the problem of rebuilding their 
authority and legitimacy within their local community. At the same time, as new 
leaders within their community, educated civil servants were challenged with the task 
of establishing their credibility amongst the local people.   
 
 
4.3   Disruptions of Authority Structures in the New Order 
 
The disruptions of the Old Order policies were exacerbated by the impact in Ambon 
of New Order policies. In the same way as the Soekarno regime, processes of 
disruption in the New Order fundamentally led to the marginalisation of Ambonese 
elites, both traditional and educated. This in turn led these elites to feeling alienated 
and insecure, and in search of alternative sources of authority. Furthermore, the 
weakening of Ambonese elites posed problems for people in the villages who lacked 
access to Ambonese patrons and leaders, thence feeling insecure and in need of new 
sources of security. 
 
When Soeharto assumed the presidential office in Indonesia in 1967, the Ambonese 
community found itself subject to various aspects of disruption which combined to 
                                                                 
12 As a result of Dutch operated professional training institutions the Ambonese were found in many 
public offices such as central administrator, public prosecutors, court executioners, and bureaucrats. 
Many Ambonese students also became government physicians and professionally trained engineers 
with the establishment of colleges of engineering in 1921 and medicine in 1927. See Richard Z. 
Leirissa, ‘Social Development in Ambon during the 19
th Century: Ambonese Burger’, Cakalele, Vol.6, 
1995, pp.1-11. 
  138generate further situations of conflict and rivalry. These will be identified in this 
section, firstly, as the displacement of traditional authority figures as a result of the 
implementation of new regional policies. Second, disruptions in Ambon took the form 
of the displacement of skilled Ambonese already occupying positions in local 
government by newly appointed government elites resulting from Soeharto’s 
tightening of control of the regions.  
 
The New Order regime’s centralisation of state authority and new development plans 
restructured village government so that the authority of the raja was usurped by new 
village elites. The New Order government promoted the advantages of these changes 
by expressing that the new Repelita or Five-Year Development programs would bring 
Maluku out of a ‘backward’ age and would be of immense benefit to the local 
population.
13 During the early years of the New Order government when the state 
began to implement the first of its Five-Year Development programs, the state opted 
for a strong central government structure in which the delegation of power to local 
government would not be encouraged.
14 Subsequently, the existing system of local 
government throughout the regions became more centralised and was restructured 
accordingly with specific functions, duties and powers (See Appendix 7).  
 
The raja was seen by central government as an impediment to this development and 
it, therefore, formulated ways in which the raja’s authority could be marginalised. It 
was the perception of state elites that a government that was strong in every way, 
while remaining the centrepiece of a bureaucratic polity, needed to neutralise 
prevailing local systems of government. In the Government Explanatory Notes of the 
1979 Law, it was suggested that existing communal systems could manifest as an 
obstacle to community development:  
 
                                                                 
13 It was also said to have represented a way in which to prevent the emergence of subversive elements, 
such as the RMS, which have in the past prevented any real desire for essential change to emerge. 
Leirissa, Maluku, 1995, pp.208-9, 216. 
14 MacAndrews, Central Government, p.6. 
  139The objective and the aim of the 1979/No 5 Law is for the 
homogenisation and strengthening of village government. 
Homogenisation is considered necessary because the consequences of 
the colonial government legacy have resulted in incompatible village 
governments. Decision-makers in the New Order have regarded this 
situation as being unable to provide the impetus for the village 
community to achieve dynamic growth. As a result, villages and their 
governments, whose shape and form are varied and individualistic, are 
sometimes perceived as an obstacle to the intensive construction and 
control in improving community standards of living.
15
 
The position of raja was accordingly superseded as a result of new legislation which 
prescribed changes in village government and administration. Within the existing 
levels of district and village government established under Soekarno, the New Order 
government enacted the Village Law, which was passed in 1979, and dictated new 
changes in village government and administration for Indonesia’s approximately 
63,000 villages at the time.
16 It was proposed that changes would take place in terms 
of 1) the government structure itself; 2) elections of the village government apparatus; 
3) the responsibilities and role of non-formal leaders; and 4) political and non-
political organisations.  
 
These changes, firstly, entailed superficially retaining the positions of raja and other 
village hierarchy, while allocating functionary power and authority to a new 
revamped village council (saniri) consisting predominantly of non-traditional leaders 
rather than traditional adat functionaries.
17 Second, the system of selection of the raja 
or village head moved from one based on hereditary lines to the merit-based election 
of a candidate, to be approved by the village council and ultimately by the regent 
                                                                 
15 Ugrasena Pranidhana, Pemerintahan Desa dan Otonomi Daerah: Langkah Awal Kepada Kearifan 
Tradisional?, Analisis CSIS, Tahun XXIV, No.6, November-December 1995, p.456. My translation 
“Maskud dan tujuan diciptakannya UU no.5/1979 adalah untuk menyeragamkan dan memperkuat 
pemerintahan desa. Penyeragaman ini dianggap perlu dilakukan karena akibat peninggalan sistem 
pemerintahan kolonial, keadaan seperti itu dianggap kurang memberikan dorongan kepada masyarakat 
desa untuk tumbuh ke arah kemajuan yang dinamis. Akibatnya, desa dan pemerintahannya yang bentuk 
dan coraknya beraneka ragam serta memiliki ciri-cirinya sendiri kadang-kadang dilihat sebagai 
hambatan dalam pembinaan dan pengendalian yang intensif dalam peningkatan taraf hidup 
masyarakat”. See also Suhino, Perkembangan Pemerintahan di Daerah, Liberty:Yogyakarta, 1980, 
p.174.  
16 MacAndrews, Central Government, p.21. 
17 Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan (Depdikbud), Sejarah Pengaruh Pelita Terhadap 
Kehidupan Masyarakat Pedesaan Di Maluku, Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan 
Daerah, Jakarta, 1981/1982, p.112. 
  140(bupati) on behalf of the provincial governor.
18 Third, non-formal leaders were 
expected to function within the existing structure of conflict resolution,
19 to control 
and resolve issues of conflict that relate to local tradition.  
 
The contraction of raja  power and influence in Ambonese society and the 
disillusionment of civilian Ambonese can be related to these changes. The system of 
selection of the raja or village head, for example, caused unprecedented complexities 
for the raja in many Ambonese villages. In Seram and on the island of Ambon, the 
election of the village head from one based on hereditary lines to a new territorially 
based system of village heads meant that the raja had to openly compete for support. 
The raja was suddenly challenged by new opposition groups seeking to gain political 
legitimacy and power in the village environment. Many raja faced strong opposition 
from migrant groups within the community, such as the Bugis or Makassarese from 
Southeast Sulawesi, who positioned themselves as candidates for village heads and 
appealed to different migrant groups for support.  
 
Changes to traditional structures of conflict resolution marginalised the raja  by 
shifting authority to new village authority figures such as the newly elected village 
head. At the same time, civilian Ambonese became disillusioned as the new village 
head did not wield the same degree of authority as the raja. It thus became difficult 
for these new authority figures to resolve disputes.
20 As one Ambonese stated, ‘The 
village head no longer seemed to function anymore. If there was a conflict, the raja 
was no longer obeyed because of the change in system’.
21  This was exemplified in 
1983 when the 1979 Village Law was initially implemented in Huaulu in Seram. The 
position of raja and the village council were in principle supposed to retain their 
                                                                 
18 Depdikbud, Sejarah Pengaruh Pelita, p.117. 
19 My translation. “Para Tua-Tua adat tetap melakukan peranan dan fungsinya dalam memelihara dan 
mengatur soal-soal adat baik dalam upacara-upacara adat maupun dalam menyelesaikan maslah-
masalah yang timbul yang berhubungan dengan tradisi dan kepercayaan setempat” in Depdikbud, 
Sejarah Pengaruh Pelita, p.119. 
20 Human Rights Watch (HRW) [online], Ambon, 1999 Report. Accessed 17 October 1999. 
21 Interview with informant. My translation of “Kepala desa sonde berperan lagi. Kalau ada 
perselisihan, raja sonde dipatuh karena perubahan sistem”. 
  141functions as the pillars of village conflict resolution and authorities in adat. However, 
the new village head and its associated village institutions were renamed, and there 
existed no specific requirements for the village head to be knowledgeable of local 
adat.
22  
 
In the same way, the marginalisation of the raja through the consolidation of new 
institutions of village authority left many people suspicious and apathetic, as they 
were no longer able to recognise these figures or institutions as a legitimate source of 
authority and power.
23 For example, the island of Buru off the West coast of Ambon 
in Central Maluku experienced unexpected upheavals in their villages after the 
implementation of the 1979 Village Law between 1986 and 1988. During that period, 
58 settlements (kampung) were amalgamated into 27 villages, with one of those 
kampung designated as the governing village (desa induk). Owing to many of these 
kampung having their own sense of origin and historical identity, most were not 
prepared to accept a new dominant village as the chief authority over their village 
affairs.  
 
In a further series of reforms for a more streamlined and centralised bureaucracy, non-
Ambonese elites recruited by the Indonesian government exerted effective control 
over civil administration in Ambon. Beginning in 1969, Soeharto’s government 
reorganised the armed services, which gave precedence to military personnel in civil 
service positions over locally employed staff. Military penetration of the bureaucracy 
at local levels effectively dislocated existing civil servants, which in Ambon’s case 
were predominately from within the local Ambonese community. The dominant 
position of the army was formalised in a new organisation called the Functional 
Service Board (Dewan Kekaryaan), which assigned military personnel to tasks within 
the civilian structure. Officers were placed in all levels of local administration from 
                                                                 
22 Suhino, Perkembangan Pemerintahan, pp.175-6. 
23 HRW [online], Ambon, 1999 Report.  
  142cabinet ministers, heads of government agencies and provincial governors, to local 
district heads and even civilian positions at village level.
24
 
Ambonese civil servants were subsequently consigned to positions of minor prestige 
and influence as, Ulf Sundhaussen points out, Soeharto transformed the Indonesian 
military into a centre of real power by making them more or less ‘in charge of every 
aspect of public life in Indonesia’.
25 Apart from being well entrenched in positions 
within central administration and the top strata of the diplomatic and consular corp, 
military increasingly usurped the upper echelons of authority at village, district and 
provincial levels. The idea of central government was that, by appointing these 
people, it would provide the opportunity for no ‘undesirable’ to gain prominence. At 
the Moluccan provincial level, military men were designated in the parliaments and 
the first two governors of Maluku appointed by Soeharto, J. Latuharhary and G.J. 
Latumahina, were from outside the Ambonese islands
26 and had military 
backgrounds. In addition, by 1969, the number of military mayors and district heads 
throughout Indonesia reached 147 of a total of 271.
27  
 
With many skilled Ambonese already occupying positions in local government 
because of their valued administrative and technical experience, Soeharto’s expansion 
of military intervention in the bureaucracy was a direct challenge to the Ambonese 
holding positions within the civil service. These challenges continued in 1997 with the 
replacement of Akib Latuconsina by Saleh Latuconsina
28 as Governor of Maluku. He 
                                                                 
24 Amal, Central Government, p.135. During his first decade in power, Soeharto ensured that army 
generals increased their share of provincial governorships from 10 out of 25 (40%) to 21 out of 27 
(78%). This trend was echoed at district level and by the 1970’s colonels and lieutenant-colonels 
received almost three-quarters of all the total bupati and mayoral appointments. Michael S. Malley, 
‘New Rules, Old Structures and the Limits of Decentralisation’, in E. Aspinall and G. Fealy (eds) Local 
Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation & Democratisation, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies: Singapore, 2003, p.107. 
25 Ulf Sundhaussen, ‘The Military: Structure, Procedures, and Effects on Indonesian Society’, in Karl 
D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds) Political Power and Communications in Indonesia, University of 
California Press: Berkeley, 1978, p.73. 
26 J. Latuharhary was from the island of Haruku and  G. J. Latumahina from Nusalaut island. 
27 After the 1971 elections, the proportion of military personnel at district level reached approximately 
two-thirds. See Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 
1978, p.244. 
28 Both governors were from the village of Pelauw on Haruku island. 
  143conducted a reorganisation of local government offices and increased the number of 
non-Ambonese within the public service.  
 
Soeharto’s restructuring of local government, therefore, disrupted Ambonese society 
in a number of ways. First, the marginalisation of the traditional elites occurred in the 
context of the uprooting of the traditional village structure and the rapid emergence of 
new tensions between the new village heads and the raja. Second, new village 
authority structures left many people suspicious and apathetic as demonstrated in the 
Buru example above. Third, the authority of new indigenous elites within the public 
service was challenged by military personnel who were favoured by the central 
government and occupied positions in local government and administration.  
 
4.4   The Disruptive Impact of Migration and the Financial Crisis 
 
The transmigration program
29, spontaneous migration and the Asian Financial crisis 
also had a disruptive impact upon both the migrants themselves and upon the local 
community. Rapid migration in Ambon generated competition within the workforce 
and economic disparities both between migrants and the indigenous community and 
amongst the migrants themselves. The exacerbation of existing poverty levels during 
the economic crisis served to increase these tensions and discrepancies amongst both 
these groups.  
 
Within this framework, an instrumentalist approach would attribute the rise of conflict 
to a channelling of violence to the actual source of economic tension. However, from a 
                                                                 
29 While there has been organised migration from Java, which refers to the Indonesian government’s 
transmigration program and the recruitment of contract labour, there is a need to distinguish other 
forms of migration. Apart from this controlled movement of people, there is also ‘spontaneous’ or 
‘free’ transmigration, which is referred here to those who are not arranged or financed by the 
transmigration program. For a slightly different interpretation of these terms, see Soedigo 
Hardjosudarmo (Kebidjaksanaan Transmigrasi dalam Rangka Pembangunan Majarakat Desa di 
Indonesia, Bhratara:Djakarta, 1965) who refers to ‘spontaneous’ migrants as those approved by the 
Transmigration Service who simply pay their passage to the settlement area and receive the same 
facilities as other transmigrants. 
  144constructivist perspective, such diverse grievances involve the development of new 
insecurities and uncertainties from individuals within the community to which 
nationalism is one such possible response. As aforementioned in this thesis, in such 
circumstances, nationalism will emerge as long as other factors are in place including 
the active search of dislocated elites for re-legitimization,  the resuscitation of myths 
of territorial homeland by these dislocated elites, and the employment of a demonized 
“Other” which counterposes the vision of harmonious and virtuous “Us”. 
 
It was the population pressures on Java and increased competition in the job market 
during the 1970s that saw the rapid increase of middle-class migrants to Ambon and 
the emergence of a business-savvy group on the island. The island of Ambon has in 
fact been exposed to a continuous period of ‘spontaneous migration’. Migrants from 
Sulawesi and Java had been coming to trade in Ambon since the sixteenth century.
30 
However, it was during the 1970s that people from the Outer Islands recognised that 
the population in Maluku had better access to agricultural land than people in Java 
and there were opportunities for opening new land for agricultural development.
31  
 
The influx of migrants to the Ambonese islands dramatically increased when the New 
Order Indonesian government implemented a transmigration program (transmigrasi) 
as a means by which the population-related problems of Java could be solved.
32 As 
with many areas of Indonesia, the placement of transmigrants in central Maluku 
received much attention, not least because of the sociological problems it raised in the 
settlement areas.
33 The program expanded dramatically under the two Five-Year 
                                                                 
30 See Gerrit Knaap, “The Demography of Ambon in the Seventeenth Century: evidence from colonial 
proto-censuses”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, vol.26, no.2, September 1995, pp.227-41. 
31 Soewartoyo, ‘Internal Migration Between Java-Bali and Eastern Indonesia’, The Indonesian 
Quarterly, vol.24, no.3, Third Quarter, 1996, pp.304. 
32 Organised inter-island migration was a phenomenon in Soekarno’s era of government although the 
initial objectives of transmigration were more to do with allocating needed labour to areas of 
development. This changed to new government decrees, which promoted the idea that transmigration 
would assist with ‘security and national unity’. See Geoffrey McNicoll, ‘Internal Migration in 
Indonesia: Descriptive Notes’, Indonesia, no.5-6, 1968, p.65. 
33 For studies concerning these problems see Kampto Utomo, Masjarakat Transmigran Spontan di 
Daerah W. Sekampung (Lampung), Penerbitan Universitas: Djakarta, 1958; Widjojo Nitisastro, 
Migration, Population Growth and Economic Development in Indonesia, PhD Dissertation, University 
of California: Berkeley, 1961; McNicoll, Indonesia, 1968. 
  145Development Plans between 1974-1984 where, at the completion of that period, 
approximately 2.3 million people had been resettled. According to official figures, the 
province of Maluku received almost 100,000 transmigrants with central Maluku 
taking over half of this total, as the following table indicates: 
Table 3: Transmigration into Maluku between 1969-1999 
 
Year Number 
of:
South 
Maluku
Central 
Maluku
North 
Maluku 
/ 
Ternate
Central 
Halmahera 
Total 
I  Households  -   607   -   -   607  
1969-1974  People  -   2,592   -   -   2,592  
II  Households  -   200   -   -   200  
1974-1979  People  -   595   -   -   595  
III  Households  -   5,426   600   1,700   7,726  
1979-1984  People  -   22,697   2,628   7,391   32,716  
IV  Households  -   2,249   425   840   3,514  
1984-1989  People  -   8,948   1,462   3,298   13,708  
V  Households  212   1,875   1,681   1,886   5,654  
Year  Number 
of: 
South 
Maluku 
Central 
Maluku 
North 
Maluku 
/ 
Ternate 
Central 
Halmahera 
Total 
1989-1994  People  830   7,456   6,237   7,384   21,907  
VI  Households  -   4,064   2,398   1,156   7,618  
1994-1999  People  -   13,854   8,060   3,990   25,904  
Total 
Households    212   14,421   5,104   5,582   25,319  
Total 
People    830   56,142   18,387   22,063   97,422  
Source: Regional Office of the Ministry of Transmigration and Forest Settlers, Province of Moluccas 
  146Tensions developed as the Ambonese saw migrant workers, who were Javanese or 
Butonese, Bugis or Makassarese from South Sulawesi, as their economic rivals for 
scarce jobs. A case study of a transmigration community in West Seram over a period 
of three years, between 1992 and 1994, concluded that while local leaders benefited 
from relations with transmigrants and from economic and infrastructural 
developments, increased inequalities emerged both within the transmigration 
community and between the transmigration community and its neighbours.
34  
 
Successful transmigrants were able to exploit access to land and trading opportunities 
which were not available to other migrants and local villagers. Migrants from 
Southeast Sulawesi have not only been successful in developing social and economic 
networks in Ambon City and other major urban areas around Eastern Indonesia, but 
also in rural areas where they have been successful in developing land for cash 
crops.
35 Butonese immigrants, for example, were provided with land for temporary 
housing and for vegetable gardens.
36  
 
Owing to increasing land shortages, additional issues such as government 
compensation, land rights and land ownership became a source of tension. It became 
common, for example, for the Butonese to engage in share-planting agreements in 
Ambon. However, conflicts emerged between the Butonese and the indigenous 
Ambonese when the Butonese started claiming economic rewards from their 
cultivation of permanent crops such as clove and nutmeg trees.
37 Although many 
                                                                 
34 Jon D. Goss and Thomas R. Leinbach, ‘Development and Differentiation: A Case Study of a 
Transmigration Settlement in West Seram’, in David Mearns and Chris Healey (eds), Remaking 
Maluku: Social Transformation in Eastern Indonesia, Special Monograph No.1, Centre for South East 
Asian Studies, Northern Territory University, Darwin, 1996, p.80, 92-3; Bartels, Invisible Mountain, 
pp.16-22; HRW [online], Ambon 1999 Report. Also for the complexities and uncertainties of land 
ownership in Ambonese society, see Franz von Benda-Beckmann and Tanja Taale, ‘Land, Trees and 
Houses: Changing (Un)certainties in Property Relationships on Ambon’, in Mearns and Healey, 
Remaking Maluku, p.42.  
35 For a useful source on voluntary migration of the Buginese, Makasarese, and Butonese in eastern 
Indonesia, see George J. Aditjondro, Datang dengan Kapal, Tidur di Pasar, Buang Air di Kali, Pulang 
Naik Pesawat, Yayasan Pengembangan Masyarakat Irian Jaya: Jayapura, 1986. 
36 von Benda-Beckmann and Taale, Remaking Maluku, p.54. 
37 According to Ambonese adat, they were not allowed to cultivate permanent crops although this 
prohibition was eventually abolished in the 1960s. See von Benda-Beckmann and Taale, Remaking 
Maluku, p.54. 
  147Bugis families, for example, gained access to this land on the basis of being empty 
‘state land’ (tanah negara), claims have been made by the indigenous communities on 
Ambon expressing resentment towards these foreigners and disputing the basis of 
such ownership.
38  
 
As Ambon’s economy grew during the Repelita  programs of the late 1970s and 
1980s, migrants from Java began to occupy positions in white collar jobs in 
professional, managerial, clerical and administrative offices.
39 The ethnic Bugis and 
other migrants from Sulawesi, who had traditionally settled along the coast in self-
contained communities, also began to settle in the city of Ambon, displacing other 
traders, taking over the transportation sector, and in the view of some indigenous 
Ambonese, ‘creating slum areas and contributing to urban crime’.
40  
 
The tensions generated by migration were aggravated further by the negative effects 
of the 1997-8 Asian Financial Crisis 
41 on the Moluccan economy which served to 
develop economic disparities  between the rural village Ambonese and the middle 
urban bourgeoisie in Ambon. In pre-crisis conditions, outer provinces such as Maluku 
had high incidences of chronic poverty and contained a large percentage of groups, 
both urban and rural, who were deemed as vulnerable to further poverty, that is, 
greater than fifty percent chance of falling into poverty in the near future.
42 Further 
clarification is offered by Table 4 and Table 5 below. 
                                                                 
38 In order to gain access to land, many Bugis migrants have used ‘officialising strategies’ by obtaining 
land certificates authorising their occupation. See Acciaioli, Masyarakat Indonesia, pp.258-9. 
39 See Soewartoyo, Indonesian Quarterly, pp.316-18, for statistics in migrant occupations in eastern 
Indonesia. 
40 HWR [online], Ambon, 1999 Report. This is not to mention that during the 1980s and 1990s in 
Ambon, migrants, particularly the Bugis, also began to make themselves felt politically, with tightly 
organised Bugis associations.
 
41 The crisis developed following the devaluation of the Thai currency. Foreign investors reacted 
adversely to the state of foreign exchange reserves in Thailand and South Korea and rapidly unloaded 
Asian currencies and assets. The economic consequences reverberated throughout the region and the 
‘Asian crisis’ hit Indonesia more quickly than many analysts had expected.  Many were surprised later 
at the subsequent damage to Indonesia’s economy and sought to explain the reasons for the emergence 
of the crisis. Moves were made initially in response to the impending economic crisis in 1997 with 
attempts to attract new foreign investment but were unsuccessful and the IMF was called on to 
intervene. 
42 Asep Suryahadi and Sudarno Sumarto, ‘The Chronic Poor, The Transient Poor, and the Vulnerable in 
Indonesia Before and After the Crisis’, Working Paper, SMERU Research Institute: Jakarta, May 2001, 
p.13-7. 
  148Table 4: Changing Poverty Rates in Indonesia in 1996 and Changes 1996-99 
 
Poverty Incidence (%) 
February 1996 
Percentage Point Change 
Feb 1996 – Feb 1999 
 
Province 
Urban Rural 
 
Total 
 
Urban Rural Total 
Jakarta 0.78 - 0.78 2.04 -  2.04
North Sulawesi  6.83 23.69 19.22 4.87 3.14  3.25
Riau 2.53 7.20 5.59 6.00 2.42  3.63
Papua 6.94 64.97 50.04 -0.87 7.22  4.85
Bali 4.98 10.63 8.67 5.69 4.98  4.95
West Nusa Tenggara  20.60 39.78 36.16 9.57 4.93  5.62
Aceh 3.25 8.32 7.27 2.18 7.09  5.63
West Sumatra  2.40 4.01 3.60 6.39 5.73  5.87
North Sumatra  3.68 11.51 8.27 7.13 7.40  7.00
Central Kalimantan  2.27 4.39 3.91 2.74 9.03  7.24
South Sulawesi  5.84 18.74 15.07 11.57 6.20  7.56
West Kalimantan  5.72 25.65 21.32 0.45 12.39  9.44
East Nusa Tenggara  21.70 56.48 51.59 6.97 9.63  9.59
Bengkulu 4.62 12.22 10.25 5.79 12.33  10.19
Yogyakarta 13.10 20.11 16.64 9.02 16.67  10.31
Central Java  12.28 25.18 21.03 11.44 12.58  11.75
 
Poverty Incidence (%) 
February 1996 
 
Percentage Point Change 
Feb 1996 – Feb 1999 
Province 
 
Urban 
 
Rural 
 
Total 
 
 
Urban 
 
Rural 
 
Total 
 
South Kalimantan  4.95 9.99 8.46 3.04 16.39  12.18
Southeast Sulawesi  11.61 27.29 23.73 2.13 17.15  12.87
Central Sulawesi  5.74 16.97 14.49 10.98 15.72  14.03
Jambi 7.32 8.27 8.01 8.09 16.98  14.18
East Java  9.40 23.57 18.99 10.10 17.30  14.32
Maluku  10.47 41.51 33.81 8.17 18.39  14.59
West Java  8.41 14.59 11.93 12.41 17.28  14.67
South Sumatra  2.00 11.70 8.75 12.47 16.23  15.05
East Kalimantan  0.75 12.36 6.52 7.99 22.71  15.15
Lampung 7.50 19.01 17.18 12.40 21.56  19.62
  
Indonesia 7.22 20.54 15.74 9.12 13.55  11.39
 
Source: Menno Pradhan (an others), “Measurements of Poverty in Indonesia: 1996, 1999 
and Beyond”, Working Paper, SMERU Research Institute: Jakarta, June 2000. 
 
  149Table 5: Poverty Incidence and Contribution to Poor in Indonesia by  
Occupational Sector, February 1996 and February 1999 (%) 
 
February 1996  February 1999  Sector 
Poverty 
Incidence
Contribution 
to total poor 
Poverty 
Incidence 
Contribution 
to total poor 
Agriculture 26.29 68.54 39.69  58.38
Trade, hotel and restaurant  7.96 8.10 17.63  11.13
Manufacturing industry  10.69 5.71 22.92  7.71
Civil/social/ private services  5.73 5.72 13.13  7.36
Transport / communication  8.85 3.32 24.02  5.58
Construction 14.04 5.42 28.97  5.52
Receiving transfer  6.58 1.86 15.57  2.65
Mining and quarrying  15.34 1.01 29.81  1.00
Others 13.29 0.10 32.00  0.27
Finance/insurance/leasing 1.24 0.06 5.23 0.23
Electricity, gas, and water  6.10 0.16 14.48  0.17
Note: Sorted by contribution to total poor in February 1999 
 
Source: Menno Pradhan (an others), “Movements of Poverty in Indonesia: 1996, 1999 and 
Beyond”, Working Paper, SMERU Research Institute: Jakarta, June 2000. 
 
As Table 4 indicates, the rural sector in Maluku had one of the highest incidences of 
poverty during the economic crisis with more than 18 percentage points increase from 
pre-existing poverty levels. This is dramatically higher than the impact on the 
Moluccan urban economy with only 8.17 percentage point change from February 
1996. Table 5 also indicates that the agriculture sector consistently had the highest 
overall incidence of poverty with 26% of those in agriculture being poor. This 
incidence of poverty increased from 26% to 39% after the crisis, that is, a 13% point 
rise in poverty or 50% increase from 1996 pre-crisis conditions. The trade, 
manufacturing, transport and civil service industries were similarly affected but the 
incidence of poverty in these areas was comparatively lower. 
 
As both Table 4 and Table 5 indicate, those working in urban Ambon City, such as 
migrant petty traders and middle-class businessmen, certainly bore the devastating 
effects of the collapse of the rupiah which saw the subsequent price escalation in 
  150goods and services and the closing of businesses especially with short-term debts.
 43 
At the same time, however, it is shown that the negative impact was particularly felt 
within the agricultural sector, a key component of the Moluccan economy, which has 
always been relatively poorer than the modern sectors based mainly in Java.
44 With 
already pre-existing high poverty rates and a weak rural economy, it was the 
indigenous Ambonese in rural Ambon who experienced a state of serious social and 
economic adversity.  
 
The relationship between the rural village Ambonese and the middle urban 
bourgeoisie in Ambon had, therefore, developed into an unequal one as a result of 
these economic disparities. Importantly, it highlighted the weak economic status of the 
indigenous Ambonese compared with their urban counterparts who fared 
comparatively better. The contraction of the Moluccan economy combined with the 
effects of El Nino
45 had the severest effects for the rural based indigenous Ambonese. 
Many poverty-stricken rural subdistricts in Maluku reported that things were ‘worse’ 
than before the crisis with specific threats to living standards and the provision of 
                                                                 
43 Despite positive signs from macroeconomic indicators during the early to mid 1990s, it has been 
shown that there were already indicators of disconcerting trends in the Indonesian economy. High costs 
resulting from corruption and negative growth rates affected the competitiveness and sustainability of 
several key export industries. Two other vital economic conditions have been deemed to be crucial to 
the sudden depreciation in the rupiah, namely the escalation of foreign debt and private sector debt and 
the emergence of private banks whose tendency to issue non-economic loans, exacerbated the crisis. 
See Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia’s Search for Stability, Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 
1999, 211-12. Also Donald K. Emmerson, ‘Exit and Aftermath: The Crisis of 1997-98’, in D. 
Emmerson (ed) Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition, M.E.Sharpe: New 
York, 1999, pp.295-343.  
44 Agriculture is a key component of the economy in Maluku with principal food crops including 
cassava, taro, yams and sweet potatoes. Maluku has also always been included as one of the poorer 
provinces, which are predominantly concentrated in the eastern part of the archipelago. All of these 
provinces have tended to show huge disparities in regional incomes compared with, for example, the 
economies of Jakarta, West Java and South Sulawesi. It has been suggested that provinces in eastern 
Indonesia, such as Maluku, have been disadvantaged due to the fact that they have ‘...a limited natural 
resource base, all are distant from major commercial centres, and none has a per capita GDP more than 
40 per cent of the national (non-oil) average’. Hill, Indonesian Economy, pp. 230-1; Encyclopedia 
[online], ‘Moluccas’. Accessed 10 January 2001. 
45 At the time of the crisis there was an ‘El Nino’ drought which occurred in many areas of eastern 
Indonesia beginning in early 1997 and continuing through most of 1998. The incidence of the drought 
in the eastern provinces caused serious food shortages and displaced hundreds of people in search of 
food. Maluku was also affected by the forest fires of Sumatra and Kalimantan which created a haze that 
spread to nearby areas of the central and northern Philippines and Papua New Guinea, and which led to 
the deaths of people from smoke inhalation.  See Jenny Grant, ‘Drought Forces Tribes To Go In Search 
For Food’, South China Morning Post, 11 November 1997 [online]. Available from Dow Jones 
Interactive (Database), accessed 10 May 2001; George Aditjondro, ‘Smoke Signals Send A Warning’, 
Sydney Morning Herald, 10 January 1997 [online]. Available from Dow Jones Interactive (Database), 
accessed 10 May 2001. 
  151social services such as education and health.
46 While the living standards of the 
Ambonese were eroded as a result, the middle-class bourgeoisie in Ambon City 
maintained a comparatively smaller incidence of poverty. 
 
4.5   The Disruptive Impact of the 1999 Decentralisation Measures 
 
Structural inadequacies relating to decentralisation led to it having an impact in 
generating greater personalisation of power and corruption - the self interested use of 
decentralisation resources by competing elites - and thence the further erosion of the 
legitimate authority of both traditional and educated elites over Ambonese society. 
From a more general perspective of the Moluccan region
47, it is proposed firstly, that 
changes in lower levels of government in the Moluccas made them more susceptible 
to capture by elite interests, secondly, that power and resources were significantly 
shifted away from traditional and incumbent elites to the Local Legislative Assembly 
(DPRD) and newly elected heads, and thirdly, that new electoral laws were fraught 
with early complications that directly threatened to increase the scope for corruption 
and collusion and threaten the legitimacy of existing heads of authority in Moluccan 
and Ambonese society.  
 
A study on corruption, published by the Partnership for Governance Reform based in 
Indonesia, suggested that the 1999 legislation saw some newly elected district chiefs 
expect ‘huge returns . . . from their positions’.
48 Indeed, the new decentralisation 
policy provided a wide scope of reforms that saw greater political, administrative and 
fiscal powers allocated to local elites within the 300 Indonesian district governments. 
As the new reforms eliminated the national government’s legal authority to intervene 
                                                                 
46 Sudarno Sumarto, Anna Wetterberg, and Lant Pritchett, ‘The Social Impact of the Crisis in 
Indonesia: Results from a Nationwide Kecamatan Survey’, Working Paper, SMERU Research 
Institute: Jakarta, 1998, pp.9-10. 
47 Limitations on specific data regarding decentralisation in Ambon has required that this section of the 
thesis refer to the Moluccan region in general. 
48 Richard Borsuk, ‘Indonesia, A New Twist on Spreading the Wealth – Decentralization of Power 
Multiplies Opportunities For Bribery, Corruption’, The Wall Street Journal, 29 January 2003, p.16. 
  152in the process of choosing and nominating new governors, bupati  and  wali kota 
(mayor), this effectively removed obstacles to local elites’ political ambitions and 
subsequently saw power and privileges shift significantly to some individuals and 
away from others.
49  
 
Whilst the decentralisation policy was widely regarded as increasing the scope for 
public participation in government and making local officials accountable to the 
people they serve, it nevertheless meant that local governments were more likely to be 
dominated by individuals seeking to enhance their own control and power within 
regional government. Michael Malley argues that a lack of national oversight in the 
election of local members of government freed legislators to collude with candidates 
by not only enabling local politicians to choose their executive but also providing 
them with the means to implement and pay for the policies which they established.
50  
He argues further that, 
 
The new regional government law transferred the national 
government’s local administrative offices (kanwil) and staff to the 
district and municipal governments, simultaneously enhancing their 
capacity and eliminating the principal means through which Jakarta 
had implemented centrally determined policies and kept tabs on local 
affairs.
51
 
As a result, allegations of vote buying were rampant at almost every election of 
governor, bupati and wali kota. In Ambon, there were widespread protests concerning 
the election of Herman Adiran Koedoeboen as bupati, and Labertus Nuhuyanan as his 
deputy, because it was feared that local elites were more susceptible to capturing their 
own interests rather than being held accountable by the general public.
52 In 
recognising how weak local governments were to personal vested interests, it was 
                                                                 
49 Michael S. Malley, ‘New Rules, Old Structures and the Limits of Democratic Decentralisation’, in E. 
Aspinall and G. Fealy (eds) Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and 
Democratisation, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, 2003, p.109. 
50 Malley, Local Power, pp.102-16. 
51 Malley, Local Power, p.109. 
52 Olop Labetubun and Munira Sahupala, ‘Besok, Gubernur Lantik Bupati Maluku Tenggara’, Maluku 
Media Centre [online], 9 October 2003. Accessed 9 October 2003. 
  153argued by some Indonesians that, the way the new decentralisation system was 
organised, it would appear that it would simply provide elites in the higher echelons 
of regional government greater opportunity to manage resources and wield greater 
power.
53 Moreover this would thereby add to the disintegration of existing structures 
and lead to a system of dishonesty and deceit. 
 
If you pull the red thread from this deception, the primary concern is its 
[regional autonomy] absorption, not its basic principles. What the 
government and parliament are doing through the autonomy program is 
simply regarded as giving more power to the regional government 
without inviting responsibility and accountability...Autonomy like this 
is suspect of only spreading the virus of corruption, collusion, and 
nepotism from the centre to the regions.
54  
 
Fundamental shifts in power to these new elites in regional government occurred in 
the context of one of the fundamental reforms that accompanied the new legislation 
which stipulated conditions for the election of regional heads. Essentially the law 
provided greater powers to the DPRD as the ‘voice of the community’. According to 
the new policy, the DPRD now possessed the right to elect the regional head, to 
request accountability or to dismiss the regional head, and to submit revenue and 
expenditure proposals for the region.
55 Whilst this signified greater political and 
administrative autonomy than ever before for newly appointed regional heads of 
government, it also clearly meant that the authority of incumbent elites such as village 
heads, regents and mayors would be dramatically curbed. As Table 6 below indicates, 
traditional powers held solely by these individuals would now be divided and 
reallocated mostly to the new discretionary powers of the DPRD.  
                                                                 
53 Tempo, ‘Otonomi atau Sentronomi?’, 7 Januari 2001, pp.16-7. 
54 Tempo, ‘Otonomi atau Sentronomi?’, 7 Januari 2001, pp.16-7. My translation of “Bila ditarik benang 
merah di antara kilah tersebut, penyebab utamanya adalah kerisauan terhadap penerapannya, bukan ide 
dasarnya. Apa yang sekarang dilakukan pemerintah dan parlemen melalui program otonomi dianggap 
cuma memberikan wewenang lebih kepada pemerintah daerah tanpa mengikutsertakan 
pertanggungjawaban dan akuntabilitasnya...Otonomi seperti ini dicurigai hanya akan menyebarkan 
virus korupsi, kolusi, dan nepotisme dari pusat ke daerah-daerah”. 
55 Mardiyah Chamim, Ardi Bramantyo, Wens Manggut, and Zed Abidien, ‘Runtuhnya Kekuasaan Raja 
Kecil’, Tempo, 22 February 1999, pp.22-3. 
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Table 6: Regional Autonomy Laws of 1974 and 1999 
 
REGIONAL AUTONOMY, NOW AND BEFORE 
Elite functions and 
appointments 
Before (Based on Regional 
Government Law 
No.5/1974) 
Now (Based on RUU Law 
on Regional Government) 
Accountability of the Governor  Addressed to the Minister 
for Internal Affairs and the 
DPRD. 
Addressed to the DPRD, 
which also has the power to 
dismiss the Governor. 
The election of the position of 
Governor 
The DPRD selected 5 
candidates to submit to the 
Minister for Internal Affairs 
who in turn submitted the 
candidate list to the 
President. 3 candidates are 
short-listed for the position 
of governor. It has 
happened where the final 
name chosen was not listed 
in the first place. 
The DPRD has the authority 
to select a candidate for the 
position of governor. If the 
central government 
approves, the candidate 
officially assumes the 
position of governor. If the 
candidate is not approved, 
elections for a new 
candidate by the DPRD are 
repeated. 
The election for the position of 
Mayor/Regent 
The local DPRD selects 5 
candidates, the names of 
whom are submitted to the 
governor and the President 
who then shortlist it to 3 
official candidates. 
The local DPRD has the full 
authority to select its 
mayor/regent without 
requesting approval from 
the central government 
Prerequisites for the position of 
Deputy Governor 
A civil servant appointed 
by the President. 
Not necessary to be a civil 
servant, and is appointed by 
the DPRD. 
Prerequisites for the position of 
Mayor/Regent 
A civil servant, appointed 
by the Minister for Internal 
Affairs. 
Not necessary to be a civil 
servant, and is appointed by 
the local DPRD. 
 
 
Source: Mardiyah Chamim, Ardi Bramantyo, Wens Manggut, and Zed Abidien, “Runtuhnya 
Kekuasaan Raja Kecil” (The Collapse of the Authority of the Small Kings), Tempo, 22 
February 1999, pp.23. 
 
Specific requirements in these radical reforms, which endowed regional politicians 
with enormous structural power, raised suspicions that these new elites would likely 
be held captive to local moneyed interests. For example, queries were raised regarding 
incongruities in the 1999 package from Law 1974 No.5 in terms of candidature for 
regional executive offices. The previous 1974 Law required that the candidates have 
government experience, which gave individuals with a bureaucratic or armed forces 
background an advantage. The new law omitted such a requirement, requiring instead 
  155that candidates were to have lived in the country for at least a year.
56 The criteria 
could potentially mean the selection of regional leaders who were more locally 
rooted. But questions arose concerning the empowerment of these elected new 
leaders, whether they would strongly represent regional interests or whether their 
bargaining power would be inhibited by central government intervention. This 
concern was expressed by one Ambonese who said that, ‘The possibility that the 
wealth of the region will be drawn in by the interests of local elite, is considerably 
high’.
57
 
Pranab Bardhan, an economist at the University of California, Berkeley, says it is not 
inevitable that dispersed political power spawns increased corruption. But he argues 
that corruption ‘becomes quite high when decentralization takes place in an anarchic 
way’
58 and when mechanisms to contain it, such as local democracy, are not yet in 
place. The regions in Indonesia were in various states of readiness and many of the 
‘preconditions’ for decentralisation had not been met.
59 This was complicated by the 
characteristic feature of legal uncertainty which historically has remained a prominent 
feature of Indonesia legislation. Nicole Niessen indicates that, while self-evident 
provisions tend to be carefully clarified in the legal regulations, other provisions in 
need of explanation are simply disposed of as ‘self-explanatory’ (cukup jelas).
60  
 
Certainly, complications in the implementation of the 1999 decentralisation policies 
caused considerable confusion in Maluku and other areas in Indonesia. Firstly outside 
Maluku, in early 1999, after the announcement of the new laws on regional 
government and the liberalisation of electoral laws, the situation in East Java 
                                                                 
56 Ketut Putra Erawan, ‘Political Reform and Regional Politics in Indonesia’, Asian Survey, Volume 
39, July 1999, pp.588-612. Available from Expanded Academic ASAP [Journal Database], accessed 15 
February 2002. 
57 Interview with informants. My translation of “Kemungkinan kekayaan daerah akan dihisap oleh 
kepentingan elite lokal akan cukup tinggi”. 
58 Borsuk, Wall Street Journal, p.16. 
59 Arellano A. Colongon, Jr., ‘What is Happening on the Ground? The Progress of Decentralisation’, in 
E. Aspinall and G. Fealy (eds) Local Power and Politics in Indonesia, Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies: Singapore, 2003, p.87. 
60 Nicole Niessen, Municipal Government in Indonesia: policy, law, and practice of decentralization 
and urban spatial planning, CNWS Publications: The Netherlands, 1999, p.328. 
  156demonstrated these difficulties. In this case, five bupati were to complete their terms 
in office in May and June of that year. According to the new electoral laws, in order 
that the local people’s assembly may prepare for the elections of a new bupati, the 
existing bupati must formally withdraw from his position six months prior to the 
completion of his term in office. This meant that the electoral process for the regency 
head had to be immediately announced. Problems arose on the 23 December when 
Minister Syarwan Hamid sent a radiogram to all provincial governors, ordering that 
they cancel all elections for bupati or wali kota.  The order was received with strong 
protests from local community representatives who questioned the extent to which the 
community would have an actual voice in selecting candidates for bupati or wali kota, 
and additionally, what would happen if the situation occurred where the selection of 
bupati  or  wali kota was rejected by members of the new DPRD from the 1999 
Elections.
61
 
The aforementioned case in East Java caused consternation amongst incumbent elites 
who were concerned with being able to guarantee their position of authority amongst 
new competing political candidates. As Mentik Budiwiyono, a member of the DPRD 
of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) indicated, confusing regulations meant that, 
‘everything does not yet have any clear guarantee’.
62 Like Budiwiyono’s sentiment, 
there was a lot of scepticism as to whether the implementation of Law 1999 No.22 
would provide equitable distribution and community participation. Corruption 
amongst competing elites was pointed out to have occurred in other countries where 
greater regional autonomy was granted. Countries such as Brazil, for example, 
experienced a dramatic monetary crisis as a result of regional government banks 
frantically borrowing large sums of money when autonomy was introduced.
63 Another 
example closer to the region was the case in Kalimantan where a bupati, after 
                                                                 
61 The situation was eventually resolved with Minister Syarwan allowing for the screening and 
selection of candidates for the positions of bupati and wali kota. The terms of office of some regent 
heads were also extended in order to resolve the vacuum in regional government. Mardiyah Chamim 
(and others), ‘Runtuhnya Kekuasaan Raja Kecil’, Tempo, 22 February 1999, pp.22-3. 
62 Chamim (and others), Tempo, pp.22-3. 
63 See Tempo, ‘Otonomi’, pp.16-7. 
  157assuming his new position, issued hundreds of forest industry rights (hutan 
pengusahaan hak).
64 Similarly, other regencies who had participated earlier in the 
‘Autonomous Regions Pilot Project’
65 used public funds to build luxurious offices and 
government houses for the bupati.
66
 
Secondly, there was a great deal anxiety throughout Maluku regarding decentralisation 
and the potential trend of ‘collusion’ among the executive and legislative bodies, in 
order to ‘enrich themselves’. In specific, there was much confusion regarding the 
decision-making process for regional heads and who was actually benefiting from 
decentralisation. As the elections of new regional heads commenced in the wake of the 
June 1999 general election, there were those Ambonese who were not so well disposed 
to the actual implementation of the Decentralisation Act for fears of the corrupting 
power of these elections. There was a pervading concern that the structural 
inadequacies in the decentralisation laws meant a flawed electoral system which 
empowered only a few. 
 
The implementation of autonomy is only talk. Most people have little 
doubt that the real motive is to re-centralize power. Who indeed does 
not agree with self-government. We simply want it as a step to 
empower our economy and improve the welfare of the Moluccan 
people.
67
 
                                                                 
64 This apparently has been a contentious issue where the Department of Forestry was re-established 
and whose powers were delegated to the regions. The change from state to public issuing of forestry 
industry rights has been criticised and the whole department has been described as the most ‘useless’ 
within the system of regional autonomy. See Andi A. Mallarangeng, ‘Otonomi Daerah: Pemerintah 
Tak Bisa Tidur’, Tempo, 7 January 2001, pp.50-1.  
65 Trevor Buising argues that Law 22 was based on lessons learnt from the failure of the Autonomous 
Regions Pilot Project. Regulation 8/1995 launched the project where activities in 19 sectors were to be 
transferred to the regencies and municipalities. The initiative eventually failed because it was under-
resourced; the central government allocated greater responsibilities to the regions but not the 
accompanied funding that needed to go with them. See Trevor Buising, ‘A Century of 
Decentralisation’, Inside Indonesia [online], No.63, July-September 2000. Accessed 29 May 2002. 
66 Tempo, ‘Otonomi’, pp.16-7. 
67 Siwalima Report No.74, INDONESIA –NEWS [online]. Accessed 28 January 2003. My translation of  
“Pemberlakuan otonomi cuma basa-basi. Siapa sih yang tidak setuju adanya otonomisasi. Kita setuju-
setuju saja sebagai langkah untuk mem-berdayakan perekonomian rakyat demi peningkatan 
kesejahteraan rakyat Maluku”. 
  158These new power holders in the region, referred to locally as ‘little kings’
68, epitomise 
how the structural inadequacies in the decentralisation laws meant a  greater 
personalisation of power by competing elites. By increasing the scope for public 
participation, new regional elites were no longer civil servants accountable to the 
central government but were answerable to the people. However, as discussed above, 
rather than accountability to the general public, decentralisation measures provided, 
instead, disproportionate power to members of the DPRD which promoted corrupting 
influences. At the same time, the transfer of political power to these local units of 
government effectively eroded the authority traditionally wielded by incumbent 
Ambonese elites. Individuals such as the village raja  and local educated elites, 
including the mayor and subdistrict head, forfeited a good proportion of their power 
and thus sharply reduced their legitimate authority over Ambonese society. 
 
4.6   Conclusion 
 
This chapter has offered an analysis of the various sources of disruption in Ambon 
and the various impacts of these disruptions on the Ambonese elites and masses. In 
this chapter, there have been five factors examined: the disruption of traditional elites, 
the lack of authority of Ambonese educated elites, the disruptive impact of economic 
crisis, the tensions relating to migration, and the uncertainties generated by 
decentralisation.  
 
These disruptions introduced new levels of insecurity and uncertainty for both elites 
and ordinary Ambonese. Traditional leaders were being marginalised by the 
introduction of new state-sponsored institutions filled by the generation of educated 
elites. While the status and career positions of these elites were being disrupted by 
centralisation reforms and the Reformasi period with unprecedented competition for 
decentralisation resources. The ordinary Ambonese found their lives and communities 
                                                                 
68 Tempo, ‘Raja Kecil Digugat: Menggugat Raja-raja Kecil’, vol.27, no.17, January-February 1999, 
pp.59-61. 
  159increasingly disrupted, not only by the rapid changes in their local authority structures 
and by the political chaos arising from government decentralisation attempts of the 
regions, but also from the economic uncertainty arising from rapid migration and the 
exacerbation of existing poverty levels which created workplace tensions and 
economic discrepancies between different migrant groups and between migrants and 
the indigenous Ambonese community.  The resulting crisis of social cohesion and 
moral certainty meant the adoption of a new nationalist ideology that could serve to 
offer a simple resolution to the complexities of an evidently rapidly changing social, 
economic and political environment.  
  
 
The next chapter will seek to discover how nationalism became one response to the 
various levels of disruption in Ambon as a way to appeal to a society influenced by 
socio-economic complexity and as a result have become less cohesive, and to resolve 
the insecurities engendered by rapid change. In this sense, it will seek to examine how 
the formation of the Moluccan Sovereignty Front (FKM) in Ambon managed to 
become the major beneficiary of the nationalist formula for the control of Ambonese 
society and to what extent it appealed to the Ambonese as an alternative source of 
authoritative legitimacy. 
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THE FKM 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN AMBONESE IDENTITY 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
The following two chapters will examine the process of ideological formation during 
the conflict in Ambon between 1999 and 2002. Two conflicting ideologies which 
developed in response to each other, the ethnocultural nationalism of the FKM and the 
ethnonationalist construction of the Laskar Jihad, will be examined as each having a 
degree of support from the Ambonese. It is argued in this thesis that these two 
counterposed constructions of Ambonese identity show the incompatibility of the 
ideological visions adhered to by the contending sides. This view of the dispute in 
Ambon means that the explanation of current confrontation does not necessarily lie 
with an explanation of objective causal factors but rather in the clash of competing 
ideologies involving myths of the past. 
 
The two counterposed ideological constructions of the FKM and the Laskar Jihad 
were adopted in Ambon as ideological formulas which appeared to demonstrate a 
resolution to the particular insecurities of individuals. Both nationalisms generated 
appeal from the Ambonse community as opposed to Indonesian nationalism or other 
regional nationalisms based on three fundamental factors: first, the brutal actions of 
the Indonesian military, the inability of the State to contain the ensuing violence, and 
the disruptive nature of the modernizing influence of State interventions, disillusioned 
people with the capacities of the Indonesian nation-state to offer security and moral 
certainty; secondly, the assertion of ethnic myths of common ancestry and myths of a 
homeland community drew appeal in asserting the uniqueness and permanence of the 
national community, and united by ethnocultural sameness; and thirdly, the assertion 
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 of a demonized ‘Other’ which offered a specific identification of the contextual 
problem in Ambon either as a Christian secessionist enemy or a ‘corrupted state’ and 
its Muslim agents.  Clearly, not all regions of Indonesia experienced this kind of riot 
and nationalist confrontation even though there was widespread disillusionment and 
disruption throughout the archipelago. The conflict in Ambon was uniquely generated 
by both the social riot element of tension between migrants and the indigenous 
population, in addition to separatist myth which could be deployed by the two 
contending sides. 
 
The selection of a ‘Moluccan’ Sovereignty movement was a strategic political move 
by local elites to externally disassociate itself from connotations of a specific South 
Moluccan secessionist movement such as the RMS and its surrogate the RMS-in-exile 
which drew little sympathy both nationally and internationally for its failure in 1950, 
its subsequent internal fissions and violent demonstrations in The Netherlands. 
However, internally the FKM deliberately rejuvenated a language of ethnic 
authenticity from the 1950 RMS movement, thereby reviving a distinct Ambonese 
identity which culturally encompassed the old Dutch administrative boundaries of 
South Maluku comprising Ambon, Seram and its surrounding islands. In this way, 
those who responded to the nationalist calls of the FKM easily shifted between the 
two ideas of a South Moluccan and Ambonese community. 
 
The following discussion seeks to explain the process of Ambonese nationalism as 
four stages of ideological construction. First was the scapegoating of migrants, second 
was the construction of non-separatist religious conflict which threatened to split the 
Ambonese community, third was the construction of a racial conflict, and fourth was 
the incorporation of ideas of minority rights and international legality as a way in 
which to appropriate claims for the right of self-government. In this way, there was an 
articulation of earlier ideas of Ambonese identity and history dating back to the RMS 
movement 50 years earlier, while the ideological basis for identity also involved a 
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 reorientation of ideas of identity and history in order to mobilise a new pan-religious 
Ambonese race towards the renewed goal of political independence from the Republic 
of Indonesia.   
 
The following is an interpretative summary of the conflict in Ambon in 1999. The 
conflict began on 19 January, 1999 when a fight erupted on the island of Ambon 
between a Christian public minibus driver and a Muslim youth, and which quickly 
developed into a regional war, polarised between Christians and Muslims. Accounts 
of the incident vary according to different sources, with some blaming the Christian 
driver of the minibus of wounding his Muslim attacker with a knife, while others 
recount that the driver was attacked and had to flee. Nevertheless, news of the 
incident soon began to spread and groups began rampaging and inflicting destruction 
to other areas in Ambon outside the immediate city of Ambon. 
 
In the weeks that followed, the violence escalated further when news spread that 
churches and mosques had been deliberately burned down, which foreshadowed 
widespread destruction  to the communities of Batu Gantung, Waringin, Benteng 
Karang, Passo, Nania, Wailete, Kamiri, Hative Besar and others. News of the violence 
in the City spread rapidly and caused other communities to violently attack others, the 
most common pattern being that Christians tended to target Muslim migrants 
predominately from Southeast Sulawesi by burning their shops and homes whilst 
sparing the Chinese who were mainly Christian. In comparison, Muslims attacked 
well-known Christian areas of residency. 
 
By early February, much of the central part of the city of Ambon and many 
neighbourhoods in other parts of Ambon island were razed to the ground. Soon after a 
short lull in the violence, the conflict developed in the neighbouring islands of Seram, 
Saparua, Manipa, Haruka, and Sanana. A spate of attacks each seemingly wanting 
retribution from the other evolved where Christians armed with sharp weapons 
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 attacked Muslims who they initially invited for a peace initiative in Kairatu on Seram, 
while  the following day Muslim Ambonese and Butonese burnt Christian houses in 
Waitasu village. Similarly, on Saparua Christians burned down a Muslim dormitory 
which led to the mobilisation of Christian and Muslim communities where at least 23 
people were killed in a fight between Muslim villagers of Pelauw and Christians from 
the neighboring hamlet of Kariu. The latter incident of February 14 caused much 
controversy with the deaths being attributed to gunshot wounds inflicted by local 
security from both the army and police who were attempting to stop the rioting. Both 
Christians and Muslims made accusations that security forces possessed ulterior 
motives and were thus deliberately taking sides under the guise of restoring order. 
 
Violence in the surrounding islands appeared to perpetuate the violence in Ambon 
City with isolated incidents continuing to erupt on a sporadic basis and causing alarm 
and panic in the community. On February 23 rioting mobs attacked local Butonese 
residents, while armed conflict broke out between the Christian village of Waai and 
the predominantly Muslim villages of Tulehu and Liang. Mobs also attacked a few 
houses including that of the head of the Al Fatah Mosque Foundation, Abdullah 
Soulissa.  By early March, Ambon City was subject to a civil war with violent clashes 
between Christians from Ahuru village and Muslim Rinjani village. During the 
violence, local police intervened and opened fire against the rioters where at least 13 
people were killed and nine others wounded. This incident provoked an 
unprecedented reaction from Muslims outside the immediate area of Maluku because 
of rumours that the initial attack had taken place in a mosque, subsequently causing 
mass protests in Jakarta among Muslims outraged at what was perceived as 
unprovoked attacks against Muslims. Similarly an attack close to Ambon Silo church 
on March 6 outraged Christians.  
 
By this time, the violence was escalating at an alarming rate with local residents 
barricading themselves in order to protect themselves and their families. In an attempt 
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 to restore peace and order in the region, Indonesian military and police forces from 
Java and Sulawesi were deployed in Ambon and elsewhere throughout the Moluccas. 
In particular, KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserve Command) forces were sent from 
Makassar
1 in Sulawesi to Ambon on 23 January, 1999 to contain the conflict. Soon 
afterwards in June 2000, militant Islamic forces called the Laskar Jihad arrived in the 
area, which prompted a marked increase in violence and unrest throughout Ambon 
and which caused many individuals to accuse the Laskar Jihad of provoking the 
enduring conflict. Such was the extent of violence that a state of civil emergency was 
declared in the Moluccas by the then Indonesian President, Abdurrahman Wahid, on 
27 June, 2000. As the violence showed no signs of abating, the Governor of Maluku, 
Saleh Latuconsina, appealed for an extension of the existing emergency status which, 
as a result, was extended until 27 December of that same year 
 
At this point, Ambon was experiencing the cost of the conflict, which was devastating 
both in terms of the loss of life and also in terms of the social and economic impact to 
the region. Public services collapsed when many officials left and decided not to 
return to Ambon and basic services such as health and education ceased to function. 
All industrial enterprise operating in Maluku was abandoned causing unemployment 
levels to reach 45.49 percent. Negative economic growth caused the economic output 
of the province to plunge from 7.33% in 1998 to minus 7.76% and the percentage of 
the population living below the poverty line rose to 38.01% from only 10.36% in 
1998.
2
 
With no signs of the violence abating in the face of devastating social and economic 
crisis and at least 700 deaths, with one report indicating ‘thousands’ of deaths, the 
Moluccan Sovereignty Front (FKM) was declared on 18 December, 2000 in Ambon 
City. With Alex Manuputty sworn in as the FKM’s Chairman of the Executive 
                                                                 
1 Formerly known as Ujung Pandang. 
2 The Jakarta Post, ‘Local Government reform key to recovery from conflict in Ambon’, 6 October 
2003 [online]. Available from Factiva (Journal Database). Accessed 9 October 2003. 
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 Branch, and with networks extended by representatives appointed for Jakarta and 
New York
3, the FKM declared the right to dissolve existing state structures, pointing 
to Indonesia’s constitution, which says, ‘Sovereignty is in the hands of the people’ 
(See Appendix 8). They demanded that Jakarta restore the sovereignty of the South 
Moluccas, arguing that Indonesia illegally annexed the islands in the early 1950s 
when it defeated the RMS. At the same time, Chairman of the FKM, Alex Manuputty, 
overtly stated that the FKM was not seeking independence and that the organisation 
was not synonymous with the RMS movement. Instead, the chief aim of the FKM was 
in ‘restoring the dignity of the Maluku people, which had been lost in the two years of 
conflict and with the authorities lacking the capacity to resolve it’.
4  
 
Within this framework of a series of events, this chapter will develop the following 
key propositions. First, that particular disrupted elites articulated a series of 
ideological constructions which provided new bases for their authority in the 
community. Second, that these ideologies sought to reconstruct the dispute away from 
a split within Ambon and towards a unified Ambon counterposed to Java. Third, that 
the resonation of this ideology with members of the Ambonese community reflects 
the embedding of absolutist mindsets. 
 
5.2   The Scapegoating of Migrants 
 
As professionals within civil institutions and as members of Ambon’s village 
community, Alex Manuputty
5, Agus Wattimena
6, Hengky Manuhutu,
7 Semy 
                                                                 
3 Hamin Sialana, an Ambonese Muslim, was designated Vice Chairman of the FKM but was based in 
America. Luis Risakotta was appointed Head of the FKM branch in Jakarta. 
4 Mohd Haikal Isa, ‘South Maluku Republic after East Timor?’, 14 January 2001 [online]. Available 
from Factiva (Journal Database). Accessed 26 September 2001. 
5 Alexander Hermanus Manuputty was the son of a Christian family in Ambon’s rural community of 
Kudamati located in the hills just outside Ambon City. He studied Human Anatomy at Hassanuddin 
University in Makassar, Sulawesi, and graduated with a medical doctor’s degree in 1978. After 
graduation he worked successively in Halmahera in North Maluku and then in 1983 in the regional 
hospital in Ambon. Manuputty lived with his wife and four children in Kuda Mati in the Ambonese 
sub-district of Nusaniwe, and by 1990, his work in the fields of demography and family planning earnt 
him an honorary doctorate. It was in 1998 that Manuputty first moved out of the medical field and 
established a non-government organisation known as Nunusaku, which was orientated towards human 
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 Walleruny
8, and W. Tamaelasapal
9, all emerged as leaders of a contemporary 
nationalist movement in Ambon. These individuals were all members of Ambon’s 
village communities and their construction of Ambonese nationalism was motivated 
by a concern for their families and communities which had suffered from the 
disruptions which were examined in the previous chapter. From this perspective, it 
was the combined pressure of the centralising expansion of the Indonesian state, the 
experience of rapid migration, and the effects of the economic crisis which, during the 
New Order period of governance, led displaced individuals to construct new myths of 
Ambonese identity. 
. 
The FKM thus emerged from these aspiring elites who sought a need to reinterpret 
existing myths of identity in order to respond to a society subject to new social and 
political disruptions.  In this way, the FKM’s leaders formulated a construction of 
enemy and identity that was able to give a sense of direction to community unrest. 
Through a simple ideological formula of the good ‘us’ versus the bad ‘them’, they 
constructed a new vision of an idealised Ambonese identity counterposed to a 
demonised Indonesian/Javanese identity.  
 
The FKM elites responded to the disruptions and disillusionment in Ambonese 
society by identifying the Indonesian government as the cause of the dispute and 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
rights issues and community services. In 2000, he went briefly to Jakarta to conduct some legal studies 
until his return to Ambon on 15 June of that year and his subsequent establishment of the FKM. 
6 Agus Wattimena, an Ambonese Christian whose family was from a Christian village outside Ambon 
City, was a local school teacher. He joined the FKM as a Grass Roots Representative after failure to 
gain support for his short-lived Laskar Kristus or Army of Christ whose followers claimed to be 
warriors defending the faith as God's soldiers. As early as March 1999 the militant Laskar Kristus was 
led by Wattimena in a crusade-like mission against what they deemed as the ‘evil oppressors’. Despite 
his claim of a ‘popular army’ consisting of approximately 20,000 members, there had been widespread 
controversy regarding support for this movement on the basis that Wattimena recruited units of young 
children to serve as front-line Christian soldiers. Some adolescent Ambonese Christians expressed 
fervent enthusiasm for militant action but many Christian leaders and members of the Moluccan 
churches wished to focus instead on local efforts to restore peace and condemned the militant action. 
7 Hengky Manuhutu, originally from Ambon’s rural community, was a lawyer within the Ambonese 
public service. 
8 Semy Walleruny was a lawyer with Ambon’s Maranatha Christian Centre. 
9 W. Tamaelasapal was a traditional authority figure in Ambon’s village community. 
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 scapegoating enemies who could be blamed. In its initial declaration on 18 December, 
2000 the FKM elites portrayed the relationship between the Moluccans and Indonesia 
as a crusade to uphold the dignity of the Ambonese in the face of an oppressive 
Indonesian regime controlled by tyrannical political elites.  
 
Indonesia has carried out overt strategies to undermine the economic, 
social and cultural bases of Moluccan society. For example, the land 
becomes part of a strategy for economic erosion of the Moluccans and a 
vehicle for their ethnic dilution and oppression, Indonesia confiscates 
the lands of the Moluccans and turns over to transmigrant 
people...Moluccans may soon become a minority in their own land...A 
Government whose character is thus marked by every act which may 
define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.
10
 
The construction of Indonesian inferiority counterposed to Moluccan virtue acted as 
an ideological preconception which generated subsequent reactions to the Indonesian 
state. In Ambon, words such as ‘Javanisation’ were strongly voiced against migrants 
as migration was perceived as a deliberate state strategy to marginalise the 
populations of Eastern Indonesia.
11 Given the socio-economic circumstances that 
ensued as discussed in the previous chapter, the resentment of the Ambonese to the 
migrants was clearly pointed out as part of wider ‘Javanese’ conspiracy: 
 
The problem is that that the Javanese and the BBM [Buginese, 
Butonese, Makassarese] have of course not come out of nowhere. 
Through policies mentioned, the Javanese government has put us to one 
side because we are considered as second-class citizens.
12
  
Perceptions of a Javanese conspiracy were also alleged against state sponsored 
institutions such as the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI). Accusations were made of the 
perceived inability of the state to guarantee peace and stability within their region and 
the perceived involvement of TNI and local security forces in the conflict. With the 
                                                                 
10 ‘FKM – Maluku Independence Declaration’, Ambon Berdarah [online], 18 December 2000. 
Accessed 7 February 2001. 
11 Interview with informants I, J, Q, A. 
12 Interview with informant J with parentheses inserted for clarification. My translation of 
“Persoalannya Jawa, BBM itu memang tidak datang dari ruang hampa. Melalui kebijakan tersebut 
pemerintah Jawa menyingkinkan kita karena dianggap sebagai warga negara kelas dua”. 
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 intervention of Islamic Laskar Jihad forces in Ambon in May-June 2000, there were 
strong indications that both the military and the local police were colluding with the 
Laskar Jihad, with some members of the Laskar Jihad even admitting to receiving 
training from TNI forces.
13 Certainly, it was widely believed by many of the 
Ambonese that the military were deliberately collaborating with the Laskar Jihad in 
the conflict.  
 
There are two groups in the military: pro-dual function and anti-dual 
function. When Soeharto’s position was unstable, the role of the 
military was threatened, and so they provoked the violence in order to 
justify their military role.
14
 
5.3   A Non-Separatist Religious Construction 
 
Fundamentally, with Manuputty’s arrest in December 2000 by Indonesian authorities, 
accused of having illegal intentions to subvert the Indonesian state, the ideology of the 
FKM was swiftly articulated in religious terms. Following Manuputty’s arrest, the 
FKM pointed to an undeserved bias within existing state authority structures against 
the Ambonese Christian community. Agus Wattimena articulated in his words the 
grievances of the Christian community: 
 
There is the impression that the State hates us (the Moluccans) but what 
have we done wrong to offend the State?  The FKM came to the 
forefront to pressure the State to respond quickly to the crisis in 
Maluku. I am very sure that the Head of the Provincial Police is only 
one player; above him there are many more influential players. So it is 
best if outsiders, who do not have any interest here in Maluku, are told 
                                                                 
13 Michael Davis, ‘Laskar Jihad and the political position of conservative Islam in Indonesia’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.24, no.1, April 2002 [online]. Available from ProQuest (Journal 
Database), accessed 19 September 2002. 
14 Interview with informant P. My translation of “Ada dua kelompok di militer: pro-dwifungsi and 
antidwifungsi. Pas posisi Soeharto goyang-goyang, fungsi militer diancam, jadi bikin rusuh untuk 
memberikan alas an”. Dual function or dwifungsi is a doctrine formed by the army once Soekarno was 
removed from power in 1966. It essentially provided the theoretical backing for the military to expand 
its influence throughout the government apparatus, including reserved allocations of seats in parliament 
and in the upper echelons of the civil service. During the New Order, military officers held key 
positions in government from ambassadors and mayors to senior positions in state-owned enterprises, 
government ministries and in the cabinet. 
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 to get out and not make the Christians feel as if they are stepchildren in 
their own country.
15
 
After the intervention of the Laskar Jihad and accusations of partiality amongst both 
TNI and local security forces the FKM began to identify a Muslim threat against a 
victimised Christian community who were perceived as experiencing increasing 
pressures imposed by Islamic forces: 
 
The fundamentalist Moslems would like to see Indonesia become an 
Islamic state...Islamisation by force or face execution by the Jihad 
vigilantes are levelled upon the Christian population. They must face 
the prospect of forced circumcision just like a bunch of animals seen 
being castrated by their owner. They Syari’a or Moslem law became the 
law in these occupied lands.
16  
 
Many Ambonese Christians began to complain against the Indonesian government 
and its intent on ‘Islamicisation’ as a means to ‘fossilize the Moluccan people’.
17 The 
fact that the Abdurrahman government did not prevent Muslim troops from the 
Laskar Jihad travelling to Maluku in June 2000 was seen by Ambonese Christians as 
an indication that Islamic hardliners in the government were willing to let the conflict 
run in order to further their own political agendas.
18 Other Ambonese accused the 
Indonesian military of participating in a campaign designed to force the Islamisation 
or ‘greening’ of the Moluccas. The perception that military personnel were seen 
‘changing into the white uniform of the Laskar Jihad’ became the main basis for these 
accusations.
19  
 
                                                                 
15 Siwalima [online], ‘Warga Demo Kapolda, Tuntut Bebaskan Manuputty Kapolda: Penangguhan 
Penahanan Diatur KUHP’, 13 January 2001. Accessed 23 February 2001. 
16 ‘FKM – Maluku Independence Declaration’, Ambon Berdarah [online], 18 December 2000. 
Accessed 7 February 2001. 
17 Human Rights Watch (HRW) [online], Ambon, 1999 Report. Accessed 20 October 1999. 
18 Chris McCall, ‘Voice of Quiet Rebellion’, South China Morning Post, 27 January 2001. Available 
from the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology – Library (KITLV) [online]. Accessed 28 
February 2001.  
19 Interview with informant K. My translation of “TNI mengganti seragamnya dengan seragam putih 
Laskar Jihad.” 
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 The military were perceived to be directly involved in carrying out forced conversions 
to Islam in Christian communities throughout the Ambonese islands. There were 
widespread claims that people had been slaughtered for refusing to convert to Islam. It 
was reported, for example, that in Seram on Kasiui Island, four Christian hamlets 
were razed by Muslim attackers from the surrounding islands. The forced 
Islamicisation of Christians in Kasiui Island had been continuing for weeks with 
thousands of villagers having to flee to the forests to escape while scores were 
arrested and slaughtered if they refused to be forcibly converted to Islam.
20
 
So far, the FKM had portrayed the relationship between the Ambonese and the state 
as a Christian crusade in the face of Islamicisation by the Indonesian State and its 
‘traitorous’ agents such as the security apparatus and the Laskar Jihad. This diagnosis 
of the conflict as Christian versus Muslim received the bulk of its support from 
Ambonese Christians. Moreover, as conflict developed, the religious representation of 
the FKM threatened to further entrench the split between the indigenous Christian and 
Muslim Ambonese communities through their depiction of an overall Muslim 
conspiracy, thereby potentially hindering FKM efforts to galvanise support from the 
overall Ambonese community. The intensity of this split gained momentum as 
Muslim activists accused the FKM of having links with the failed RMS movement of 
the 1950s, which was perceived by many Ambonese as a purely Christian-led 
movement.  
 
As long as Ambonese identity was defined in religious terms, support for the FKM 
was in danger of being restricted to the Christian community. With allegations that the 
RMS was synonymous with the FKM, the FKM attempted to ameliorate the potential 
political disunity between the two indigenous religious communities. At the outset, 
the FKM elites denied any affiliation with the 1950s separatist movement and 
depicted their newly formed Moluccan Sovereignty Front rather as a liberal contender 
                                                                 
20 Interview with informants K, L, O. 
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 for social justice and equal rights for all Moluccans. Manuputty and Wattimena 
specifically refuted that the RMS had any connection with their organisation and 
stated that the RMS was ‘a thing of the past’, with no Christians today wanting to 
align themselves to a separatist movement, let alone a Christian one. Manuputty 
maintained that the FKM was simply a ‘moral force’ (gerakan moral) in attempting to 
maintain the integrity of the Ambonese, especially on issues concerning the biased 
involvement of local armed forces in the conflict.
21 They claimed that they were only 
concerned with maintaining the once peaceful coexistence that was sustained on the 
island but have been made into scapegoats of the whole conflict.  
 
The publicity surrounding Manuputty’s arrest in December 2000 and trial in 2001 was 
particularly seen by the FKM as adversely highlighting its association with the RMS 
and aggravating religious divisions in its support base. To somewhat ease these 
tensions,  Semy Wileruny, FKM’s Head of the Judicial Branch, adamantly denied 
FKM’s alleged connection with the RMS. He argued that the RMS was a closed case 
and that the allegations of the re-emergence of the RMS through the FKM were false 
manipulations of events by certain individuals. Hence, 
 
If there is a sour note I should emphasise that my parents were awarded 
an Indonesian medal of honour for their role against the RMS. So why 
would I join the FKM? Of course to portray the reality that the RMS 
struggle for independence has all this time been covered up. There are 
in fact various architects to this conflict. In essence, this state no longer 
follows its constitutional principles.
22
 
It was becoming clear that the FKM and its relationship with the Christian-led RMS 
movement were alienating the indigenous Ambonese Muslims. There was widespread 
anger from local Muslims who staged regular protests against what they perceived as 
                                                                 
21 ‘FKM’, [INDONESIA-DOCS] [online], accessed 23 February 2001. 
22 Siwalima, ‘Keluarga Waileruny’, (Waileruny’s Family), [online], accessed 23 February 2001. My 
translation of “Kalau ada nada sumbang saya perlu tegaskan bahwa orang tua saya adalah penerima 
tanda jasa pemberontakan RMS versi Indonesia. Jadi kenapa saya bergabung dengan FKM tentu untuk 
mengungkapkan kenyataan perjuangan kedaulatan RMS yang selama ini ditutup-tutupi. Padahal ada 
beberapa penyebab, intinya negara ini sudah tidak lagi berjalan dalam aturan-aturan dasar 
kenegaraannya”. 
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 a predominant Christian movement deliberately provoking the violence in the region. 
The FKM’s attempt to disassociate their position from the RMS was subject to set-
backs with hundreds of Ambonese Christians flying RMS flags on the island in 
celebration of the anniversary of declaration of the RMS on 25 April, 2001. In the 
following weeks, there was an upsurge in unprecedented bombings, killings and 
tortures of civilians after a relative period of calm for four months on the island. 
Christian communities were particularly targeted, with fifty explosions and 
indiscriminate stabbings and slashings of inhabitants recorded throughout the city.
23  
 
As anxieties in Ambon escalated with increased violent activity, the FKM sought to 
provide a unifying basis of political support by appealing to the fears and values of 
the local Muslims who were perceived to lack close ties to the core constituencies of 
the FKM elite.
24 In the lead up to the Indonesian presidential elections in 2001 and the 
intervention of the Joint Battalion (Batalyon Gabungan) into the Moluccas, 
Wattimena released a public statement that the FKM was not a ‘Christian’ movement. 
His comments were in response to a statement released by the parliamentary faction 
of the Defenders of a Unified State (F-Penegak) at the Moluccan Provincial Assembly 
(DPRD Maluku). He said that Moluccan Muslims and Christians were both unjustly 
portrayed as militant dissidents, an accusation which, despite its irreverence, only 
served to heighten FKM’s true cause as defenders of both the Moluccan Muslims and 
Moluccan Christians.
25 The FKM distinguished between those Muslims of the Laskar 
Jihad who were intent to do away with Indonesia’s secular form of government, in 
comparison to those Moluccan Muslims who were against the concept of an Islamic 
State and were allegedly forced to fight their Christian counterparts.
26
 
                                                                 
23 Ambon Berdarah [online], ‘Maluku Terror Reborn’, 28 May – 4 June 2001. Accessed 28 September 
2002. 
24 Despite the Front’s identification with a Christian-led movement, it has been alleged there are also 
Muslims in the FKM’s leadership. See McCall, South China Morning Post [online]. 
25 Siwalima, ‘Thamrin Ely’, [online]. 
26 Siwalima, ‘Thamrin Ely’, [online]. 
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 With intense furore surrounding the issue of the RMS, this shift in emphasis became 
the first rallying cry to unite both indigenous Christians and Muslims. Many Christian 
Ambonese responded with fervent enthusiasm through their portrayal of the RMS as a 
secular rather than a Christian-based movement.  It was said, for example, that the 
declaration of the RMS in 1950 was a move lead by R.S. Soumokil, the first president 
of the RMS, as a result of personal disillusionment. Rather than being seen as the 
‘mastermind’ of the RMS plot, Soumokil was depicted as a figure with little political 
experience, whose political career as the then Minister for Justice in the Federal State 
of East Indonesia (NIT) was wrought with controversy and debate. 
 
Basically the proclamation was the peak of acute disappointment for 
Soumokil because he could not attain a meaningful position in the State 
of East Indonesia, which at that time was based in Makassar.
27  
 
The claim by many of the Christian Ambonese who were interviewed was that after 
the demise of the NIT, Soumokil was more or less ‘forced’ to proclaim the RMS on 
the 25 April, 1950 to save the precarious position of the KNIL soldiers who were in 
an awkward position of choosing whether or not to join the Indonesian Republican 
Army. The perception was that the RMS was not solely a Christian manifestation; 
members of both the Christian and Muslim communities were united in support for a 
separate Moluccan state. Contrary to the widespread belief of a Christian led 
movement, the RMS forces formed by Soumokil and his new government, comprised 
both Muslim and Christian Moluccans; ‘The RMS is not owned or is not a product of 
just the Christian community, but also the Muslim community’. 
28  
 
It has thus so far been discussed that the dispute went through two main stages of 
development, first as part of their constructed ideology the FKM identified the 
                                                                 
27 Interview with informant. My translation of “Proklamsinya itu pada hakekatnya merupakan 
puncak kekecewaan luar biasa Soumokil, karena tidak mendapat kedudukan yang berarti 
dalam Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT) yang waktu itu berkedudukan di Makassar”. 
28 Interview with informant J. My translation of “RMS bukan milik atau produk warga Kristen saja, 
melainkan juga warga Islam”. 
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 Indonesian government as causing the dispute in which migrants were scapegoated as 
enemies who could be blamed. Second, the FKM identified the dispute in religious 
terms as a virtuous Christian community opposed to a state-endorsed conspiracy to 
Islamicise the Moluccas through a ‘corrupted’ military and the Laskar Jihad.  
 
In time, this construction of two opposing religious sides began to be seen as 
demarcating rather than unifying divisions between indigenous Christians and 
Muslims especially as connections were made with the 1950s RMS movement. FKM 
leaders denied its Christian character let alone its affiliation with the RMS but, as the 
following section will show, the FKM elites made further shifts in ideological 
formation in order to maximise their political support. 
 
5.4   A Racial Construction 
A shift in ideological formation from a non-separatist religious construction to a 
separatist racial conflict arose as a result of the emergence of new political and 
conflict circumstances. First, Megawati Soekarnoputri assumed presidential power in 
July 2001. Her election as President provoked little enthusiasm from many 
Ambonese, and prompted fears as to what was to become of their situation if no 
resolution was reached to stop the persistent killings.
29  Megawati’s conspicuous lack 
of interest in the situation in the Moluccas during her Vice-Presidency was already 
well-known and a key source of resentment from both Muslim and Christian parties in 
Ambon. According to one source it, ‘reflected the attitude that it was out of the hands 
of the central government and that it could only be settled by the Ambonese 
themselves’.
30 Despite the fact that she was personally charged with bringing an end 
to the conflict during her term as Vice-President, Megawati displayed a clear 
disregard of her responsibility for the ending of the conflict. Second, the sharp 
                                                                 
29 Interview with informants X, D, O. 
30 Interview with informant O. My translation of “Ini adalah cermin dari sikap lepas tangan pemerintah 
pusat, hanya bisa diselesaikan oleh orang Ambon sendiri”. 
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 escalation of violence during 2001 in Ambon fuelled local fears and insecurities as 
Laskar Jihad forces seemed to double in numbers and inflict massive casualties. As a 
result, the incidence of violence throughout the Ambonese islands reached horrific 
proportions with further clashes between members of the Ambonese community and 
Muslim militia causing hundreds of casualties. Explosions occurred in many villages 
causing numerous deaths. Ambonese homes were also being regularly attacked by 
unknown assailants.
31  
 
In the early stages of their formation in December 2000, the FKM were reluctant to 
state that they were separatists. Embracing nationalism was evidently not a public 
stance the FKM wished to adopt as traditionally there were clear implications for 
those resisting state integration. However, avoiding a separatist identity became 
problematic as accusations were made that the RMS had links with the FKM. In this 
way, there were not only clear implications of the FKM as a Christian-led movement, 
but that the FKM was also a subversive movement against the state. The association 
was aggravated as further correlations were made between the FKM and the three 
renowned separatist movements in Indonesia, the Free Papua Organisation (OPM), 
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the RMS-in-exile movement. 
 
The relationship of the separatist RMS with the FKM became intensified when 
Muslims in Jakarta indicated that the three renowned separatist movements in 
Indonesia, the OPM, GAM and the RMS-in-exile movement, agreed to an alliance 
towards their respective struggles for independence.
32 However, soon after, in 
September of 2000, the alleged alliance made between Hasan Tiro of GAM and Otto 
Matulessy of the RMS-in-exile in The Netherlands, was denied in a press release 
issued by the Aceh Islamic Republic (RIA).
33 The RIA accused GAM of ‘narrow ultra 
                                                                 
31 This is an interpretative summary of various sources. 
32 Kondor [online], ‘No GAM-RMS Alliance’, September 2000. Accessed 8 February 2001. 
33 In 1953, the leader of the Islamic Party, Daud Beureueh, declared Aceh as an independent Islamic 
Republic (RIA) in order to free the Acehnese from Indonesia's ‘political betrayal’. The standoff was 
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 nationalism’, indicating that the republican movement in Aceh would not support the 
RMS who had been accused of provoking violence against Muslims in Maluku.
34 The 
President of the RMS-in-exile, Tutuhatunewa and his cabinet, including Matulessy as 
his Minister for Foreign Affairs, had already expressed sentiments in 1995 to 
consolidate the sympathies of other ethnic loyalties in unison in order to protest 
against the Indonesian State
35, but their appeal to the FKM was not rewarded with 
public claims of support. 
 
In defence of the FKM, Semy Waileruny carefully stated that the organisation’s call 
for independence was not a separatist claim but a ‘call for truth’.
36 It was emphasised 
that the ‘truth’ was in fact a bid for greater equality and fairness between 
communities, especially after several Moluccan leaders had already publicly declared 
their disillusionment with the powers of the Indonesian government to guarantee the 
rights of its people.
37  
 
Even while in detention during 2001, Manuputty was also careful to avoid demanding 
‘independence’ and to call the FKM a ‘separatist movement’. When Manuputty was 
placed under house arrest in January 2001 as part of an investigation in what was seen 
as a dissident movement, Agus Wattimena spoke to Siwalima, a local daily 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
partially solved in 1961 when the central government granted Aceh its own provincial status with more 
autonomy.  Beureueh later became affiliated with the Darul Islam rebellion in Aceh from 1953-1962 
after which he surrendered. Before his death in 1987, he declared  Abu Hasbi Geudong as his 
successor, whose son Teungku Fauzi Hasbi used the name of the RIA as a label for his splinter group 
away from GAM. Fauzi Hasbi was very close to Indonesian intelligence and the main line he tried to 
run against GAM was that it was secular-nationalist and had betrayed Islam. He has written a few 
books attacking GAM and its founder, Hasan di Tiro, often using the name Abu Jihad. See ICG, 
‘Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates’, Asia Report No.43, 
11 December 2002. Thanks to Ed Aspinall for his comments. 
34 Kondor [online], ‘No GAM-RMS’. 
35 Tiras, ‘Semua Itu Pasukan Saya’, no.15, 11 May 1995, p.67. 
36 Siwalima [online], ‘Keluarga Waileruny Terima Penghargaan Tumpas RMS Basudara Muslim 
Mendukung RMS’, 30 December 2000. Accessed 23 February 2001. My translation of “Waileruny 
meminta kepada semua pihak agar jangan mempermasalahkan kata deklarasi kemerdekaan yang 
katanya dilakukan oleh FKM, sebab yang FKM lakukan adalah mengungkapkan kebenaran”.  
37 Agence France-Presse, ‘Independence calls in Indonesia’s strife-torn Malukus’, 23 June 2000 
[online]. Available from Dow Jones Interactive, Publications Library. Accessed 8 June 2001. 
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 newspaper, on several occasions and reiterated that the FKM was not a separatist 
movement intent on the formation of its own state, but rather a movement aiming to 
restore law and order in the Moluccas and to recover the dignity of the Moluccans.
38 
Both he and Manuputty denied any affiliation with the RMS or any resemblance with 
other separatist movements, such as GAM in Aceh and the OPM in West Papua.  
 
With a strengthening of the appeal of the Laskar Jihad among Muslim militia in 2001 
and widespread demands from the Ambonese for a cessation of violence owing to the 
perceived incapacities of the state, the FKM shifted its ideological framework of 
identity to a racial construction of Ambonese identity. By portraying a community 
united by its ethnocultural sameness, the FKM attempted to unite individuals of 
religious affiliation into a community forged together by imagery of a biological 
family. The Ambonese community was therefore depicted as having indigenous racial 
homogeneity that connected them directly to the ancestors of the indigenous 
Ambonese from the island of Seram, irrespective of their religious denomination.  
 
The myth of common ancestry employed by the FKM came to function as the 
demarcation of a community with a unique racial core. In this way, FKM leaders such 
as Wattimena used the concept of the ‘Alifuru Nation’ to refer to an authentic 
community of common ancestry, denoted by common traditional culture and history, 
where the ‘nation’ was a reflection of a people’s common will.
39 This construction of 
the Ambonese as a unified ‘Alifuru’ race also provided new connotations to the 
traditional term of ‘Alifuru’. The concept of Alifuru originally referred to the 
Seramese mountain tribes who were seen as the prototypical inhabitant of the 
Moluccan State.
40 It was once regarded by the Ambonese as having negative 
                                                                 
38 Siwalima [online], ‘FKM Telah Dikampanyekan Thamrin Ely’, 21 February 2001.  Accessed 23 
February 2001. 
39 Siwalima [online] ,’Thamrin Ely’. 
40 The concept was popular with the exiled Moluccans in The Netherlands. Other exiled Moluccan 
migrants often concealed or adapted any divergent cultural attributes to the Alifuru concept in their 
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 connotations for a primitive people, a traditional belief previously propagated among 
the Ambonese and made popular by local myths and folktales.
41 The FKM adopted 
and redefined the term to unite the ethnolingusitically diverse people into a positive 
symbol of Moluccan ancestry and culture.  
 
The leaders of the FKM consciously linked this sense of ‘Alifuru’ community with 
one that disregarded religious differences so as to mobilise indigenous Ambonese 
Muslims into a trans-religious ethnic community. In an interview with Siwalima, the 
local Ambonese newspaper, Agus Wattimena of the FKM defended indigenous 
Ambonese Muslims whom he said were an integral part of the Ambonese ‘Alifuru’ 
community, irrespective of their religious affiliation. He pointed to Thamrin Ely, a 
prominent Muslim State official, as an example of how the Ambonese Muslim 
community had been victimised by a ‘ruthless’ Indonesian state. He accused the state 
of intent to marginalise the Ambonese race through forceful Muslim recruitment into 
military forces opposed to the Ambonese. He indicated that Thamrin Ely’s 
exploitation of local Ambonese Muslims by having them engage in the conflict was 
victimising the community and was a deliberate act of treachery against the 
Ambonese race. 
 
I am bold to say that Thamrin Ely has enticed Muslims to become 
involved in the conflict, without observing the common suffering that 
both Muslims and Christians are experiencing in Maluku. Then he has 
also requested the Indonesian armed forces and police to eliminate the 
RMS identified with the FKM. Even more astounding is when Thamrin 
Ely requested the Indonesian armed forces and police to eliminate the 
Alifuru Nation. So Thamrin Ely is of what nationality? He forgets that 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
allegiance to the cause of the RMS. For further explanatory notes on the concept of Alifuru see Bartels, 
Invisible Mountain, pp.6-7; Paramita R.Abdurachman, ‘Moluccan Responses to the First Intrusions of 
the West’, in Haryati Soebadio and Carine A. du Marchie Sarvaas (eds), Dynamics of Indonesian 
History, North-Holland Publishing Company: Amsterdam, 1978, p.167. 
41 For examples see, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, Cerita Rakyat [Mite dan Legende] 
Daerah Maluku, Proyek Inventarisasi dan Dokumentasi Kebudayaan Daerah, Jakarta, 1979/1980. 
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 that sort of request can evoke the emotions of all Moluccans. If Ely 
regards himself as not an Alifuru, it means he is not a Moluccan.
42
 
Here, the myth of common ancestry was also used by the FKM to not only demarcate 
a unique community based on one ancestral heritage, but also in its consequent 
opposition to a demonised ‘other’. As shown above, the ‘Alifuru’ race was 
simultaneously constructed in its superiority against the state and its national 
institutions such as the armed forces and police units. Throughout 2001, the FKM 
continued to claim these distinctions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ communities but through 
racial distinctions of Moluccan and non-Moluccan communities. In other words, 
communities were demarcated based on whether they could or could not claim to be 
of  Alifuru  blood or Alifuru  ancestry. After further unrest in Ambon and its 
surrounding islands in mid-2001, there were demonstrations conducted by indigenous 
Ambonese with banners saying, ‘All non-Alifuru people to be ousted from the 
Moluccas’.
43 Also, with the prolonged detention of Dr. Alex Manuputty, there were 
further demonstrations with an appeal being made to the Police Chief Commander 
stating, amongst others, the call for all Laskar Jihad forces and all non–
Alifuru/Moluccans to leave Maluku.
44  
 
The myth of common ancestry was supplemented with the idea of a racial community 
being ‘God’s chosen people’ and the idea of a community bound to a ‘holy war’.   
Both ideas within FKM ideology provided almost supernatural nuances to the conflict 
as a way of capturing the imagination of the society. Based on highly emotional 
symbols of religious identification with a Supreme Being or a God, FKM language 
                                                                 
42 Siwalima [online],’Thamrin Ely’. My translation of “Saya berani bilang Thamrin Ely memancing 
umat Muslim tetap berada dalam kerusuhan, tanpa melihat penderitaan bersama yang kini dialami 
masyarakat Muslim dan Kristen di Maluku. Kemudian dia meminta TNI-Polri membasmi RMS yang 
identik FKM. Justru mengejutkan ketika Thamrin Ely meminta TNI-Polri membasmi Bangsa Alifuru. 
Lalu Thamrin Ely itu bangsa apa? Dia lupa bahwa penyataan itu bisa memancing emosional orang 
Maluku keseluruhan. Dengan pernyataan Ely yang menganggap dirnya bukan orang Alifuru, berarti dia 
bukanlah orang Maluku”.  
43 Amboina Crisis Centre, The Situation in the Ambon/Moluccas – Report No.168, Available email: 
ComAmq@Ambon.wasantara.net.id, sent 21 May 2001.  
44 Amboina Crisis Centre, Report No.168. 
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 referred to symbols of autochthony and purity. Wattimena’s representation of the 
nation employed a potent model that portrayed the natural community as the 
homeland of the Moluccans forefathers whose collective immortality had outfaced 
destruction. 
 
God gave this country to the Moluccan people. What does the name 
“Alif” actually mean? Number One or the First Person. Let’s examine 
that: the Laskar Jihad with its advanced weapon strength clearly has not 
been able to eliminate Maluku.
45
 
In this respect, it appeared that the FKM vision of identity inculcated a type of pre-
conceived destiny or a pre-determined war. Indeed, many Ambonese demonstrated a 
belief in a historical continuity so as to portray their community in largely mythical 
terms. Proclaiming similarities to the Old Testament, there were those Ambonese who 
attempted to re-enact mythological representations of these wars. For example, small 
horns were blown to signal the commencement of a war or before an imminent attack, 
and local priests sprinkled those involved in the fighting with ‘holy water’ to protect 
them from harm.
46 It was asserted that these symbolic gestures established 
correlations between biblical stories of war and the conflict in the Moluccas, where it 
was said, in both cases, that the conflict was centrally concerned with defending the 
homeland and territory as bequeathed by God. It was described for example, 
 
Those about to go to war were given holy water for their safety. 
Swords were swapped with paper trumpets, which were blown 
enthusiastically in one tone, like in the old times in Israel.
47
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
45 Siwalima [online],’Thamrin Ely’.  
46 Interview with informants K, Q. 
47 Interview with informant Q. My translation of “Yang mau berperang dikasih air suci supaya selamat. 
Parang diganti trumpet kertas yang ditiup semarak tanpa nada seperti zaman dulu  di Israel”. 
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 5.5   A Claim to Human Rights, Self-Determination and Democracy 
 
The fourth main shift of ideological formation occurred in the adoption of modern 
discourse of minority, human rights and international legality. It was the coming 
together of two ideas, separatism and race, which here provided the basis for notions 
of a nation with nationalist rights. The FKM claim to a ‘new nation’ would more 
likely succeed to an external audience if it embraced another manner of argument, by 
combining the language of traditional authenticity with the contemporary language of 
minority status and human rights. The suggestion is that the global language of 
‘rights’ and ‘democracy’ implied firstly, a greater degree of empowerment and 
security for the individual and, secondly, the opportunity to gain international support 
for the assertion of its own sense of separate collective identity and demands for 
sovereignty.  
 
From its initial formation in 2000, the FKM always depicted itself as an oppressed 
minority who saw the betrayal of the Indonesian State in its imperialistic 
incorporation of the Moluccas since the 1950s. Since that time, it was declared by the 
FKM leaders that the Moluccans had always been subject to ‘ethnic dilution and 
oppression’ where ‘Indonesia has carried out overt strategies to undermine the 
economic, social and cultural bases of Moluccan society’.
48 In other words, state 
sponsored projects of directed change and national development were accused of 
deliberately marginalising further the Moluccans as a minority group. It promoted 
ethnic exclusion rather than inclusion with its failed economic policies that have left 
‘Moluccan youth [who] are increasingly unemployed with no life prospects and 
education’, and its political centralisation, which has left ‘the police and the courts 
basically impotent or unwilling to solve this war’.
49 It was also recognised that the 
Indonesian State was bent on propagating another culture by the state’s confiscation 
                                                                 
48 INDONESIA-DOCS [online], ‘Front Kedaulatan Maluku’, 18 December 2000. Available email 
<indonesia-docs@indopubs.com> Sent 26 December 2000.  Accessed 23 February 2001. 
49 INDONESIA-DOCS [online], ‘Front Kedaulatan Maluku’. 
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 of indigenous land, turning it over to transmigrants, and deliberately wanting to 
diminish the Moluccan population in Indonesia by ‘forced sterilisation’ through 
various family planning programs in the region.
50  
 
The FKM pushed ideas of self-determination to argue that, under international law, 
the Republic of Indonesia had never held sovereignty over Maluku or most of the 
other regions that it controls. These appeals were made even when Indonesian 
authorities arrested Alex Manuputty and Semy Walleruny in December 2002 and put 
on trial in Jakarta for allegedly fuelling violence in the Moluccas.
51 Clearly, it was 
imperative for the FKM to articulate its calls within international principles of human 
rights and self-determination in order to justify its calls for sovereignty within the 
international arena. However, calls for support and assistance from the United Nations 
and other international parties, including Australia, received little response at the 
time.
52
 
One of the core constructions of the FKM was the depiction of the RMS as a separatist 
movement as a basis for establishing their own legal case against the Indonesian 
government. The FKM declared the right to say that the RMS before them truly 
existed as a separatist movement based on a valid international legal basis of self-
determination. Manuputty stated that the RMS was in fact a legal government that 
                                                                 
50 INDONESIA-DOCS [online], ‘Front Kedaulatan Maluku’. 
51 The Ambon District Court also sent fourteen other members of the FKM to jail in October 2002 for 
raising four separatist flags on 25 April of that year.  
52 At the time, the Australian Deputy Ambassador to Indonesia, Leslie Rowe, publicly declared that 
Australia did not support the separatist movement in the Moluccas. See Jawa Pos, ‘Australia Tidak 
Dukung Gerakan Separatis RMS di Maluku’, 17 November 2000. Available at Dunia Islam [online]. 
Accessed 8 February 2001. 
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 once sat in the United Nations and was illegally brought down.
 53 From a purely legal 
perspective, it was highlighted that there was a clear transgression of rights against the 
FKM, similar to that which happened to the RMS 50 years earlier. Moses Tuanakota 
of the FKM thus challenged the Indonesian State to bring the RMS issue to the UN, 
indicating that ‘the two sides should allow the International Court of Justice decide 
whether the South Maluku Republic is legitimate’.
54  
 
Moreover, the legality of the 1950s RMS as an independence movement was linked 
with the registration of the RMS in the Unrepresented Nations and People’s 
Organisation (UNPO).
55 It was pointed out by the FKM that comments by 
international legal authorities, within the UNPO and other legal institutions, had 
tended to uphold the RMS position. It was argued that the newly formed Republic of 
Indonesia had deliberately rejected the emphatic and repeated appeals of the 
Ambonese population to apply for the provision in the transfer of sovereignty 
agreement between Indonesia and The Netherlands, which guaranteed the right to 
self-determination to every separate state in the federal Indonesian Republic at the 
                                                                 
53 Azis Tunny, ‘FKM Defies Maluku Authorities’, The Jakarta Post, 12 April 2003 [online]. Available 
from Factiva (Journal Database), accessed 16 April 2003. The UNPO has a close working relationship 
with the United Nations and is considered to be a vital component of the UN Working Group on 
Indigenous Peoples. Together with members of the Moluccan Human Rights Organisation in 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, the UNPO has exerted much pressure on the Indonesian Government, 
even prior to the conflict in Ambon, to fulfil demands for independence not only from the Moluccas 
but elsewhere throughout the archipelago: ‘UNPO is convinced that true democratic change cannot 
take place without recognising and respecting the rights of the peoples colonised or ruled by Indonesia. 
Aware of the distinct legal and political situation of each UNPO Member people currently under 
Indonesian rule, thus UNPO calls on the government of Indonesia, in particular the new leaders of the 
country, but also the leaders of the opposition movements, to recognise the rights of the peoples of 
Aceh, East Timor, South Moluccas and West Papua to democracy and self-determination and to open a 
dialogue with the leaders of those peoples to develop effective ways to implement those rights.’ UNPO 
[online], ‘Statement Concerning Indonesia’, The Hague, 26 May 1998. Accessed 16 April 2003. 
54 Tunny, The Jakarta Post [online]. 
55 UNPO is an international organisation created to represent nations and peoples around the world who 
are not represented as such in the world´s principal international organisations such as the United 
Nations. Founded in 1991, UNPO today consists of over 50 members who represent over 100 million 
persons. While having close ties with the RMS government-in-exile, based in The Netherlands, which 
has pursued campaigns for recognition in the past, the UNPO has continually expressed their ‘profound 
concern’ about the crisis in Ambon and the human rights abuses in the region. Whilst not specifically 
citing the FKM separatist movement, it has nevertheless actively lobbied NGOs and international 
organisations about contemporary calls for self-determination in the south Moluccas. 
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 time.
56 It was further pointed out that the subsequent Indonesian invasion of the 
Ambonese islands on 13 July 1950, to eliminate the RMS separatist movement was an 
expression of the ‘repression of human rights and wholesale decimation of Malukan 
lands and resources’.
57
 
In conclusion, linked with ideas of racial purity, the FKM construction of the RMS as 
a separatist movement whose legacy provided the basis for FKM demands for 
sovereignty was, on one hand, an articulation of earlier ideas of Ambonese identity 
and history dating back to the RMS movement 50 years earlier. On the other hand, the 
FKM’s ideological basis for identity involved a reorientation of ideas of identity and 
history in order to mobilise a new pan-religious Ambonese race towards the renewed 
goal of political independence from the Republic of Indonesia.   
 
5.6   Support for the FKM 
 
The resultant Ambonese movement is a reflection of the embedding of absolutist 
ideological mindsets amongst the local Ambonese where they have retreated into the 
identity construction perpetuated by the FKM . The commitment to self-determination 
wielded strong support in Ambonese society even while both Manuputty and 
Waileruny were jailed in Ambon City, after being arrested in Ambon on 17 April, 
2002 and then sentenced to three years jail by the North Jakarta District Court in 
January 2003. Both Christian and Muslim village heads admitted to a large village 
commitment to separatism. Julianus Mual of Aboru village indicated that a large 
                                                                 
56 Moses Tuwanakotta, ‘Letter FKM to UN, New York’, Nunusaku [online], accessed 28 September 
2003. Gunter Decker, a German legal authority, and The Netherlands Association for International Law 
have commented in this regard. Even contemporary relations between Indonesia and the Moluccas 
under the New Order were purported by humanitarian agencies as characterising an infringement of 
minority rights demonstrated by Indonesia’s, ‘relocation of many Javanese into the Moluccas as part of 
a strategy to undermine the self-determination claim of the Malukans .... the Indonesian government 
carries out overt policies to break down the Malukan culture.’ See Parker, Humanitarian Law, p.5, and 
Justus Van Der Kroef, “The Republic of the South Moluccas after Eleven Years: A Review”, World 
Justice, vol.3, no.2, 1961, pp.189-90. Also Karen Parker, ‘Republik Maluku: The Case for Self-
Determination, A Briefing Paper’, Humanitarian Law Project/International Educational Development 
(HLP/IED), Presented to The United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, March 1996. 
57 Parker, Humanitarian Law, p.5. 
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 number of residents of his village sympathised with the RMS separatist movement 
because ‘their lives had not been touched by developmental activities...so they have 
been disappointed’.
58 Thus, despite the fact that Indonesian authorities conceded that 
the violence in Ambon and throughout the Moluccas had abated, widespread 
separatist activity in Ambon meant that the civil emergency status of the region was 
maintained until 15 September 2003.  
 
The FKM’s absolutist ideological constructions of a virtuous Ambonese versus a 
tyrannical Indonesian state succeeded in maintaining strong support throughout 
Ambon. In 2003, evidence for continued support was shown by the assembly of 
hundreds of Ambonese choosing to celebrate the anniversary of the late RMS 
movement on the 25 April, 2003. RMS flags were flown throughout Ambon and on 
the neighbouring island of Buru. When security forces conducted a sweep of the 
islands, dozens of alleged supporters of the FKM were arrested while attempting to 
celebrate the 53rd anniversary of the RMS. Local military and police units also raided 
homes and allegedly seizing RMS flags and documents.
59 Many of those arrested 
admitted that they had received orders from the FKM and its leader Alex 
Manuputty.
60 Similarly, on the 58
th anniversary of Indonesia’s independence on 17
 
August, 2003 RMS supporters in Ambon raised their flags, which were duly 
confiscated by local authorities. In conjunction with the raising of the RMS flags, 
many separatist supporters, including FKM Secretary General Mosses Tuana Kotta, 
were extremely vocal in continuing to condemn the Indonesian government for 
rejecting the position of the FKM’s ‘fight for justice’. 
 
Let the security authorities take repressive actions on us, but we will 
continue our moral movement and peace struggle. The more repressive 
                                                                 
58 Munira Sahupala, ‘Sekretaris Desa Aboru warga Aboru simpati pada RMS karena tak tersentuh 
pembangunan’, Ambon Berdarah [online], 2 October 2003. Accessed 13 October 2003. 
59 BBC, ‘Indonesian Republic of Maluku separatists arrested, flags seized’, 24 April 2003 [online]. 
Available from Factiva (Journal Database). Accessed 09 June 2003. 
60 Amboina Crisis Centre [online], The Situation in the Ambon/Moluccas – Report No.364. Accessed 
20 June 2003. 
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 the security authorities become, the more that international support will 
pour in for us.
61  
 
While the actions of Indonesian authorities during 2003-04 have clearly indicated that 
there is a resolute decision by the government to take affirmative action against 
separatist groups
62, it is evident that the absolutist ideological framework of the FKM 
maintains a firm hold in the mindset of the Ambonese. In Ambon, court trials of 
suspected RMS/FKM supporters who were detained by local authorities were 
witnessed and cheered on by the Ambonese. Literally hundreds of Ambonese came to 
see the trial of John Rea and nine others who had declared that they were ‘citizens of 
the RMS state’ and that ‘the RMS is a legitimate state that stands in opposition to the 
Indonesian Republic’.
63 In propagating their claim to the court judge, their appeals 
were joined by cries for freedom by hundreds of onlookers who came to give their 
encouragement and show their support. 
 
5.7   Conclusion 
 
It is argued in this thesis that the persistence of Ambonese separatism is illuminated 
by the constructivist view, which depicts it as an ideology which offered a diagnosis 
to changing complexities in Ambonese society. The FKM nationalist formula, 
therefore, used the psychological and political appeal of myths of common ancestry to 
enable the strengthening of ideas of national consciousness and individual loyalty. 
The identity and the moral needs of the individual were linked with the definition of 
new concepts of authenticity based on myths of  homogeneity, the absolutist 
                                                                 
61 Azis Tunny, ‘Over 60 Separatists Arrested in Maluku’, The Jakarta Post, 26 April 2003 [online] 
Available from Factiva (Journal Database), accessed 09 June 2003. 
62 This includes President Megawati Soekarnoputri imposing martial law on the province of Aceh on 
19 May 2003 after the collapse of a ceasefire agreement in December 2002. Government forces 
numbering more than 40,000 said in October 2003 that they had killed more than 900 suspected GAM 
members and that a further 900 GAM members had been arrested. 
63 Daniel Nirahua and Munira Sahpala, ‘Sidang Kasus RMS: Jaksa John Rea Bohong Soal Identitas’, 
Maluku Media Centre [online], 7 October 2003. Accessed 9 October 2003. My translation of “warga 
negara RMS” and ‘RMS sebagai negara yang sah dan berhadapan dengan NKRI’. 
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 constructions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ communities, and issues of minority rights linked 
with the international legality of the RMS as a separatist movement.  
 
The other competing ideology that has developed to counterpose the FKM’s 
allegiance to an ethnic Moluccan homeland has been based on allegiance to an 
Islamic-based ethnonationalist vision of common residence. This competing 
nationalist formula also offered a sense of community within an era of social and 
political turbulence but at the same time crucially sought to enhance its radical 
Islamic constituency. This process, where nationalist myths have appealed to both 
those in search of positions of authority and masses in search of security, will be 
illustrated in the following chapter. It is argued that it is this counterposition of two 
different nationalist formulas which has largely inhibited the effectiveness of any 
compromise solutions to the conflict in the Moluccas and thus served to entrench and 
deepen the conflict. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
 
THE LASKAR JIHAD  
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF ETHNONATIONALISM 
 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine the process of ideological formation of the Laskar Jihad 
between 2000 and 2002. During this period there were two stages of ideological 
formation, first as an ethnoreligious construction which was conducive to the 
mobilisation of Indonesian Muslims and second, as an overtly ethnonationalist 
construction which sought to develop the radical Islamic constituency of the Laskar 
Jihad and gain authority over them. 
 
Ja’far Umar Thalib established the Laskar Jihad in January 2000. He is a Javanese 
born in Malang in East Java and is of Arab-Madurese descent. Following his formal 
education for Religious Teachers in Malang, 1981, Thalib continued his studies at 
Persis  pesantren in Bangil, East Java. However due to personal theological 
differences in opinion, Thalib decided to move to Jakarta.
1 In 1983, he undertook 
studies at LIPIA, an institute devoted to the study of Islam and the Middle East which 
is funded by the Saudi Arabian government. As a student at LIPIA, Thalib became a 
prominent activist and a leader of a student organisation called al-Irsyad which 
rejected the ideology of the Pancasila. He briefly studied there for 3 years dropping 
out due to differences of opinion with his teachers, and subsequently moved to Lahore 
in Pakistan where he quickly became familiar and impressed with Salafism.
2  
 
                                                                 
1 Noorhaidi Hasan, ‘Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in 
Indonesia’, Indonesia, No.73, 2002, pp.153. 
2 Hasan, Indonesia, 2002, p.153. 
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 Thalib joined the fighting in Afghanistan in 1989 and intensified his studies of the 
Salafy movement at various Islamic schools devoted to this movement. Returning to 
Indonesia, prior to the formation of the Laskar Jihad, Thalib headed the Sunni 
Communication Forum (FKAWJ) based in Yogyakarta in Central Java, which 
organised Islamic religious study groups and commemorated religious events in its 
branches throughout Indonesia.
3
 
Thalib established the Laskar Jihad at a vulnerable time of political transition in 
Indonesian politics. The elections of June 1999 revealed a substantial lack of support 
for the Islamic parties and instead an emphatic endorsement of pluralist parties 
opposed to conservative Islam.
4 In this respect, the prospect of a transition to a 
democratic system may have threatened conservative Muslim groups throughout 
Indonesia but it also raised expectations that a transition might lead towards an 
Indonesia in which the wishes of the Islamic majority would be better represented.
5  
 
It has been argued in chapter 3 of this thesis that nationalism and the subscription to 
nationalist sentiment is not simply engendered by a series of socio-economic 
circumstances which affect communal harmony and cohesion. Instead, nationalism is 
one possible response which is more likely to occur if a set of pre-conditions are in 
place. Thus, the Laskar Jihad did not galvanise support in Ambon simply on the basis 
of long-term processes of disruption. The decision to combat Christian adversaries 
under the nationalist banner of the Laskar Jihad relates to a series of both internal and 
                                                                 
3 For further discussion see Kirsten E. Schulze, ‘Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon’, Brown 
Journal of World Affairs, vol.9, no.1, Spring 2002. Accessed from Watson Institute for International 
Studies [online], accessed 28 September 2003. According to alleged findings of the FKAWJ, with 
regard to the conflict in Ambon, Thalib argued that the decision to form the Laskar Jihad came after 
researchers from FKAWJ found evidence that Christian churches were planning to secede from the 
Indonesian Republic in collaboration with the RMS government-in-exile based in The Netherlands. 
Greg Fealy, ‘Inside the Laskar Jihad’, Inside Indonesia [online], January-March 2001. Accessed 19 
September 2002. 
4 Michael Davis, ‘Laskar Jihad and the political position of conservative Islam in Indonesia’, 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol.24, no.1, April 2002 [online]. Available from ProQuest (Journal 
Database), accessed 19 September 2002. 
5 Several observers have noted there was a general enthusiasm in Indonesia for the democratisation 
process. The Asia Foundation/The United States-Indonesia Society (USINDO) Joint Conference 
Report, ‘Islam in Modern Indonesia’, Washington, D.C., 7 February 2002. 
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 external disruptions which have lead to stresses and insecurities that have perpetuated 
a process of the reconstruction of identity within the community. This means that in 
this case, significant and unique interactions between Muslims and Christians in 
Ambon which brought about underlying insecurities or uncertainties of the ‘Us’ lead 
not only to Ambonese Muslim receptivity to an outsider’s depictions of the ‘Us’ but 
also lead to a reconstruction of the ‘Us’ as a distinct community of unique heritage 
and one that commanded virtuous strength against an evil Other.  
 
Thus the change from riot to nationalist conflict was specifically facilitated by the 
access to these earlier myths of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and the confrontation of two 
ideological nationalisms in which each responded to each other’s changing 
ideological depictions of themselves and their enemy. As 6.2 will show, just prior to 
the emergence of the Laskar Jihad, people in Ambon were constructing the conflict 
and their enemies on the basis of the nascent dynamics of the conflict at the time 
including socio-economic grievances of perceived bias in the public service against 
Muslims and higher unemployment among certain sections of the Muslim 
community. This left a significant role to the Laskar Jihad to galvanise local Muslims 
through a unifying ideology based on a systematic ideological depiction of a Christian 
conspiracy against Indonesian/Islamic autonomy. Once constructed in this way, 
Ambonese experiences and myths of identity were filtered through this nationalist 
vision of Indonesian/Muslim identity, one that was based instead on a belief of 
common brotherhood, homeland and ancestry. This constructed vision promoted the 
confrontationalism of 2000 and generated the exclusivist construction of Muslim 
identity on Ambon. 
 
On this basis, this chapter will develop the following key propositions. First, that 
perceptions of the conflict in Ambon prior to the formation of the Laskar Jihad were 
inchoate and diverse. Second, that Ja’far Umar Thalib of the Laskar Jihad articulated 
a series of ideological constructions which provided a shift in focus away from the 
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 inchoate views of Muslims to a depiction of the dispute as Christian secessionism 
versus the claim that conservative Islam constituted the core of the Indonesian nation. 
Third, that the resonance of this ideology with the migrant Muslim community in 
Ambon reflects the embedding of absolutist ideological mindsets. 
 
6.2   Pre-Laskar Jihad Perceptions 
 
The ideology of the Laskar Jihad responded to the confusion and uncertainty within 
Ambon and to the public sentiments of Indonesian Muslims who were outside 
Ambon. The process of ideological formation reflects the way in which Thalib, 
through the Laskar Jihad, attempted to find common ground with Muslims in Ambon 
and throughout Indonesia. Thalib sought to do this by changing the perceptions of 
Muslims in Ambon to one which perceived the conflict as a Christian conspiracy, and 
encouraging existing sentiments outside Ambon of a religious riot. The following 
discussion of pre-Laskar Jihad perceptions, divided into two sub-sections ‘Muslims in 
Ambon’ and ‘Muslims outside Ambon’, will therefore argue that diverse explanations 
of the conflict by both indigenous Ambonese Muslims and Muslim migrants and the 
perceptions of non-Ambonese Indonesian Muslims came to be dominated by an overt 
Christian-Muslim construction which offered a simple formula of the Indonesian state 
and of the solution to the confusion in Ambon.  
 
The subscription of Muslims in Ambon to the Laskar Jihad’s construction of 
nationalism involved a polarisation between Muslims on the island; firstly by those 
who subscribed to the articulation of conflict explained on the basis of a pan-
Islamic/Indonesian identity claiming Ambon as part of its national territory versus a 
Christian secessionist movement claiming solely the South Moluccas as its legitimate 
political and cultural homeland; and secondly by Muslims in Ambon who articulated 
the conflict in Muslim versus Christian terms on the basis of simple Christian 
arrogance. These Muslims experienced certain incompatibilities with Thalib’s 
  192 
 
 resolution for a pitted war against alleged Christian separatists in Ambon. As will be 
shown in this chapter, that despite this polarisation and, in this sense, somewhat 
fragmented support from Muslims in Ambon, the Laskar Jihad’s nationalist ideology 
still commanded appeal particularly from members of the migrant Muslim community 
who began to respond by articulating historical grievances of state favouritism and 
‘unfair’ economic and social disparities. At the same time, the Laskar Jihad’s 
pronunciation of security and deferential treatment towards Muslims hindered the 
political alienation of at least some members of the Muslim community in Ambon.  
 
6.2.1   Muslims in Ambon 
 
Prior to the Laskar Jihad, the conflict in Ambon was initially perceived by Muslims 
in Ambon in diverse ways. Shortly after the eruption of violence, one of the 
perceptions of the conflict was of a religious war between Christians and Muslims. 
This was no doubt provoked by the short-lived Laskar Kristus (Army of Christ) 
movement during March 1999 which was led by Agus Wattimena in a crusade-like 
mission against their ‘Christian opponents’.
6
 However, with migrants, mainly from 
Southeast Sulawesi and Java, being predominantly Muslim and many indigenous 
Ambonese professing Christianity, there was also a common identification of the 
conflict as one based on race.
7  
 
During the immediate weeks following the eruption of violence, kiosks owned by 
local migrant Buginese and Butonese were razed, Buginese-owned market stalls were 
                                                                 
6 The Laskar Kristus or Army of Christ claimed to be warriors defending the faith as God's soldiers. 
Despite Wattimena’s claim of a ‘popular army’ consisting of approximately 20,000 members, there had 
been widespread controversy regarding support for this movement on the basis that Wattimena 
recruited units of young children to serve as front-line Christian soldiers. Some adolescent Ambonese 
Christians expressed fervent enthusiasm for militant action but many Christian leaders and members of 
the Moluccan churches wished to focus instead on local efforts to restore peace and condemned the 
militant action 
7 Muslims allegedly handed out white armbands and headbands to other Muslims to identify each other 
and those Christians wearing red head cloths. During the conflict, the two sides were thus referred to as 
the ‘whites’ (kelompok putih) and the ‘reds’ (kelompok merah or pihak merah).  
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 destroyed, and houses owned by migrant groups were burnt to the ground.
8  
Interviews with some local inhabitants at the time of the violence often referred to 
these attacks as Christian provocation on Muslims, while many others referred to 
alleged provocateurs of these incidents as ‘Tenggara’, literally meaning ‘Southeast’ 
which referred to the predominantly Christian indigenous Ambonese race from the 
south-eastern Moluccas.
9  
 
The Bugis were principally highlighted in the conflict ever since two Bugis youths 
were implicated in the initial incident of violence. The Bugis, the Butonese and the 
Makassarese (BBM), all migrants from Southeast Sulawesi, were thereafter often 
reported as being the targets of violence, which prompted many Ambonese to depict 
the conflict in Ambon as an ‘ethnic cleansing of transmigrants’.
10  
 
This resulted in Muslim immigrants in Ambon expressing their sense of confusion in 
the beginning, where it appeared at times that BBM were targeted while the Javanese 
and Chinese were left alone.
11 It was indicated that at other times there were 
conflicting public calls of ‘Allah Akbar’ (‘God is Great’) and ‘Basmi Islam’! 
(‘Exterminate Islam!’)
12 Other Ambonese even indicated that there were further 
demarcations of communities with differentiations being made between Christian 
groups, where it was alleged that Protestants were the agitators of the violence while 
those of Catholic denomination remained neutral.
13  
 
                                                                 
8 In West Kalimantan the 1998/9 violent confrontations between transmigrant Madurese and the 
indigenous Dayaks and Malays often saw the invocation of the abbreviation BBM or Bugis Buton 
Makassar. This abbreviation refers to three of the major ethnic groups in Sulawesi who have had long-
held traditions of inter-island trading and are well known to settle outside their homeland territories of 
South and Southeast Sulawesi. However it most often has derogatory connotations relating to a people 
who have allegedly usurped the rights and privileges from those they have traded with and settled 
among. The increasing usage of this at least as a characterisation of violent confrontations between 
these ethnic groups and indigenous communities has been particularly salient in the context of Ambon. 
See Acciaioli, Masyarakat Indonesia, pp.239-68. 
9 HRW [online], Ambon, 1999 Report. Accessed 20 October 1999. 
10 Eriko Uchida, ‘Indonesian Troops Fire on Mobs in Renewed Ethnic Cleansing in Maluku’, INA-
Maluku [online], (no date cited). Accessed 20 October 1999. 
11 Interview with informants A, B, C. 
12 Interview with informants A, B, C. 
13 Interview with informant A. 
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 Local explanations of the conflict also tended to point to a wider political conspiracy 
or, at the very least, an intervening third party. There were allegations by Ambonese 
Muslims that Soeharto and members of his past regime had engineered the violence 
which fuelled fresh fears and anxieties of a larger network that could have possibly 
been responsible for other recent outbreaks of communal conflict throughout the 
Indonesian archipelago. It was known, for example, that less than two weeks after the 
investigation into the Ambon incident by the Commission for Missing Persons and 
Victims of Violence (KONTRAS), investigative results allegedly pointed to ‘the 
activities of several non-local political interests’.
14  
 
As the conflict in Ambon continued during 1999-2000, the problem was that the 
‘unknown’ threat became more acute and pervasive. Anxieties in Ambon continued to 
be generated by the rising concerns over the immediate security of the community 
with no substantial outcomes to arrests and increasing reports of military 
discrimination. Many Ambonese publicly indicated their concern early in February 
1999 over various reported incidents regarding the unusual treatment by the armed 
forces, whose objective should have to been to secure the situation and guarantee the 
safety of both sides in the conflict; ‘They carried out a lot of stupid acts and were also 
slow in their action in Ambon, just like in previous riots in Java’.
15  
 
Subsequently, some Ambonese continued to make third-party allegations accusing 
disgruntled officers loyal to disgraced former Indonesian Armed Forces commander 
Lieutenant, General Prabowo, of instigating spates of violence in Indonesia which 
were reflected by members of the armed forces siding with local groups during the 
conflict.
16 The view was publicly endorsed by Abdurrahman Wahid, the head of the 
                                                                 
14 Indonesian Observer [online], ‘Kontras Reports Ambon Riots Engineered’, 19 February 1999. 
Accessed 20 October 1999. 
15 Indonesian Observer [online], ‘Kontras Reports Ambon Riots Engineered’, 19 February 1999. 
Accessed 20 October 1999. 
16 Amboina Crisis Centre – email 19/10/1999. 
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 Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
17, who indirectly suggested that it was a premeditated conflict 
in Ambon by laying the blame for the riots on certain rogue gang members with close 
connections to the military and political elite.
18  
 
By the end of 1999, Ambon was at the same time also experiencing the cost of the 
conflict, which was devastating both in terms of the loss of lives and also in terms of 
the social and economic impact to the region. Negative economic growth had a 
devastating impact on the local economy with escalating unemployment levels and 
high rates of poverty. Public services had also collapsed and basic services such as 
health and education no longer continued to function as personnel decided to flee the 
area rather than remain on the island. 
 
6.2.2   Muslims outside Ambon 
 
Prior to the Laskar Jihad, Muslims outside Ambon explained the dispute in Muslim 
versus Christian terms as a result of the failure of the State to protect Muslims in 
Ambon during the unrest. Indonesian Muslims’ outrage at the government’s failure 
and perceived incapacity to protect members was exacerbated by the perception that 
the state’s security apparatus seemed to be just as complacent.
19 Comments by 
General Wiranto, the then Minister of Defence and Security, maintained that the TNI 
was under a lot of pressure, indicating that ‘recent incidents show that our nation’s 
brotherhood is highly threatened and under a serious test’.
20 However, the TNI’s 
obvious difficulty in managing this threat only seemed to suggest the inability of state 
authority structures to restore communitarian harmony to contemporary social 
disruptions. 
                                                                 
17 The Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of the Religious Scholars) is a major Muslim political party in 
Indonesia. It is well known to be an avant-garde political force compared with some of Indonesia’s 
more radical Muslim parties. 
18 McBeth, Far Eastern Economic Review, p.30. 
19 Tom McCawley, ‘Muslims demand holy war on Ambon’, The Australian, 8-9 January 2000, p.11. 
20 Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs (Deplu) [online], ‘Wiranto Calls Meeting on Violence’, 
25 January 1999. Available from accessed 16 May 2000. 
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 With no end to the violence despite the intervention of Indonesian Armed Forces into 
the Moluccas in March 1999, there were increasing perceptions by Indonesian 
Muslims of a failure by the state to protect the Muslim community. There was 
renewed anger from protesters and Muslim organisations at the perception that the 
state was unwilling to protect the Islamic community. Despite the fact that interim 
Indonesian President, B.J.Habibie, during his brief term in office in 1998-1999, 
sacked the Ambon police chief for failing to halt the violence and ordered more 
soldiers deployed, Muslims throughout Indonesia intensified their protests over the 
central government’s failure to exert tougher control over the conflict. One analyst of 
the situation in Ambon indicated that, ‘the Ambon problem is significant nationally 
because it is fuelling a sense of disrespect for the political leadership and stirring up 
the religious divide’.
21
 
The response of Indonesian Muslims to these perceptions led to a demonstration of 
thousands of Muslims organised by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) who were a 
strong ally of the FKWAJ.
22 Muslims who marched in protest in Jakarta in March 
1999 publicly threatened to mount a jihad or holy war.
23 Protestors expressed worry at 
the increase in Christian violence perpetrated against Muslims. In response, various 
conservative Muslim organisations throughout Indonesia attempted to mobilise jihad 
volunteers during March 1999. Muslim leaders indicated that there existed a 
fundamental basis in Islamic ideology to defend the greater Muslim community. K.H. 
Abdurrasyid Abdullah, Chairman of KISDI stated,  
 
I think that, anywhere, if Muslims are slaughtered, murdered or 
oppressed, Muslims must defend themselves; and fellow brother 
                                                                 
21 Louise Williams, ‘Ambon an Isolated Island of Bitterness’, The Sydney Morning Herald, World: 
Asia, 6 March 1999, p.20. 
22 Schulze, World Affairs, 2002, [online]. 
23 Jihad is often referred to as ‘holy war’ where a war is undertaken for a just cause and for the defence 
of Islam. Thalib uses this meaning of jihad although jihad has a second meaning. The word jihad 
derives from jahadan meaning exertion of striving. Thus jihad also refers to those endeavours made at 
any particular time for the preaching and propagation of Islam and the moral and spiritual correction 
and guidance of humankind. For more information on this see Glenn D.Paige, Chaiwat Satha-Anand 
and Sarah Gilliat (eds), Islam and Non-Violence, Center for Global Nonviolence Planning Project, 
Institute for Peace, University of Hawaii: Honolulu, 1993. 
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 Muslims must come to their aid. If we let this slaughter, murder and 
oppression occur, our Islam is not genuine. Regarding the Ambon case, 
we are obliged to launch a holy war.
24
 
Vocal complaints from Muslims of perceived favouritism of the state towards 
Christians were reflected by many conservative Muslims outside the Moluccas who 
had expressed for a long time their deep-rooted resentment of Christian dominance in 
the government bureaucracy and their control of various media and think-tank 
organisations.
25 After the eruption of violence in Ambon, these complaints were 
emphatically made by conservative Muslims such as Husain Umair, Chairman of the 
Muslim Committee for World Solidarity, who, in 1999 aired publicly a long held 
complaint that, ‘Christian officers in the armed forces are christianising Indonesia’.
26
 
6.3   An Ethnoreligious Construction 
 
In early 2000, Thalib’s ideological construction was a religious construction which 
sought to resonate with Muslims in Ambon and throughout Indonesia by firstly, 
changing the perceptions of Muslims in Ambon so as to view the riots as arising from 
a Christian conspiracy, and responding to existing sentiments outside Ambon of a 
religious riot. In portraying a contemporary threat as coming from Christian 
antagonists, Thalib endeavoured to exert a level of compulsion strong enough to gain 
the support of both the Ambonese and wider Indonesian Islamic community who 
would grant political support to his objectives. In June 2000, Thalib explained the riot 
in Ambon in Muslim versus Christian terms as the outcome of state discrimination 
against Muslims. He accused Abdurrahman Wahid of partiality to Christians as the 
violence continued in Ambon and throughout the Moluccas.
27 He pointed out that 
there was a clear failure of state elites to maintain order which thereby legitimised his 
actions to send his own paramilitants into Ambon, 
                                                                 
24 Rahmat H. Cahyono (and others), ‘Di Mana Batas Jihad’, DR, 22-27 March 1999, pp.56-7. 
25 Liddle, Government Policies, p. 279. See also John Sidel, ‘Macet Total: Logics of Circulation and 
Accumulation in the Demise of Indonesia’s New Order’, Indonesia, no.66, October 1998, pp.159-94. 
26 Tom McCawley, ‘Muslims demand holy war on Ambon’, The Australian, 8-9 January 2000, p.11. 
27 BBC News [online], ‘Who are the Laskar Jihad?’, 20 June 2000. Accessed 19 September 2002. 
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 Clearly the Abdurrahman Wahid government is unable or unwilling to 
protect the Islamic community. If the state can’t protect us, then we 
must do it ourselves.
28
 
In 1999, Thalib was keen to indicate that the outcome of his meeting with the newly 
elected President Wahid was an indication that the Indonesian government was intent 
on defending the Christian community. According to Thalib, Wahid’s opposition to 
his plan to send thousands of Laskar Jihad volunteers to Maluku only served to 
confirm suspicions that the state had always possessed a discriminatory stance 
towards Muslims. As Thalib stated, 
 
In meeting with Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid) our aim was to get him 
to hear directly from our own mouths. So that his ears would hear 
directly the ultimatums that we presented. I told him, ‘Before you 
became President to the time you became President, you have sided with 
the Christians.’ Possibly my words angered him. No one has said that to 
him directly.
29
 
Thalib frequently drew attention to these accusations of state discrimination and 
illegitimacy in various public speeches he made in 2000. In early April 2000, Thalib 
conducted a religious sermon in Jakarta organised by the FKAWJ which was entitled 
‘Jihad: A Final Effort to End the Moluccan Christian Uprising’.
30 Amongst the 
speakers were some prominent Indonesian Muslim leaders, including Brigadier 
General Rustam Kastor.
31  Kastor heavily criticised the Indonesian security apparatus 
for their inability to secure the area from further violence, while Thalib criticised the 
Wahid government for becoming a ‘horseman for the West in their aggression 
towards Islam’.
32 Thalib’s subsequent cry for the Muslim community to unite was met 
                                                                 
28 Fealy, Inside Indonesia, 2001, [online]. 
29 My parentheses inserted. Forum Keadilan, “Wawancara – Ja’far Umar Thalib: ‘Keresahan juga 
terjadi di kalangan kiai NU’”, no.3, 23 April 2000, p.28. 
30 Hanibal W.Y.Wijayanta, ‘Laskar Menggertak, Gus Dur Terancam’, Forum Keadilan, no.2, 16 April 
2000, pp.76-7. 
31 Rustam Kastor is a retired armed services officer who resides in Ambon. He is a well-known for 
having been a high ranking officer in the Indonesian Armed Forces and taking part in Trikora (Tri 
Komando Rakyat), a strategy formed pre-1963 for the mobilisation for the country in order to wrest 
West New Guinea from the Dutch. 
32 Wijayanta, Forum Keadilan, 2000, pp.76-7. 
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 with vocal support from members of the Muslim Ambonese Youth group in Jakarta 
and the FPI.
33
 
Thalib cited the perceived one-sidedness of the state towards a Christian religious 
minority in Indonesia as a clear justification to declare a jihad and send Laskar Jihad 
volunteers to Maluku. In other words, it was believed that the transgression of 
majority rights of the Muslims in Indonesia and contemporary inequalities disproved 
the government’s claim to credibility. For Thalib and his allies, it was a reason to 
create a more effective regime and take control over issues that concerned the 
‘national interest’, where state structures had evidently failed. For Indonesian 
Muslims in general and Muslims in Ambon particularly, who were experiencing 
frustration with contemporary disruptions, it was a solution, as Thalib indicated, for 
‘peace, stability, safety, welfare’ and a resolution to widespread disillusionment with 
Wahid’s government.
34  
 
As evidenced by interviews with local Muslims conducted by the author, Thalib’s 
depiction of a threat to Muslims by an Indonesian State that was pro-Christian 
resonated with Muslims in Ambon. Complaints from local Muslims began with 
alleged discrimination against Muslims in Ambon in the occupation of high positions 
in local government and the private sector.
35 It was argued by members of the 
Ambonese Muslim community that when the Muslims in Ambon began to educate 
themselves and occupy these types of prominent positions, the Christians deliberately 
endeavoured to occupy and dominate positions in local government and in higher 
educational institutions.  
 
Muslims began to study and become degree holders, children of district 
heads, and others. We were discriminated against if we wanted to go on 
                                                                 
33 Wijayanta, Forum Keadilan, 2000, pp.76-7. 
34 Thalib specified particular individuals as discriminating against the Muslim community including 
Benny Doro, who has been accused of being a military leader for Christian groups (Panglima Perang 
Kelompok Kristen). 
35 Davis, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2002, pp.14-5. 
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 to further education and in the office. Muslims in the office were 
rivalled against the Christians who wanted to take over. Christians 
started to occupy positions in government and education. We feel that 
we have not been fairly treated.
36  
 
It was alleged that this discrimination existed ever since the demise of the RMS 
movement in 1950 by Indonesian troops when Christian proponents of the RMS 
‘changed their tactics’ (merubah pola) and were bent on firmly establishing a 
Christian foothold in the workplace and regional government.
37 For the complainants, 
this meant a completely disproportionate number of Christians in Ambon who now 
occupy local jobs and have access to power.
38  
 
This was partly attributed to perceived discriminatory state policies, particularly 
during the New Order period of government, which allowed the Christian minority in 
Indonesia to accumulate high levels of political and economic influence. It was 
asserted that this resulted with the Christians taking advantage of the existing system 
so as to discriminate against any Muslim wishing to enter the educational system or 
the public service.
39 Subsequent calls by Muslims for equity in the workplace, less 
discrimination by the state, and greater employment and educational opportunities, 
brought with it increased tension in the Ambonese community. 
 
Muslims in Ambon were also accusing the military of actively perpetuating the 
conflict or simply shooting at only the Muslims if they were involved in a clash. 
Christians were accused of using automatic weapons, which, it was said, could only 
have come from the military.
40 Anonymous snipers were at one stage accused of 
                                                                 
36 Interview with informant A. My translation of “Orang Islam mulai belajar jadi dokterandus, anak 
bupati dan sebagainya. Kami digenjet bila mau sekolah tinggi dan di kantor. Orang Islam di kantor 
mulai ada saingan masyarakat Kristen mau jajah. Kristen mulai duduk kursi di pemerintah dan 
pendidikan, kami sudah merasa diperlakukan tidak adil”. 
37 Interview with informant W. 
38 Interview with informants S, T. 
39 Interview with informants S, T.  
40 Interview with informants C, V, W. 
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 being military personnel
41, while various other incidents were pointed out to indicate 
a rather blatant partiality of the state security apparatus, as one Ambonese indicated: 
 
Just have a look at the assault on the Brimob boarding house in Tantui 
in Ambon. In the assault, clearly there were armed forces and police 
involved. Also in Kolam village and Batumerah, several members of 
the armed forces became involved in the conflict. They even were the 
ones leading the masses.
42  
 
Local Muslims in Ambon also talked of brutal repression by Christians. During the 
period 1994 to late 1998, and prior to the 1999 outbreak of violence on the island, 
many pointed out serious cases of antagonism by Christians who were accused of 
being increasingly imbued with the idea of political and economic dominance.
43 At 
this time, there was already widespread recognition that tensions between Christians 
and Muslims had intensified throughout Indonesia, with frequent spates of violent 
conflict between the two religious communities. There were several clashes and 
violent incidents between the indigenous Catholics in East Timor and Muslim 
migrants, for example, which resulted in the burning of several markets and mosques 
in 1995.
44 It was said by Muslim informants that Christians similarly exacerbated 
religious divisions in Ambon in 1994, when Christians perpetrated attacks on Muslim 
groups during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan.
45 In 1998, the Christians were 
also accused of scapegoating the local Muslim community when one of the major 
Christian churches was burnt. Hence, 
 
In Ambon it had been peaceful until 1994 when there were frequent 
altercations between Muslims and Christians. Christians began to cause 
disturbances during the Muslim fasting month. The Christians were 
drunk and became increasingly engaged in conflict. In 1998 things got 
                                                                 
41 Yus Ariyanto, ‘Maaf, Agama Kami Nomor Satu’, Forum Keadilan, no.14, 9 July 2000, pp.20-1. 
42 Interview with informant V. My translation of “Tengok saja peristiwa penyerangan asrama Brimob 
di Tantui di Ambon. Dalam penyerangan jelas ada TNI dan Polri terlibat. Juga di Kampung Kolam dan 
Batumerah, sejumlah aparat TNI ikut terlibat dalam aksi penyerangan. Bahkan merekalah yang 
memimpin massa”. 
43 Interview with informants A, C, S, T, U. 
44 Liddle, Government Policies, p.300. 
45 Interview with informants A and C. 
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 worse when it was alleged that Petra Church had been burnt. The 
Christians had deliberately made an issue out of it.
46
 
For indigenous Ambonese Muslims who were long-term residents on the island, there 
were concerns that there was a breakdown in community cohesion as a result of the 
Christian’s lack of commitment to Ambonese culture which traditionally dictated 
social relationships and local customs. The burning of the church in 1998 by alleged 
Christian assailants was, therefore, perceived as a breach of respect for the traditional 
alliance system of pela. For these Muslims, sources of religious tension in the region 
portrayed the Christians lack of commitment to pela. It was often stated that this 
breakdown in commitment was exemplified by the fact that the locally burnt church 
had been built by both Muslims and Christians from villages pledged to this pela 
tradition. It was said for example, 
 
Before it had been peaceful, never has there been a conflict like this. 
Beforehand there was pela, Christians and Muslims were regarded 
equal. Even the church that was burnt was built by Muslims.
47  
 
In this way, Thalib’s ethnoreligious construction resonated with Ambonese Muslim 
society whose lives had been subject to strains in their relationship with the 
Christians. While in the same process, Thalib could position himself as a standard 
bearer of Islam against a depicted Christian-led threat hostile to Islam and Indonesian 
Muslims in particular. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
46 Interview with informant B. My translation of “Di Ambon dulu rukun, lalu pada tahun 1994 sering 
ada tawuran antar Islam dan Kristen. Orang Kristen mulai ganggu pas hari puasa Muslim. Kristen 
mabuk lebih-lebih saur. Pada saat tahun 1998 mulai memanas hingga buat isu Gereja Petra dibakar. 
Yang membuat isu orang Kristen”. 
47 Interview with informant A. My translation of “Sebelumnya rukun, belum pernah ada konflik seperti 
ini. Pela dulu ada, Kristen dan Islam dianggap sama. Gereja yang dibakar malah dibangun oleh orang 
Islam”. 
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 6.4   An Ethnonationalist Construction 
 
Thalib now elaborated his initial ideas of the threat to Muslims posed by a pro-
Christian Indonesian state, by articulating a view of the Indonesian state as built on an 
Islamic core under threat from Christian separatists. Thalib seemed to recognise that 
with unprecedented attention on militant Islamic groups after September 11 the initial 
rhetoric of a struggle based on faith needed to be changed.
48 Thalib subsequently 
depicted the Christian enemy as a separatist movement subversive to the state which 
meant that the movement would be deemed illegal. It was one of the only ways to 
openly bid for the backing of the army, who normally strictly oppose conflicts based 
on SARA and would thus under no circumstances be justified in participating in such a 
conflict. Hence Thalib’s statement, 
 
  President George W. Bush last Saturday indicated that he was 
  prepared to launch a crusade against terrorism. And if we are talking 
  terrorism, according to the ex Director of the Coordinating Body for 
  State Intelligence (BAKIN), Dr. A.C. Manullang, terrorist groups are 
  not predominantly Islamic groups. He stated that there are five 
 terrorist  organisations  in Indonesia. These groups, it is said have ties 
  with the South Moluccan Republican movement (RMS).
49
                                                                 
48 The events of September 11, 2001 prompted many strategists from the Bush administration to source 
out possible suspects in the ‘war against terrorism’. Considerable coverage has been subsequently 
devoted to the Laskar Jihad in Indonesia.  Paul Wolfwitz, US Deputy Secretary of Defence, in an 
interview on 7 January 2002, warned of those ungoverned regions which had become ‘havens for 
terrorists’, with specific reference to Maluku and central Sulawesi which was an obvious reference to 
the Laskar Jihad. The conspicuous militant activity of the Laskar Jihad and particularly Thalib’s 
rousing speeches endorsing a jihad or holy war led many to suspect that Thalib held links with Osama 
bin Laden and his al-Qaeda network. In Indonesia’s weak political position, it was feared that such 
terrorist networks could potentially take advantage of the state’s vulnerability. However Thalib always 
denied any links with Osama Bin Laden, the al-Qaeda network and any other suspected terrorist 
organisations. In January 2002, he illuminated that, ‘Ideologically we (Laskar Jihad) are opposite to al-
Qaeda. We are in confrontation with al-Qaeda. We are from the Ahlusunnah Wal Jammah sect, they 
are from Khawaarij. Their principle is reactionary always against the government and even regard 
Muslims from outside their sect as infidels. We are against that principle even since I met Osama bin 
Laden. We are still against him and al-Qaeda’. See Channelnewsasia, ‘Indonesia’s militant groups 
deny links with Osama and Al Qaeda network’, 30 January 2002 [online]. Available from Factiva 
(Journal Database), accessed 22 July 2002. 
49 FKAWJ, ‘Kelompok Kristen Tidak Berhenti untuk Sudutkan Islam’. Available from Email Group 
List <laskarjihad@yahoogroups.com> 25 September 2001. Accessed 1 October 2001. My translation 
of ‘Presiden George W. Bush, Sabtu pekan lalu, menyatakan siap melakukan crusade melawan 
terorisme. Padahal kalau berbicara teroris, menurut Mantan Direktur Intelijen Badan Koordinasi 
Intelijen Negara (BAKIN), Dr. A.C. Manullang, kelompok teroris bukan saja didominasi kelompok 
Islam. Kelompok ini, kabarnya masih punya kaitan dengan kelompok Republik Maluku Selatan 
(RMS)’.   
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 With the RMS figuring prominently in Muslim denouncements of the violence, Thalib 
promoted the ‘Christian threat’ as a threat to both Indonesian Muslims and the 
Indonesian community as a whole. Deemed as a separatist terror, it served to 
legitimise a jihad targeting a Christian community on political grounds rather than 
purely religious ones. Thalib and his conservative Muslim allies, such as Ahmad 
Sumargono of KISDI and Eggi Sudjana of the Muslim Workers’ Brotherhood Union, 
therefore, translated the moral right of the Muslim community to launch a holy war 
into a public rights claim of their community.
50 Thalib indicated that it was for the 
nation’s benefit to send Muslims to Ambon, as the RMS could potentially threaten the 
disintegration of the nation by encouraging other separatist acts: ‘If Maluku breaks 
away like East Timor, it is a problem for all of Indonesia. This will affect other places 
such as Irian Jaya, Sulawesi and Flores’.
51
 
This shift in ideological construction was a way in which Thalib harnessed existing 
fears both in Ambon and throughout Indonesia, of a separatist threat. The separatist 
RMS had in fact featured as an issue of contention when, in 1999, Indonesian 
Muslims, including those in Ambon, questioned the fact that the violence erupted on 
the feast day marking the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and the 49
th 
anniversary of the official signing of the RMS movement.
52 Many Muslims were of 
the conviction that this was no coincidence and claims were made that the RMS was 
responsible for the violence. These suspicions were substantiated or were given 
justification on the grounds that the RMS flag was allegedly sighted in various places 
on the island of Ambon and that shouts of ‘Long Live the RMS!’ (‘Hidup RMS!’) 
were also heard.
53 It was also significant for many that the exiled president of the 
                                                                 
50 As a unionist and past ally of Prabowo, Soeharto’s son-in-law, Sudjana was accused of worsening 
the situation and taking advantage of the Ambon riots to win votes in the upcoming election during that 
time. See McBeth, Far Eastern Economic Review, p.30. 
51 Sadanand Dhume, ‘Islam’s Holy Warriors’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 April 2001, pp.56. 
52 M.Husni Putuhena, SH, Tragedi Kemanusiaan dalam Kerusuhan di Maluku: Sebuah Prosesi Ulang 
Sejarah Masa Lalu, Lembaga Eksistensi Muslim Maluku (LEMM): Ambon, 1999, p.19. 
53 Interview with informants S, T. 
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 RMS in The Netherlands, Dr. Frans Tutuhatunewa, publicly acknowledged 
responsibility for the flying of the RMS flags.
54  
 
Where in previous years the focus had generally been on a call for jihad based on a 
religious struggle of the Muslim ummat, Thalib and his allies gravitated towards the 
articulation of a national struggle by Indonesian Muslims where Islam represented the 
core of the nation. Hence Thalib’s well-known rallying call: 
 
  We remind the Muslim community especially as the community who 
  founded this United Indonesian Republic State, that we are the 
  primary vanguard for the defence of this State and that we wish 
  only for protection in  order  to continue our faith purely and 
 consequently.
55
 
In this process, Thalib began to unfold a comprehensive explanation of history, 
detailing the development of a Christian conspiracy in Indonesia as an elucidation for 
those confused with conflict circumstances. Inherent within various speeches, 
including a speech entitled ‘Jihad: The Final Solution to End the Christian Separatist 
Violence’, Thalib unravelled a story of a separatist conspiracy in Indonesia dating 
back to the proclamation of Indonesian independence on the 17
th August 1945.
56 He 
                                                                 
54 Tutuhatunewa’s failure to create a clear distinction between the outbreak of communal conflict in 
Ambon and the execution of his ‘RMS struggle’ arguably provided leeway for developing suspicions. 
He denied, however, that members of his cause deliberately instigated the violence in Ambon. See 
Dwitri Waluyo, Mochtar Touwe, and A.R.Sosrosuwignyo, ‘Ambon Menangise’, Gatra, Special 
Report, 30 January 1999, p.60. 
55 Ja’far Umar Thalib, Mewaspadi Gerakan Kristen Radical Indonesia, FKAWJ: Malang, 2000. My 
translation of “Kami ingatkan kepada muslimin khususnya bahwa ummat Islam adalah pendiri Negara 
Kesatuan Republik Indonesia ini, Ummat Islam adalah pelopor utama pembela NKRI ini dan yang 
mereka inginkan hanyalah perlindungan untuk menjalankan agamanya secara murni dan konsekuen”.  
56 It is acknowledged that many conservative Islamic groups in Indonesia already possessed well-
known ideological templates of Christian conspiracies to destroy Islam and undermine the Indonesian 
nation. It is the argument that the RMS was incorporated into this template in order to make sense of 
contemporary disruptions including the conflict in Ambon. For an illumination of the strong symbol of 
‘otherness’ as an example of Islamic rhetoric of discontent, see Bernard Lewis, The Political Language 
of Islam, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, p.65, and Katherine C.Kolstad, Enemy Others 
and Violence in Jakarta: An Islamic Rhetoric of Discontent, in Toward a New Paradigm: Recent 
Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, Mark R. Woodward (ed), Arizona State University, 
1996. For recent examples of this concept of Islamic rhetoric of discontent in New Order Indonesia, see 
Kathleen Turner , The Rising Crescent Tide: Javanese Islamic and Christian Churches in Conflict in 
New Order Indonesia, Honours Thesis, Faculty of Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1997. 
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 suggested that certain patrons who made justified attempts to establish an Indonesian 
Republic were ultimately thwarted by Christian groups from Eastern Indonesia, who 
instigated separatist movements and allegedly masterminded other separatist groups 
during this period in places such as Manado and West Papua. Hence, 
 
All these revolts, which aimed to separate from the Indonesian 
Republic, were commanded by the Catholic and Protestant churches. 
They were then destroyed by the Indonesian armed forces but this was 
only on the face of it since the Christians have stuck firmly to their 
principles. This was of course proven by their renewed separatist claim 
dating back to the time of the weak Indonesian government during the 
Old Order government.
57  
 
At the same time, Thalib indicated that corrupt patrons facilitated the growth of 
reactive separatist movements through governmental policies that transgressed the 
rights of the majority Muslim group. He indicated that the birth of the Indonesian 
Republic was automatically opposed by counter Christian elements whose basic 
principles were to 1) Christianise the whole of Indonesia as the second Christian 
nation in Southeast Asia after the Philippines, and 2) if the first fails, to separate 
themselves from the Indonesian State.
58 In effect, Thalib explained that the exclusivist 
and radical aspects of the Christians derived from this ingrained ideological 
disposition, which can be traced throughout Indonesian history.  
 
On this basis, Thalib argued that the RMS movement was not an isolated movement. 
He asserted that it emerged in unison with the Catholic and Protestant churches 
throughout Indonesia and was motivated under the auspices of corrupt authority 
structures. State patrons during the Old Order and New Order periods were 
propounded, in varying degrees, to have failed to achieve credibility as agents of 
                                                                 
57 Abdurrohim (ed), Mewaspadai Gerakan Kristen Radikal Indonesia, FKAWJ: Malang, 2000. p.8. My 
translation of “Semua gerak-gerakan pemberontakan ini bertujuan untuk memisahkan diri dari NKRI 
yang dikomandoi oleh Gereja-gereja Katolik dan Kristen. Kemudian mereka berhasil ditumpas oleh 
ABRI tetapi hanya permukaannya saja, karena pihak Kristen tetap berpegang teguh pada prinsipnya 
yang memang terbukti mereka memberontak kembali ketika melihat pemerintahan Indonesia Lemah 
yaitu pada masa lemahnya pemerintahan Orde Baru saat itu”. 
58 Abdurrohim, Mewaspadai, p.8.  
  207 
 
 equity and social justice because they ‘were not brave enough to take affirmative 
action against separatist movements’.
59 The fact that these governments permitted 
separatist movements, such as the RMS, to flourish, was an act against a unified 
territory based on historical sovereignty and the process of state unification. In 
Thalib’s depiction of state patronage of Christian counter movements in the Old and 
New Order periods, including post-New Order under former Indonesian President 
Wahid, he argued that there had always been a clear weakening of state legitimacy in 
its inability to offer security to its citizens.
60  
 
Why does the Muslim community always become a target? Because it 
is only the Muslim community who always is the forerunner in ensuring 
that the United Indonesian Republic remains standing in the regions and 
throughout Indonesia itself. So that if there are rebellions by Christians 
then the Muslims are the first to face these disasters until Muslims are 
forced to place a cross at the front of their houses in order to protect 
themselves from the cruelty and insolence for the Christian youth. The 
Muslim community no longer feels safe even though they live and stay 
in their own country, even feeling foreign in their homeland.
61  
 
Thalib consolidated this argument by echoing Muslim allegations of subversive 
elements within the ranks of the Indonesian state security forces. General suspicions 
by the Indonesian community, both in and outside Ambon, that certain members 
within the armed forces sided with opposing sides in Ambon, had already 
disseminated doubts regarding the erosion of central authority and the failure of the 
armed forces. It was recalled that, in previous times on the island, 
 
                                                                 
59 Abdurrohim, Mewaspadai,p.9. My translation of “tidak berani secara tegas mengambil tindakan 
menangani gerakan-gerakan pemberontakan”. 
60 The separation of East Timor was a highly contentious issue for the Laskar Jihad declaring it a 
betrayal against the citizens of the nation-state and proof of Christian separatist aspirations.  
61 Abdurrohim, Mewaspadai, pp.10-1. My translation of “Mengapa ummat Islam yang selalu menjadi 
sasaran? Karena hanya ummat Islamlah yang selalu menjadi pelopor menjaga tetap tegaknya NKRI di 
wilayah maupun di Indonesia ini. Sehingga ketika terjadi pemberontakan yang dilakukan oleh pihak 
Kristen maka pihak Islamlah yang pertama menghadapi malapetaka sampai-sampai ummat Islam 
terpaksa memasang salib di depan rumahnya guna melindungi diri dari kebengisan dan kebiadaban 
pemuda-pemuda Kristen. Ummat Islam tidak lagi merasa aman walaupun hidup dan tinggal di 
negerinya sendiri bahkan merasa asing di tanah airnya sendiri”. 
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 When there were problems in 1994-5, the military would go in, take 
the troublemakers out by the truckload and give them a course in 
discipline. This time it didn’t happen.
62
 
Despite the evident failure of the TNI to act promptly and resolve existing disputes, 
Thalib still accredited the army as a public institution of integrity that had, however, 
been a product of separatist corruption. Disillusionment with the capabilities of the 
state and its institutions, he argued, did not necessarily mean a total decline in those 
capacities. By and large, the TNI itself was still perceived by the Laskar Jihad as a 
credible component of the state security apparatus. The attack by members of the 
division of elite armed forces (Kopassus) on a Muslim polyclinic in Ambon on 14 
June 2001, for example, was seen not only as an attack against the Muslim 
community but also against TNI state forces. Fracturing or factionalism within 
military ranks was associated with the RMS, who Thalib accused of using 
international connections to supply separatist soldiers with modern weapons.
63  
  
Intrinsically, the idea portrayed by the Laskar Jihad was that the interests of the 
individual and community were concurrent with those of the state, in that they both 
principally adhered to the concept of national unity and depended upon institutional 
structures to ensure stability and equality. The principles of social justice and political 
stability were therefore principles which demanded subsequent loyalty of its citizens 
to the ‘strong state’ or, in other words, loyalty to an agent of equitable development 
and social harmony, a state that could ensure the prospect of justice in the community. 
It was stated by the Laskar Jihad that, 
 
To put an end to the conflict in the Moluccas, the Government must 
detain and bring to justice the provocateurs that hide behind the 
conflict. Look what they did in the Poso case. The champion of the 
conflict, Fabianus Tibo, was caught and brought to justice publicly, 
witnessed by many.
64
                                                                 
62 Comment made by Marcus Mietzner. Taken from McBeth, Far Eastern Economic Review, p.29. 
63 FKAWJ, ‘Pasukan Bayaran Yon-Gab 90% Beragama Kristen’, Maluku Pekan Ini, Newsletter, 
Edition 15 –21 June 2001, Malang, pp.1-2. 
64 ‘Translation of excerpts from the Laskar Jihad leaders concerning the Malino II Peace Agreement’, 
Ambon Information Website [online], 13 February 2002. Accessed 18 July 2002. 
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 While there evidently was a belief in the capacities of the Indonesian State to ensure 
the implementation of justice in the community demonstrable in the government’s 
acting upon the arrest of Fabianus Tibo in the Poso incident 
65, the Laskar Jihad found 
that these proven capacities were less successful in the Moluccas. In some sense of 
being morally progressive, the Laskar Jihad instead indicated that the failure of the 
state to ensure social justice obligated the ‘loyal community’ to inherit the role of the 
state in the implementation of justice and stability in the Moluccas. In other words, 
the Muslim community, who claimed to defend the Indonesian State against 
nationalist insurgents, were called upon to fulfil certain moral obligations associated 
with this loyalty to the State and its institutions. Thalib stated that, ‘Of course, if 
justice has to be done in the Moluccas, the Muslims themselves must do it. In what 
way? There is no other way than jihad fisabililah [the way of/to God]’!
66
 
With Thalib and the Laskar Jihad under severe scrutiny after September 11, Thalib 
subsequently sought to emphasise the ‘us’, or the Muslim community’s shared 
nationality and citizenship, and sought to promote his militant endeavour as one based 
on national interest. In a ‘Declaration of War’ broadcast on Radio SPMM (Voice of 
the Maluku Muslim Struggle) on 1-3 May 2002, Thalib articulated a sense of 
nationalist affiliation based on the attachment to a public Indonesian culture: 
 
We have done all this in the name of exercising our duty and obligation 
as citizens of the Republic of Indonesia to defend it. Moreover, we have 
done all this in the name of exercising our religious obligations, namely 
defending the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.
67
 
Additionally, as well as envisioning the community as progressively evolving through 
the fulfilment of common commitments and responsibilities, Thalib chose to reinforce 
                                                                 
65 Fabianus Tibo, a Christian and a retired armed services officer, and thirteen of his friends were 
accused of inciting violence in Poso, Sulawesi in April-May 2000 where conflict erupted between the 
local Christian and Muslim communities. 
66 ‘Translation of excerpts from the Laskar Jihad leaders concerning the Malino II Peace Agreement’, 
Ambon Information Website [online].  
67 BBC Monitoring International Reports, “Text of Laskar Jihad Leader’s ‘Declaration of War’”, 16 
May 2002. Available from Ambon Information Website [online], accessed 18 July 2002. 
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 the sense of community with overt symbolism rooted in history. In other words, 
Thalib’s drew upon a sense of evolutionary development by promoting myths from 
the past and employing a language of common ancestry to refer not to the community 
itself but rather to the homeland which they inhabited. The character of the ‘us’ was 
therefore depicted as a community whose ‘forbears have toiled and spilled their 
blood’
68 and who came together in the front of Indonesian nationalism. This idea of 
common loyalty to the territory also implied the acquisition of ethical obligations, 
which were identified with the ideas of historical inheritance and a common destiny to 
undertake the tasks of their forebears. Hence, ‘This has been the teaching of the 
forefathers of our nation when they opposed the Dutch Christians’.
69  
 
Thalib continued to justify his position through the reinforcement of Indonesia’s weak 
political position against a separatist threat. A day before the 57
th anniversary of the 
declaration of the RMS on 24 April 2002, Thalib reiterated the prevalence of a 
separatist threat in Indonesia, pitched against a community loyal to the Indonesian 
state. Thalib held a prayer gathering attended by thousands of Moluccan Muslims, at 
the local Ambonese Al Fatah Mosque in which he declared war on any RMS and 
FKM activists and their supporters. At the time there was much nervousness and 
anticipation from the local Ambonese, including local security forces, concerning the 
FKM’s confirmed wish to observe the anniversary of the RMS. While Hayim Muzadi, 
chairman of Indonesia’s Islamic organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama, appealed to 
Muslims in Ambon not to be provoked into violent action by opposing forces, security 
forces both locally and nationally echoed Thalib’s spoken urgency to defend the 
nation against those who threatened the unity of the state. The military commander in 
Maluku, Commander Brigadier General Mustoposo, indicated strongly that, 
 
 
                                                                 
68 Quoted from Miller in David Brown, Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural & 
Multicultural Politics, Routledge: London, 2000, p.62. 
69 ‘Translation of excerpts from the Laskar Jihad leaders concerning the Malino II Peace Agreement’, 
Ambon Information Website [online]. 
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 The existence of the FKM and RMS is very dangerous to the concept 
of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore the 
security agencies must take stern action against the RMS flag 
hoisters.
70  
 
Also, Chris Shaetapy of the Indonesian political party PDIP and Sueb Ekaputra, a 
legislator of the Indonesian military, advocated the desirability of arresting the 
masterminds behind the RMS separatist cause in the Moluccas, reiterating that it 
threatened the unity of the Indonesian State.
71 RMS flags were allegedly flown in 
Ambon and also on Haruku, Seram and Saparua, initiating a large protest by Muslims 
on the island of Ambon.
72 Indeed, despite the arrest of Alex Manuputty and Semmy 
Waileruny of the FKM on April 17
th, angered calls by local Muslims for authorities 
and security personnel to act firmly against RMS supporters were still unleashed. 
 
With the raising of the RMS flags throughout the Moluccas, many Ambonese 
articulated fears of the existence of a definite separatist movement in Ambon. There 
were those Ambonese who expressed a high level of fear and apprehension prior to 
the 52
nd anniversary of the proclamation of the RMS on 25 April 2002. Witnesses 
claimed for example that, ‘frightened residents fled their homes as security forces 
tightened their grip ahead of the anniversary’.
73 Furthermore, that ‘many residents in 
Kudamati district have fled their homes on fears on violence’.
74 This was despite the 
fact that others in Ambon claimed that the RMS movement was confined to The 
Netherlands and that there was no underlying RMS in exile movement in Ambon and 
Maluku in general.
75  
 
                                                                 
70 Organisation of Asia-Pacific News Agencies, ‘RMS Flag-Hoisting Instances serious danger to 
Indonesian State, says Mily’, 27 April 2002 [online]. Available from Factiva (Journal Database), 
accessed 22 July 2002. 
71 Antara,’Govt urged to disclose masterminds of RMS flag-hoisting actions’, 27 April 2002 [online]. 
Available from Factiva (Journal Database), accessed 22 July 2002. 
72 Agence France-Presse, ‘Twelve reported killed in renewed violence in Indonesia’s Ambon city’, 28 
April 2002 [online]. Available from Factiva (Journal Database), accessed 22 July 2002. 
73 Reuters News, ‘Jakarta bans media from Moluccas for separatist event’, 23 April 2002 [online]. 
Available from Factiva (Journal Database), accessed 22 July 2002. 
74 Reuters News, ‘Jakarta bans media’, [online].  
75 Interview with informants J, I. 
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 As evidenced by interviews conducted by the author with Muslims, Thalib’s 
construction of a separatist threat resonated with Muslims in Ambon. Certainly, many 
migrant Muslims in Ambon were adamant about the existence of a separatist threat or 
at least ‘a non-Islamic group supported by a separatist group who were importing 
weapons’.
76 It was said that a Moluccan separatist movement was a transparent case 
of Christian separatist conspiracy since, they alleged, geographically a south 
Moluccan republic was a ridiculous concept in the first place when Ambon was not 
strictly located in the south Moluccan region. It was argued that the RMS was an 
invented acronym designed as a ‘cover-up’ to veil its genuine intention of establishing 
a Christian State in Maluku. The RMS acronym, they said, actually represented 
Republik Maluku Serani (Christian Moluccan Republic) and not Republik Maluku 
Selatan (Republic of the South Moluccas).
77
 
Other Muslim respondents depicted a detailed narrative of a Christian separatist 
infiltration into Ambonese society beginning in 1950. Shortly after the demise of the 
RMS in 1950, it was said that proponents of the separatist group  re-emerged to 
infiltrate Ambon city by deliberately occupying positions in local government and in 
higher educational institutions.  Citing their collaboration with the RMS-in-exile 
government in The Netherlands, it was alleged that the Christian separatists in Ambon 
received weapons directly from the RMS overseas in preparation for a take-over of 
the island with the collapse of Soeharto’s regime in May 1998. What ensued were 
frequent attacks on Muslims in Ambon throughout 1998 prior to the eruption of major 
violence in January 1999. It was described: 
 
On the 13 December 1998, the RMS attacked Muslims looting our 
possessions and burning our houses and mosques. The attack was 
conducted in the middle of the night using rifles, machetes, spears and 
bows and arrows. They yelled out ‘Kill Muslims’ and ‘Long live the 
RMS!’ Then on 19 January 1999, we were in the middle of our fasting 
month, when the RMS from every corner of Ambon staged a sudden 
                                                                 
76 Interview with informant T. My translation of ‘Kelompok bukan Islam didukung oleh kelompok 
separatis dengan memasuk persenjataan.’ 
77 Interview with informants T, C. 
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 attack. At Karang Panjang and Gunung Nona, the Christian masses flew 
the RMS flag.
78  
 
The perception was exacerbated by the local Muslim radio station, the SPMM, which 
operated on behalf of FKAWJ based in Yogyakarta in Central Java, which accused 
the Moluccan Protestant Church and the separatist FKM of being responsible for joint 
action in the ceremonial raising of the RMS flag.
79 The radio station drew little 
distinction between the two groups and in effect constructed a broad specious sense of 
identity by establishing further accusations that the United Nations Mission in Ambon 
was also an integral component of the ‘separatist conspiracy’, based on the 
observation that the UN flag was hoisted together with the RMS flag at the UN 
Bureau in Ambon.  
 
Other local Muslims also lashed out at the RMS and FKM who had claimed that in 
certain villages of Ambon, Ambonese Christians were the original inhabitants. They 
argued that in fact the ancestors of these villages were Muslims who converted to 
Christianity. They said that Christians in Ambon could not claim that this was their 
homeland because Christians were originally migrants from other islands, proof of 
which could be found by their foreign family names: ‘De Fretes, de Quelu, van 
Houten, Barons, all of these clearly are not Moluccan names’.
80 FKM claims to a 
community or family of common ancestry were argued therefore to contain 
fundamental flaws. An area known as Poka Rumah Tiga in Ambon came under 
particular contention in this respect as Christians in the area denounced Muslim 
                                                                 
78 Interview with informant S. My translation of “Tanggal 13 Desember 1998, RMS melakukan 
pembantaian terhadap warga Muslim menjarah barang-barang kami, membakar rumah dan masjid. 
Penyerangan tersebut dilaksanakan lewat tengah malam menggunakan senjata api, parang, tombak dan 
panah. Mereka sempat teriak ‘Bunuh Muslim!’ dan ‘Hidup RMS!’ Lalu tanggal 19 Januari 1999, ketika 
kami sedang larut dalam suasana Idul Fitri 1419, RMS dari seluruh penjuru kotamadya Ambon 
melakukan serangan mendadak. Di Karang Panjang and Gunung Nona, massa Kristen mengibarkan 
bendera RMS”.    
79 Amboina Crisis Centre, The Situation in the Ambon/Moluccas – Report No.168, Available email: 
ComAmq@Ambon.wasantara.net.id, sent 21 May 2001. 
80 FKAWJ, ‘Klaim Kristen RMS Merupakan Ketidakjujuran Intelektual’, Maluku Pekan Ini, 
Newsletter, Edition 14 July – 20 July 2001, Malang, pp.3-4.  
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 residents as ‘migrants’ (penduduk liar) and therefore should be ousted from the 
village. Local Muslims refuted this accusation indicating,  
 
The ancestor of Rumah Tiga was a Muslim woman who converted to 
Christianity and moved to Rumah Tiga. This woman started the 
generation of inhabitants, which only numbered a few at the time. Other 
than that, Rumah Tiga residents are migrants from various areas outside 
of Rumah Tiga. A similar assessment was also expressed by Moluccan 
historian Drs.Noer Tawaenella. According to him, Rumah Tiga still has 
kinship ties with Wakal and Hitu. This can be seen in the old literature 
like that which was written by Safar Rijali, a writer of Moluccan 
history.
81  
 
Thalib’s ideological framework changed as a result of new developments in 2002 with 
renewed endeavours for reconciliation on the island. The signing of the Malino Peace 
Agreement was conducted between rival Christian and Muslim factions from Maluku 
in search of a resolution to the civil war affecting the province (See Appendix 9). The 
agreement stipulated the establishment of two commissions – for security and for 
social and economic affairs – to monitor the truce in the Moluccan region.
82
 It also 
provided for the disarming and banning of militias and the establishment of joint 
security patrols. 
 
Thalib chose to reinforce the Laskar Jihad’s involvement in the conflict in Ambon 
based on the existence of a secessionist movement. Thalib, therefore, denounced the 
Malino Peace Agreement (See Appendix 10) citing a conspiracy of separatists against 
                                                                 
81 Maluku Pekan Ini, ‘Klaim Kristen RMS’, pp.3-4. My translation of “Nenek moyang Rumah Tiga 
adalah seorang perempuan muslim yang kemudian murtad masuk ke agama kristen dan berpindah ke 
Rumah Tiga. Perempuan murtad itu memunculkan generasi penghuni Rumah Tiga yang memang 
sedikit sekali. Selainnya, penduduk Rumah Tiga adalah para pendatang dari berbagai daerah di luar 
Rumah Tiga. Penilaian senada juga diungkapkan oleh pengamat sejarah Maluku Drs.Noer Tawaenella. 
Menurutnya, Rumah Tiga masih memiliki hubungan saudara dengan Wakal dan Hitu. Hal itu bisa 
dilihat dalam literatur-literatur kuno seperti yang ditulis oleh Safar Rijali, seorang penulis sejarah 
Maluku”. 
82 See Associated Press Newswires, ‘Warring Christian and Muslim groups from Maluku sign peace 
deal’, 12 February 2002 [online]. Available from Dow Jones Interactive, Publications Library, accessed 
13 February 2002. Due to a lack of acceptance of the Malino Peace Agreement by various factions 
within the community including the Laskar Jihad who continued to operate in Ambon, the truce was 
deemed ineffective after only two months from the date of its signing. Further arson attacks and 
bombings continued on the island including a bomb explosion in Ambon on April 3, 2002, which killed 
seven people. 
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 the Indonesian government and its citizens. He denied that the Muslim delegates at 
the Malino negotiations represented the people of the province and suggested that the 
separatist threat maintained its existence irrespective of any mediation talks for 
conflict resolution. A statement issued by Thalib highlighted a continued albeit 
greater struggle of the Muslim community against national insurgents. For Thalib, the 
manifestation of the Malino Agreement enlarged the perception of a threatening 
entity.  It was alleged that through the use of false euphemisms within the stipulations 
of the agreement, the separatist movement sought to falsely portray themselves as 
advocates of societal unity. It was contended that, 
 
Since the first slaughter of Muslims on January 19, 1999, we have 
always been stuffed with “reconciliation”. It is like somebody that 
has been beaten up and while still recovering from the impact, has to 
agree to the dictum “peace”, wrapped in the word “reconciliation”. 
However how apparently this “reconciliation” is just a camouflage of 
the rotten intentions of the Christian revolutionaries. To the Muslims 
in the Moluccas, reconciliation means: voluntarily giving up their 
lives. Many times there have been acts of reconciliation, but each 
time it is torn up by the Christians. Reconciliation has thus become a 
stigma. Surely, for the Muslims any reconciliation is hard. 
Anticipating any act of justice and truth, and while the slaughterers 
are still freely roaming about, the word “peace” is hardly acceptable. 
Before the inflicted injuries have healed, treachery upon treachery is 
taking place. How strange it is that all parties can effectuate 
reconciliation. As if by this reconciliation, everlasting peace will be 
accomplished. They lay the roof for protection, but are forgetting the 
foundation and the pillars. As if everybody wants to close his eyes, 
not caring about the carnage on that Idul Fitri day. They do not care 
about the presence of the separatist FKM movement, covering up the 
rottenness of the church and those provocateurs that hide behind the 
“World of God”.
83
 
Even when Thalib was detained on 4 May 2002, accused by state authorities of 
defaming President Megawati and her Vice-President, Hamzah Haz, defaming the 
regional government and also for inciting further conflict in the area, Thalib continued 
to justify the violence in Ambon, indicating that Muslims were defending Indonesia 
                                                                 
83 ‘Translation of excerpts from the Laskar Jihad leaders concerning the Malino II Peace Agreement’, 
Ambon Information Website [online].  
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 where the security apparatus and authority structures had clearly failed. He was also 
publicly supported by a large base of Muslim organisations, students and prominent 
conservative Muslim activists, who either rallied or spoke publicly for his release. The 
Laskar Jihad had in fact been actively supported by conservative Indonesian Muslim 
groups such as KISDI and FPI who publicly endorsed Thalib’s activities including 
rallies and demonstrations.
84  
 
6.5   Support for the Laskar Jihad 
 
The purpose of this section is to show that this is a case of limited ideological 
mobilisation. All Muslims did not fully lapse into absolutist ideologies. Some degree 
of interactive normality continued to exist in Ambon, so that ties to an Ambonese 
community of Muslims and Christians, migrants and indigenous, were not completely 
broken. As explained in Chapter 2, the disruptions in Ambon impacted to different 
degrees on different sections of the society, so that there were consequent variations 
in the extent of the ideologisations which occurred.  
 
Thalib’s campaign attempted to harness the fears and confusion of Muslims through 
the articulation of conflict explained in Muslim versus Christian terms and which later 
shifted to a separatist Christian threat. It has been shown that there were those 
indigenous Muslims in Ambon who articulated the conflict in Muslim versus 
Christian terms on the basis of simple Christian arrogance. These Muslims 
experienced certain incompatibilities with Thalib’s resolution for a pitted war against 
alleged Christian separatists in Ambon. The fact that Thalib was a non-Ambonese 
may have been one reason, but the more obvious being, firstly, the clear repercussions 
of violent confrontation in terms of disunity, insecurity and death, and secondly, the 
                                                                 
84 Many of these groups have long been active particularly on university campuses and Islamic schools 
in promoting campaigns against pluralism and Western political values. Davis, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia, pp.19-20. 
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 loss of faith in Thalib’s and the Laskar Jihad’s ability to fulfil their various promises 
of security and social justice as the conflict prevailed.  
 
At the same time, the prospect of security and decreased discrimination against 
Muslims served to inhibit the political alienation of at least some members of the 
Muslim community in Ambon. Thalib’s ideology appealed to members of the migrant 
Muslim community who, as shown in this chapter, began to respond by articulating 
historical grievances of state favouritism towards Christians leading to ‘unfair’ 
economic and social disparities, and workplace discrimination that prejudiced local 
Muslims. The RMS also figured prominently in their denouncements of the violence 
as Thalib shifted his ideological construction into one that translated the conflict into 
an overt Christian separatist threat. 
 
Despite the fragmentation of Muslim support in Ambon for Thalib and his 
paramilitants, the importance of continued various support for the ideals of the Laskar 
Jihad is a reflection of the trend towards ideological absolutism. Members of the 
Muslim community in Ambon continued to express simple ideological and moral 
clarities even with the removal of the Laskar Jihad and its elites from Ambon, who 
were officially disbanded in October 2002.
85 In April 2003, hundreds of Ambonese 
Muslims protested about the existence of separatist Christian threat on the island 
supported by the Moluccan chapters of national Islamic groups such as the Indonesian 
Ulemas Council (MUI) and STAIN. Chairman of STAIN, HM Atamimi, stressed that 
there was to be no compromise with the RMS and that ‘the RMS has to be toppled to 
its roots so that the Moluccan Earth can be peaceful in real terms’.
86
                                                                 
85 Following the Bali bombings on 12 October, 2002, the Laskar Jihad was disbanded in low-key 
circumstances on 15 October 2002. Chairman of the South Sulawesi chapter of the FKASWJ indicated 
that the Laskar Jihad ‘were worried by the possibility of becoming involved in matters that deviated 
from religious values and they were worried that they would neglect the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-
Jama’ah’s missionary endeavour’. See Kompas, “Indonesia: Laskar Jihad member admits ‘mistakes’, 
reasons for dissolution”, 16 October 2002. Thalib was still on trial in Jakarta at this time accused of 
inciting the violence in Ambon He was later acquitted on 30 January 2003 of charges of inciting 
violence in Ambon and throughout Maluku.  
86 Kompas [online], ‘Ambon Tenang, Sekitar 250 Anggota RMS Ditahan’, 26 April 2003. Accessed 13 
October 2003. My translation of “RMS harus ditumpas hingga ke akar-akarnya agar Bumi Maluku 
menjadi damai dalam arti sesungguhnya”. 
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 These perceptions have remained internalised on the island with local Muslims 
continuing to accuse the RMS of provoking the instability in Ambon and have 
subsequently lashed out at Christian communities. Throughout 2003-04, there was 
continued violent fighting between Muslim and Christian communities on the island 
of Seram. While in Ambon, Ambonese members of the Islam Defenders Front of 
Maluku (FPIM) have been warning the Muslim community of the separatist 
movement, even calling for a jihad against any Christian secessionist group.
87
 
6.6   Conclusion 
 
With persistent accusations of a Christian conspiracy and calls for regime change, 
Thalib’s ideological framework reflected a visible change of the inchoate views of 
members of the Muslim community in Ambon and provided them with a new focus. 
Thalib’s construction of a separatist Christian threat acted as an ideological 
preconception which generated subsequent reactions to, and perceptions of, Christians 
and the Indonesian State. In this way, in an atmosphere of mounting confusion and 
apprehension, Thalib manipulated the issue of the RMS and New Order policy to 
diagnose contemporary dislocations as the transgression of Muslim rights. The 
ethnonationalism espoused by Thalib of the Laskar Jihad,  therefore, offered a 
political movement to restore these rights and provide a basis for national identity. 
 
 
 
                                                                 
87 Azis Tunny, ‘Muslims plan to thwart rebel group’s celebration’, The Jakarta Post, 14 April 2003. 
Available from Ambon Berdarah [online], accessed 13 October 2003. 
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  CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
7.1   A Contribution to Ethnic Studies 
  
It has been frequently suggested that ethnic nationalism and ethnic separatism are 
radical responses by minority groups who feel they have been marginalised from the 
society in which they live. In the literature on ethnic separatist claims in Indonesia, 
there has been a tendency to distinguish participants as ‘dissidents’ who direct their 
violence against a regime whom the participants claim as being biased towards a 
majority group, for example, Benedict Anderson’s analysis of ethnic separatism in 
Aceh and West Papua.
1 Anderson perceives the independence movements of Aceh 
and West Papua as simply reactions to the oppressive mentality, policies, and 
practices of the Indonesian government, and it is on this basis, he argues, that Aceh 
and West Papua should be accorded genuine and full autonomy. 
  
The astounding greed of the rulers in Jakarta, and of their provincial 
minions and errand boys, as well as the replacement of local-son civilian 
rule by the military originating very often from Java, increasingly 
seemed to say to the Acehnese: “We don't need you; what we need are 
your natural resources. How wonderful it would be if Aceh were 
emptied of the Acehnese.” Here was the origin of the atrocities which 
the newspapers have recently laid bare. Irian's story is in many ways 
comparable. The OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Organization for a 
Free Papua) arose not before the Orde Baru-which I will from now on 
call the Orde Kropos (Dry-Rot Order)-came into being, but afterward. 
And its language remains the Indonesian language. But the menaces and 
manipulations orchestrated by Ali Murtopo and his accomplices to give 
the appearance that all Irianese were obedient servants of the Dry-Rot 
Order quickly showed the local people that, in the eyes of the Center, 
Irian mattered, not the people who lived there. In all their real diversity, 
they were lumped together as a primitive population named after the 
province. Once again Jakarta was understood to be saying: “What a pity 
there are Irianese in Irian.” The people of Irian were never seriously 
                                                 
1 Benedict R O'G Anderson, ‘Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future, Indonesia, Issue 67, 
April 1999, pp.1-12. 
  220invited into the common project, so it is only natural that they quickly 
began to feel that they were being colonized.
2
In many accounts, it is assumed that the behaviour of these ‘dissidents’ are 
explainable in instrumentalist terms, that is as the politics of material self-interest. 
This is evident in the interpretation of the Riau rebellion as those pressing for 
economic rewards with decentralised access to new government revenues and local 
resource tax income. It has been reported that the new decentralisation laws entitled 
the provincial and district governments to 15% of central government revenues from 
oil, 30% from gas and 80% from forests. This meant that, in 2001, the combined 
budget of Riau's provincial and district governments multiplied six-fold to about six 
trillion rupiah ($583 million). Subsequently, it was seen that aspirations for 
separatism diminished as local expectations were high in the light of new 
development and investment promises from Governor Saleh Djasit and Caltex’s 
managing director, Robert Galbraith.
3
The purpose of this thesis has been to critically examine the case of ethnic nationalism 
in Ambon in the light of the proposition that the politics of interest may be overtaken 
by the ideologisation of ethnic nationalism. Ethnic elites and their followers may 
gauge their nationalist decisions on the advantages of power and resources and readily 
accept decentralisation prospects on the basis of economic reward. However, 
disillusionment with the state and a rejection of its patronage as a perceived form of 
Javanese imperialism suggests a new kind of political behaviour. Some ethnic 
nationalists instead begin to perceive secession as enhancing their prospects of 
economic prosperity and equality and subsequently develop ideological constructions 
of ethnicity.  From this perspective, the development of exaggerated forms of the ‘us’ 
and the ‘other’ tend to dominate nationalist politics rather than instrumental concerns 
of material welfare. 
                                                 
2 Anderson, Indonesia, 1999, p.2. 
3 Sadanand Dhume, ‘A Windfall for Riau’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 February 2002, vol.165, 
Iss. 7, pp.42-6. 
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in part a reply to the gap in the literature on ethnicity and nationalism in Indonesia 
which explains ethnic nationalism simply as a bargaining tool for the pursuit of 
material and power advantage. It has been suggested in this thesis that the 
development from self-interested pragmatism towards the ideologisation of ethnic 
consciousness is most likely to occur when communities are disrupted and dislocated 
as a result of, for example, economic fluctuations and state interventions. The case of 
ethnic nationalism in Ambon has therefore sought to show that individuals and groups 
pursued goals based on moral and ideological considerations. In this way, 
constructivism was able to illuminate how the Ambonese engaged in constructions of 
the moral identities both of themselves and the targeted ‘Other’.  
 
The argument of this thesis has rested in part on the shift from ethnic riot to the 
reversion of the Ambonese to ideological formulas based on myths of historical 
continuity and the imperative to eliminate the threatening ‘other’. This shift from 
ethnic riot to an ideological nationalism can be best understood as an extension of 
Donald Horowitz’s
4  analysis of the nature and causes of the ethnic riot. While 
Horowitz’s examination of the major elements in riot behaviour and riot dynamics 
falls in part within the constructivist argument, this thesis has extended upon his 
analysis by offering an explanation of why the ethnic riot can change into a nationalist 
movement.  
 
It has been shown in this thesis that the change from riot to nationalist movement has 
been based on the presence of three distinct elements: when disruptions are 
particularly severe, when societies have access to earlier myths of a particular type, 
and finally when there are subsequent disruptions of the conflict itself. Indeed, the 
conflict became characterised by a sense of interplay between two contending 
nationalisms in which both engaged in a series of redefining nationalist identity on the 
                                                 
4 Donald L. Horowitz, The Deadly Ethnic Riot, University of California Press: Berkeley, 2001. 
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from riot to one of nationalist contention. 
 
The advent of violence, according to Horowitz, perhaps indicates some facilitative 
conditions present in the social and political environment. What may be described as 
‘background conditions’, as opposed to precipitating events, can potentially have 
powerful inhibiting or causal influence on acts of aggression. Riots, he argues, are 
facilitated when ‘ethnic politics is dangerously in flux’ such as periods of transition in 
authority relations or fluctuations in ethnic or regional policy issues. The resultant 
feelings of uncertainty and impunity are thus likely to create a favourable context for 
violence because 
 
they undermine previously stable expectations and, by rendering group 
prospects uncertain, make the need for violence seem exigent when an 
appropriate precipitant occurs, or else they lend moral sanction to 
violence or remove the fear that ordinarily prevents violence. 
 
The argument implied here is that societies which have become subject to these 
conditions engendering dangerous uncertainties and abrupt turn around in fortunes 
would be the communities most likely to experience ethnic rioting.  It is from this 
perspective that constructivism similarly argues that the ideologisation of identity is 
promoted by the stress and trauma experienced by disruptions caused by rapid social 
change, migration and forceful interventions by the state. This is true of Ambon 
where Ambonese society has been subject to rapid social change, coercive state 
policies and the negative impacts of economic globalisation.  
 
However, the transition from riot to absolutist ethnonationalist ideology in Ambon 
suggests that disruptions were exceptionally acute on the island so as to promote this 
ideologisation of identity as also seen in Aceh and West Papua. This is opposed to 
elsewhere in Indonesia where disruptions of local communities and authority 
  223structures were less intense and therefore ethnonationalist ideologies did not 
materialise. As demonstrated in this thesis, Ambon experienced profound changes to 
village communities through state reorientation of authority structures, the 
exacerbation of existing poverty levels, and increased competition in the workplace. 
Compounded by the onset of widespread violence and death and complacency of the 
state and its security forces, circumstances were so traumatic that dislocated 
individuals became amenable to ideological formulas offering security and anomie. 
Ambonese nationalist identity emerged at this point to offer a simple diagnosis of 
events and a sense of emotional security to traumatised individuals.  
 
Ethnic nationalism in Ambon has relied heavily on being able to access familiar 
myths of the past in order to appeal to dislocated individuals. In this respect, the 
constructivist argument is useful in focusing attention on myths of territorial certainty 
and common ancestry and the ideologisation of identity between a virtuous ‘Us’ and a 
demonised ‘Other’. In the case of the latter, Horowitz examines the specific act of 
demonising a segment of society in order to direct attention directly to a perceived 
threat. Horowitz provides a portrayal of this trend as an example of ‘cumulative 
aggression’, the conjunction of displaced and direct aggression.  
 
It may be preferable to consider the possibility to cumulative aggression, 
attacks produced by the conjunction of different sets of frustrations or 
grievances but directed at fewer than all of the frustrating groups. If a 
target group simultaneously received direct and displaced aggression, 
then it is easier to understand the intensity of certain violent outbursts, 
which otherwise seems inexplicable. Some initiators of violence may 
well be fighting what amount to wars on two fronts, but all their fire may 
be trained on one target.
5
 
According to Horowitz, the Burmese riot of 1938 showed how the Indians became a 
scapegoat for anti-British feeling and yet ‘antipathy toward the Indians had roots 
outside the sphere of Anglo-Burman relations, and the specific choice of Indian 
                                                 
5 Horowitz, Deadly Ethnic Riot, p.138. 
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British’.
6 Thus the likelihood and magnitude of violence directed towards the Indians 
as a perceived threat was increased by the presence of frustrations and perceptions 
within the community which had gradually accumulated over time. 
 
From this perspective, the nationalist elites in Ambon responded to the disruptions 
and disillusionment in Ambonese society by identifying the Indonesian government as 
the cause of the dispute and scapegoating enemies who could be blamed. Thus words 
such as ‘Javanisation’ were strongly voiced against migrants in Ambon as migration 
was perceived as a deliberate state strategy to marginalise the populations of Eastern 
Indonesia. Given the socio-economic disparities between migrants and the indigenous 
population and the presence of grievances against Javanese occupation of civil 
administrative jobs, nationalist elites accessed these existing issues of contention and 
accused the migrants of being part of a wider ‘Javanese’ conspiracy. Ambonese 
nationalism thus emerged to resonate with a society already imbued with resentment 
towards a Javanese ‘other’ which was portrayed as the contamination of an ‘inferior’ 
migrant population. 
 
The politics of nationalism in Ambon has also been significantly characterised by 
ideological myths invented in 1950 as the events of the RMS became the raw material 
for the subsequent constructions of Ambonese identity. By using the ethnocultural 
symbols of common ancestry, territorial homeland, language and religion, FKM elites 
not only articulated and promoted these pre-existing identities but reconstructed them 
in order to mobilise a new pan-Ambonese community. Thus, visions of an idealised 
Ambonese identity can be traced back to past myths of an ‘Alifuru’ nation of common 
ancestry but with a new goal of political independence based on the legal and moral 
principles of the RMS.   
 
                                                 
6 Horowitz, Deadly Ethnic Riot, pp.138-9. 
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Laskar Jihad provided an important basis for nationalist elites in Ambon to promote 
ideological constructions of ethnic identity. The changing politics of Ambonese 
nationalism from the construction of a non-separatist religious conflict to the 
construction of a racial conflict was heavily influenced by the tensions generated by 
the intervention of Laskar Jihad forces. The traumatic and brutal actions of such an 
external force allowed ethnic elites to offer a simple diagnosis of a complex pattern of 
interactions which were affecting Ambonese society in terrifying ways. Both the 
FKM and Ja’far Umar Thalib’s Laskar Jihad subsequently engaged in the 
contestation of the moral identity of the ‘Us’ and the ‘Other’ thereby modifying the 
reactive basis of an Ambonese ethnic riot into an internally-generated self-confidence 
focused on cultural revival and political autonomy.  
 
7.2   The Process Which Links Disruption to Ideologisation 
 
In order to analyse the transition from ethnic riot to ethnic nationalism, this thesis has 
focused on the process which links disruptions to ideologisation. It has been 
suggested in this thesis that social disruptions cause a shift from self-interested 
pragmatism towards political behaviour based on moralistic ethnonationalist 
ideologies. From this perspective, this thesis has sought to examine how ethnic and 
national identities were constructed during the conflict in Ambon in the course of 
social interactions on the island. The first insight of this approach has been that 
disruptions in Ambon caused insecure elites to seek new legitimisations in ideologies 
and caused disrupted masses to be responsive to these ideologies. The second insight 
has been that ethnic ideologies appealed to the masses because they offered security 
and moral authority within an idealised past.  
 
It has been explained in this thesis that disruptions are not related manifestations of 
appropriations by external interests where outsider’s constructions of identity provoke 
  226insider’s definitions of themselves. In this context, the emergence of Ambonese 
nationalism relates to a series of both internal and external disruptions which lead to 
stresses and insecurities that perpetuate a process of the reconstruction of identity 
within the community. This means that significant interactions between insiders and 
outsiders which bring about underlying insecurities or uncertainties of the ‘Us’ lead 
not only to a receptivity to an outsider’s depictions of the ‘Us’ but also lead to a 
reconstruction of the ‘Us’ as a distinct community of unique heritage and one that 
commands virtuous strength against an immoral and evil Other.  
 
Within the literature on nationalism, Anthony Smith’s ‘ethnosymbolism’ is useful in 
indicating that the appeal of nationalism derives from its adoption of ethnic myths, 
symbols and memories which generate a kind of ‘nostalgia’ for a superior way of 
life.
7 . The nationalist appeal, he argues, derives from the ethno-historical, religious 
and territorial heritages of an ethnic group which invoke presumed kinship and 
residency ties. However, there exists no full explanation of why claims to common 
descent and historical continuity are politicised by these activists and why they appeal 
to communities. If, as Smith indicates, these types of nationalist myths fulfil ‘intimate, 
internal functions for individuals in communities’, then there needs to be an 
explanation of how and why this occurs. Moreover, if some ethnic nationalist 
ideologies are formed on the basis of state failures in fulfilling developmental 
promises
8, there also needs to be further specification of the process whereby 
nationalist myths appeal to elites during such forms of societal disruption.  
This thesis specifies and illustrates the role of disruptions to show how individuals 
who feel disempowered in the face of disruptive social forces are more likely to be 
acquiescent to ideological formulas. It is suggested in this thesis that the weakening of 
communities by economic forces or political interventions firstly disrupts authority 
                                                 
7 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, p.183. 
8 Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, Polity Press: Cambridge, 2001, pp.141, 
143. 
  227structures thereby displacing elites who lose their authority and power and secondly, 
disrupts social cohesion by making individuals confused and insecure in the face of 
the complexities of modernity. In this way, elites seek to construct nationalist 
formulas in order to re-establish and re-legitimise their authority, while nationalist 
myths provide a sense of community for individuals seeking refuge in nationalist 
visions promising harmony and security.  
It has been shown that the disruption of traditional authority structures in Ambon as a 
result of Dutch political and economic interventions and the subsequent centralising 
movements of the Indonesian state during the Old and New Order periods resulted in 
the dislocation of the traditional raja and local bureaucrats. This meant that they were 
no longer able to wield the same power and authority over their community due to a 
weakening of their leadership roles. In these circumstances, these individuals could no 
longer appeal as responsive and legitimate patrons to the Ambonese community and 
thus ethnic nationalism became a new ideological base in which to re-establish 
legitimate authority. 
At the same time, ordinary village Ambonese found their lives and communities 
increasingly disrupted not only by the rapid changes in the traditional authority 
structures of their society but also by the social, political and economic chaos arising 
from rapid migration into the region, the exacerbation of existing poverty levels, and 
disparities between the developmental promises of state elites and their performance. 
Visions of nationalist harmony immediately appealed to the Ambonese through its 
offering of new myths of community beyond the traditional arena of the village. In 
this way, the nationalist ideology of the Ambonese endowed individuals with a sense 
of immemorial continuity embodied within an idealised past based on symbolism of 
ancestors, forefathers, homeland and national character. 
It is implicit within the thesis that disruption is the important catalyst by which 
individuals begin to seek a sense of security through identification with the 
  228community. The emotional power of nationalism has therefore been explained as the 
anxieties generated by profound social changes which make individuals more 
amenable to an ideology offering resolution to these feelings of isolation and fear. 
Hence, the construction of national categories emerges as an example of how 
individuals seek refuge from the complex ambiguities of modern life within myths of 
permanence and myths of sameness. 
 
Once it is understood that nationalism is based on these ideological myths constructed 
by displaced elites and appealing to societies which have been disrupted, then it 
becomes feasible to understand the changes in ethnic and national consciousness of 
the Ambonese. In this way, these conceptualisations of nationalism not only 
illuminate the contemporary dispute of secessionism in Ambon but also assist in 
reflecting on how these concepts may be developed.  
 
7.3   A Case of Counterposed Nationalisms which Developed in Response to 
Each Other 
 
It has been suggested in this thesis that the emotional power of nationalism may be 
explained as arising from the claim of nationalism that it can offer individuals 
identity, security and authority through symbolic associations with the family and 
home. While the assertion of myths of common ancestry and myths of a homeland 
community strengthen the psychological appeal of nationalism, there are potential 
tensions which can threaten to undermine the appeal of nationalism. As demonstrated 
in this thesis, nationalism can manifest itself in situations of conflict and rivalry which 
threaten to generate new insecurities and uncertainties. The tensions of nationalist 
politics in Ambon have therefore been clashes between two ideologies which were 
counterposed and developed in response to each other. More specifically, these 
tensions emerged because of the collision between two competing kinship and 
homeland visions, each marginalising or demonising the other.  
  229The politics of nationalist confrontation in Ambon has been characterised by a sense 
of interplay between the two nationalist visions as each responded to each other’s 
changing ideological depictions of themselves and their enemy. The FKM’s 
employment of a religious language which depicted an Ambonese Christian identity 
counterposed to a ‘corrupted’ state and its Muslim agents, was developed in response 
to Ja’far Umar Thalib and his military assault on Ambon in June 2000. Thalib had 
portrayed the relationship between the Ambonese and Indonesian State in religious 
terms – as a crusade to uphold Indonesian/Muslim values in the face of a ‘traitorous’ 
Christian-led movement hostile to Islam and Indonesian Muslims. 
 
With the public affront of the FKM, Thalib’s religious symbolism gave way to a more 
overt anti-Christian symbolism in which he promoted the ‘Christian threat’ as a threat 
to both Indonesian Muslims and the Indonesian community as a whole. The national 
community was therefore defined as all Indonesian citizens where Islam represented 
the core of the Indonesian people. This was ideologically contrasted with the FKM 
who were portrayed as ‘political conspirators’ and were made synonymous with the 
separatist RMS movement of the 1950s. Thalib’s portrayal of the Christian ‘other’ 
was therefore reconstructed in ethnonationalist terms as the threat of political 
secessionism.   
 
The construction of the FKM as a Christian separatist movement which the State was 
obliged to condemn, generated the shift to a focus on the symbolism of race. As noted 
previously, the FKM’s ideology had been built around the symbol of religion which 
defined the Ambonese being in opposition to Islam and the perceived Islamisation of 
a ‘corrupt’ state. The call for Christian Ambonese had limited utility in unifying all 
Ambonese. As Thalib unfolded a history of ‘Christian conspiracy’, the marker of 
Ambonese identity shifted to a specific racial construction. Using myths of common 
ancestry of an ‘Alifuru’ race and a common homeland based on migration from the 
  230island of Seram, the FKM portrayed a community united by its ethnocultural 
sameness and forged together by perceived biological kinship ties.  
 
While Thalib continued his portrayal of the ‘seccessionist’ enemy through 
associations with the RMS, Ambonese nationalist identity shifted focus from a racial 
construction to a claim that the historical authenticity of Ambon granted a right to 
sovereign statehood. The FKM depicted that national community as part of a global 
community of ‘oppressed minorities’ with minority rights who were undergoing 
repression from the state and its counterparts such as the Laskar Jihad. This kind of 
politics which constructed ethnic identity by combining the language of traditional 
authenticity at least had the potential to challenge Thalib’s conceptualisation of the 
rights of the Indonesian state to repress human political organisation.  
 
As these two nationalist visions developed in response to each other’s ideological 
constructions, the tensions of nationalist politics emerged because of the clash 
between two counterposed visions employing competing symbols and myths of 
kinship and homeland. The nationalist claim is that the community is united by 
common kinship and both visions of community in Ambon portrayed themselves in 
this way through the language and imagery of family and home. At the same time, 
this thesis has shown that this claim is also denoted by two different types of 
nationalist myths which developed in Ambon; one that offered a sense of cultural 
sameness in its claim to common ancestry and one which offered a sense of 
permanency in a territory of common residence but with a core Islamic constituency. 
Both visions of community therefore offered two different types of membership 
whereby entry into one depended upon similarities of a common language and culture 
whereby the other referred to all Indonesian citizens who were perceived as forming 
the Islamic majority. 
 
  231The myth of common ancestry was employed by the Moluccan Sovereignty Front 
(FKM) to denote a community distinguished by contemporary similarities of 
traditional Ambonese culture. The Ambonese community was therefore depicted as 
having indigenous racial homogeneity that connected them directly to the ancestors of 
the indigenous Ambonese from the island of Seram. In this way, the FKM adopted 
and redefined the concept of the ‘Alifuru Nation’ from the traditionally negative 
association of a backward people to one that instead denoted positive pride in the 
contemporary cultural evidence of common kinship.  
 
Whereas the FKM stressed the imagery of a biological family and ancestral kin, the 
nationalism of the Ja’far Umar Thalib and the Laskar Jihad articulated a sense of 
nationalist affiliation based on the attachment to a public Indonesian culture and a 
core Islamic constituency. Thalib effectively drew upon a sense of evolutionary 
development by promoting myths from the past and employing a language of 
common ancestry to refer not to the community itself but rather to the homeland 
which they inhabited. This idea of common loyalty to the homeland implied the 
acquisition of ethical obligations which were identified with the ideas of historical 
inheritance and a common destiny to undertake the tasks of their forebears.  
 
Both competing visions demarcated the other as the external enemy threatening 
societal unity and whose removal was imperative. Ja’far Umar Thalib of the Laskar 
Jihad articulated a series of ideological constructions of the dispute as Christian 
secessionism propelled by the FKM and its Ambonese supporters. Whereas the FKM 
denounced the Indonesian State and its national institutions of which the Laskar Jihad 
claimed to act on their behalf. As a result of this, Ambonese ethnocultural nationalism 
of the FKM came to be seen as ethnic/religious domination, and the ethnonationalism 
of the Laskar Jihad came to be perceived as the centralising invasion of political 
autonomy.  
 
  232The structural basis of the conflict thus became embedded in the two constructed 
ideologies of the FKM and the Laskar Jihad which involved these incompatible 
nationalist myths of community and destiny.  As these constructions developed during 
the course of social and ideological interactions, the Ambonese engaged in a process 
of transacting and redefining identity. The suggestion is that these recent 
constructions have inhibited further flexibility in identity construction causing the 
Ambonese to reach a threshold in identity consciousness. While the conflict has 
abated somewhat, remnants of these constructions have remained embedded in 
Ambon as this thesis has demonstrated suggesting that this ‘sedimentation’ has been a 
way in which individuals deal with the insecurities caused by disruption. Similar 
processes have been discerned elsewhere with the ideological mindsets continued 
after the ‘formal’ ending of the disputes so as to inhibit real long term peace. This has 
been demonstrated by nationalist confrontation in Northern Ireland and Bosnia, for 
example, where there are clear adherences to adversative ethnocultural ideologies.  
 
7.4   A Contribution to Indonesian studies of Post-Soeharto Conflict and 
Violence 
 
This thesis offers insights which relate to Indonesia’s national integration problems in 
the post-Soeharto era through the examination of nationalist confrontation in Ambon. 
The events in Ambon represent a typical trajectory of Indonesian regional 
development and how the different political and economic relations between Jakarta 
and its periphery were defined from the colonial period to the present. It has been 
suggested that it was the disruptive impact of state interventions and economic forces 
on Ambonese society which engendered feelings of fear and insecurity and thence 
facilitated the rise of an ethnic nationalist vision. The politics of nationalist contention 
in Ambon has in this way become the politics of ideological confrontation which has 
been inherently resistant to compromise. 
 
  233The core of the thesis’ argument is that those societies who experience severe 
disruption to their local community and authority structures will be those societies 
who will most likely be the recipient of political behaviour characterised by 
perceptions of a Java-centric vision counterposed to ethnic minority claims of self-
determination.  Underlying this perception has been the Indonesian regime’s highly 
embedded centralised system which ‘reached down to every village’
9 and which 
fostered increasing impressions of colonialist-like repression and ethnocentralist 
favouritism. The dominant theme in Indonesian nationalist ideology has been the 
depiction of Indonesian history as that of a nation built around an ethnic Javanese 
core, and that the geographical and cultural diversity of Indonesia thereby necessitated 
the political centralisation by the Jakarta-based government. Outer Indonesia found 
that Jakarta exerted exploitative measures which generated a lack of regional 
economic development and cooperation between the centre and the periphery 
especially in resource-rich areas such as Aceh and West Papua.
10  
 
It is clear that economic and political marginalisation of the Indonesian peripheries 
was not enough to produce nationalist rebellion in all regions. Where ethnonationalist 
ideologies have taken most hold in Indonesia, such as Ambon, Aceh, and West Papua, 
the impact of disruptions from Indonesian state intervention and exploitation have 
been the most severe and intense. In particular, especially in terms of Aceh and 
Ambon, the disruption has also been the disruption of the conflict itself. The brutal 
actions of the Indonesian military in Aceh and the disruptive nature of outside 
interventions in Ambon assisted in promoting this ideologisation of ethnic identity 
and the widespread appeal of the mythical kinship community as a surrogate.  
 
                                                 
9 Schwartz, Nation, p.37. 
10 David Brown, ‘Why Independence? The Instrumental and Ideological Dimensions of Nationalism’, 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol.45, no. 2-3, 2004. pp277-96. 
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that it might independently be ethnic heterogeneity (primordialist) or over-
centralisation of power and resources (instrumentalist), which has caused Indonesian 
disunity. While there is sometimes the suggestion that ethnic communities in 
Indonesia may identify with the genetic family for some purposes in particular 
situations, it is clear that ethnic and national identities which depict themselves in the 
primordialist language of historical continuity might nevertheless also involve 
calculations of interest advantage. The most widespread argument is to suggest that 
nationalism develops as elites appeal not only to instinct but to community interests. 
Therefore nationalist politics is explained as rational responses to various catalysts 
such as political factionalism and failed government policies whereby demands for 
ethnic autonomy become a strategy to press for greater economic parity with the 
central government. From an instrumentalist perspective, such depictions of 
Indonesian political behaviour are useful in illuminating how nationalists can 
articulate and mobilise their ethnic identity in support of claims for resources and 
power in response to the erosion of the economic capabilities of the Indonesian state.  
 
Using this approach, it could be said that Ambonese ethnonationalists made the 
decision to demand independence as a way in which to promote their interests which 
had been most threatened by economic change and Indonesian political oppression. 
On this basis, the offer by the Indonesian state for greater power and resources would 
have appealed to Ambonese elites seeking to defend their economic status and 
indigenous Ambonese workers seeking at least in part to defend their interests against 
migrant workers. However, disillusionment with the failure of the Indonesian state to 
offer genuine concessionary measures invited a rejection of this offer accompanied by 
the misgivings of any attempt by a perceived Java-biased government to pacify their 
separatist demands.  
 
  235The trend in Ambon towards this type of political behaviour, with perceptions of a 
Java-centric vision counterposed to ethnic minority claims of self-determination, has 
invited an alternative form of analysis. The inference is that there is a shift from the 
politics of competing interests to the politics of absolutist confrontation as ethnic 
elites adopt stereotyped perceptions of the state as immoral. The case of Ambon is 
able to demonstrate the tendency of local elites to mobilise popular support by 
adopting anti-Indonesian and anti-Javanese rhetoric as an ideological construction of 
the repressive ‘Other.’ The Ambonese demand for seccession which continues to this 
day has thus been characterised by a nationalist ideology which has focused on 
Jakarta as the source of all disruption and which finds resonance with individuals as a 
result of the disruptive impact of globalisation and authoritarian rule. The implication 
here is that that a diminishing of disruptive activities may strengthen compromise 
solutions towards regional integration within a ‘modernised’ Indonesia. However, the 
ingrained nature of these ideological constructions of the ‘us’ and the ‘other’, make it 
a challenging task for Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s new President elect.     
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